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―It is not by augmenting the capital of the 
country, but by rendering a greater part of that 
capital active and productive than would 
otherwise be so, that the most judicious 
operations of banking can increase the industry of 
the country.‖ 
Adam Smith (1776) 
The Wealth of Nations 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The existence of banks as financial intermediaries and the functioning of the 
banking system are argued to be of great importance in determining a country‘s 
economic growth and stability. Governments and national institutions all over the world 
are aware of the important role played by financial institutions and impose several 
regulations on the banking sector. Remarkably, the existence of regulations constraining 
the action of banks may make the governance of these institutions different from non-
financial firms‘ corporate governance. In addition to being heavily regulated, banks are 
argued to be unique because they are highly leveraged and more opaque than non-
financial firms. 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
functioning of banks, by providing empirical evidence of how specific dimensions of 
bank activity are affected by internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
Precisely, three different essays are conducted in order to help explaining some features 
of banks‘ functioning. 
In the first essay, we offer evidence on the relationships of bank ownership 
concentration with both risk and performance, in the presence of broad bank regulations 
and other country-level conditions that shape banking industry. 
In the second essay, we help to characterize bank lending practices through the 
assessment of the relative roles of three broad bank regulations, namely, (i) capital 
requirements, (ii) official supervision and (iii) external private monitoring, on the 
determination of risk terms of loan contracts. 
In the third essay, we provide evidence of the effectiveness of two dimensions of 
market discipline of banks: first, the market monitoring of banks through equity 
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markets‘ price reactions to loan announcements, and second, the banks‘ responses to 
these market reactions in the direction of pursuing sound risk-taking practices. 
The results achieved by the three empirical essays are derived using samples 
containing information about banks located in a large set of countries, as well as 
measures of bank regulations and other country-level traits. The first essay uses a 
comprehensive sample of 4,681 bank-year observations of ownership and accounting 
information produced by a set of 795 large, medium and small commercial banks 
located in 47 countries, in the period from 1997 to 2007, to examine the influence of 
bank ownership structure, country-level bank regulations and investor protection laws 
on bank risk and performance, employing the so-called Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), which consists of techniques of dynamic panel data estimation. The 
second essay relies on a sample of 46,453 loans extended by 278 large commercial 
banks of 39 countries, during the period from 1998 to 2006, to perform an OLS 
regression analysis that helps to explain how spread and maturity of loan contracts are 
affected by bank regulations and their interactions with other country-level factors. The 
third essay employs event-study techniques to assess market reactions in stock prices of 
119 banks located in 35 countries to 1,354 loan announcements made in the 1998-2006 
period, and OLS regression analysis to explain how reactions are associated to a 
country‘s degree of external private monitoring of banks. 
The contributions of this thesis to the literature are summarized as follows: 
(I) Relationships between bank ownership, risk and performance: 
- Banks‘ ownership concentration and performance have a cubic relationship, 
supporting the theoretical hypotheses of effective monitoring at low levels of ownership 
concentration, expropriation or loss of managerial discretion at moderate ownership 
concentration, and high costs of expropriation at high levels of ownership concentration. 
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- Banks‘ ownership concentration and risk have a U-shaped relationship, 
supporting that shareholders‘ incentives to take risk prevail when their equity stake is 
above a threshold. 
- Capital regulations, bank competition and shareholders protection laws interact 
with ownership concentration to influence the performance of banks. 
(II) Effectiveness of bank regulations: 
- Capital regulations stringency is effective in simultaneously reducing the risk 
and improving the performance of banks. 
- The stringency of capital regulations reduces loan contracts‘ risk characteristics 
(spread and maturity) only above a threshold.  
- More powerful official supervision increases the risk of loan contracts, instead 
of reducing it. 
- Regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks complement capital 
requirements regulations as mechanisms that reduce the risk of lending. 
- A country‘s degree of financial development, legal enforcement and 
competition in the banking industry complement capital and private monitoring 
regulations to improve the risk characteristics of loan contracts. 
(III) Relationships between market discipline and bank lending: 
- Abnormal bank stock returns are significant on the days surrounding a bank 
loan announcement. Positive abnormal returns are larger and more frequent in countries 
with high private monitoring, while negative abnormal returns are lower and more 
frequent when the private monitoring is low. The evidence supports the idea that more 
regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks - e.g., regulatory requirements of 
information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, depositor protection, use of 
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subordinated debt, and discipline - improve the quality of market signals, and induce the 
pursuing of sound lending practices on the part of banks‘ managers. 
- The private monitoring of banks is especially important in countries with low 
enforced legal systems, poorly developed stock markets, low concentrated banking 
industry, and strong official bank supervision. 
The main conclusions achieved by this thesis are the following:  
(1) Banks behave in the same way as firms in general, facing similar agency 
problems and using similar corporate governance mechanisms.  
(2) Capital regulations have a beneficial role in attaining bank efficiency from 
both the systemic perspective of regulators, who seek to attain financial stability, and 
the perspective of the bank‘s shareholders, who want to improve performance. 
(3) There are complex interactions between the different types of bank 
regulations that try to influence the risk taking behaviour in banks´ lending policies. It is 
too simplistic to assume that these regulations are complements, as advocated by 
proponents of reinforcing pillars of Basel II. 
(4) Regulations that promote the external private monitoring of banks increase 
the sensitivity of market reactions on bank stocks‘ prices following banks‘ risk taking 
decisions. Thus, stock markets reward, through increasing bank equity value, good news 
in terms of sound bank lending, and induce, through market reactions, the pursuing of 
sound lending practices on the part of banks‘ managers. 
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RESUMEN 
 
La existencia de los bancos como intermediarios financieros y el funcionamiento 
del sistema bancario están considerados como de gran importancia para la 
determinación del crecimiento y de la estabilidad económica de un país. Atentos al 
papel importante que juegan las instituciones financieras para la economía, los 
gobiernos y otras instituciones nacionales en todo el mundo imponen una serie de 
regulaciones al sector bancario. En particular, la existencia de regulaciones que limitan 
la acción de los bancos puede hacer que su gobierno corporativo sea distinto del de las 
empresas no financieras. Además, los bancos son considerados empresas peculiares, no 
solo por estar intensamente regulados, sino también porque están en media más 
apalancados y son más opacos que los demás tipos de empresas.  
El objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es aportar conocimientos que contribuyan a un 
mejor entendimiento del funcionamiento de los bancos, proporcionando evidencia 
empírica de cómo determinadas dimensiones de la actividad bancaria se ven afectadas 
por mecanismos internos y externos de gobierno corporativo. En concreto, se llevan a 
cabo tres ensayos diferentes que contribuyen a explicar algunos aspectos de la actividad 
de los bancos. 
En el primer ensayo, se muestra evidencia de la relación entre el riesgo, el 
resultado de los bancos y su concentración de propiedad, incorporando en el análisis la 
presencia de regulaciones bancarias y otros factores a nivel de país que afectan a la 
industria bancaria. 
En el segundo ensayo, se ayuda a describir prácticas crediticias de los bancos 
mediante la evaluación de la importancia relativa de tres conjuntos de regulaciones 
bancarias como son: (i) los requerimientos de capital, (ii) la supervisión oficial y (iii) la 
xi 
 
supervisión por parte de los mercados financieros, en la determinación de las 
características de riesgo de los préstamos bancarios. 
El tercer ensayo muestra evidencia de la efectividad de dos dimensiones de la 
disciplina de mercado sobre los bancos. En primer lugar, la supervisión del mercado 
mostrada a través de las reacciones en los precios de las acciones de los bancos a los 
anuncios de préstamos a empresas. En segundo lugar, la propia respuesta de los bancos 
a las referidas reacciones del mercado, en el sentido de promover prácticas de riesgo 
responsables. 
Los resultados aportados en los tres ensayos empíricos son obtenidos usando 
muestras que contienen información de bancos localizados en un amplio conjunto de 
países, así como medidas de regulaciones bancarias y otras características a nivel de 
país. El primer ensayo utiliza una amplia muestra de 4.681 observaciones conteniendo 
información contable y de estructura de propiedad, generada por un conjunto de 795 
bancos comerciales localizados en 47 países, en el periodo de 1997 a 2007, para 
investigar la influencia de la concentración de la propiedad, de las regulaciones 
bancarias y del nivel de protección legal de los accionistas, en el riesgo y el resultado de 
los bancos. La metodología empleada consiste de la técnica de estimación de panel 
dinámico de datos llamada ―Generalized Method of Moments‖ (GMM). El segundo 
ensayo realiza análisis de regresiones del tipo ―Ordinary Least Square‖ (OLS) sobre 
una muestra de 46.453 préstamos concedidos por 278 bancos comerciales de 39 países, 
durante el periodo de 1998 a 2006, con objeto de explicar cómo la prima de riesgo y la 
duración (maturity) de los préstamos bancarios se ven afectados por regulaciones 
bancarias y sus interacciones con otros factores a nivel de país. El tercer ensayo utiliza 
técnicas de estudios de eventos para medir las reacciones de los mercados en los precios 
de las acciones de 119 bancos localizados en 35 países, a 1.354 anuncios de préstamos 
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hechos en el periodo de 1998 a 2006. Se utilizan, a su vez, técnicas de regresión 
estándar para explicar cómo las reacciones están asociadas a las regulaciones que 
promueven la supervisión de los bancos por parte del mercado. 
Las aportaciones que hace esta tesis a la literatura se pueden resumir en los 
siguientes puntos: 
(I) Conectadas con la relación entre propiedad, riesgo y rentabilidad 
- La concentración de propiedad y el resultado de los bancos poseen una relación 
cúbica. Esta relación se explica porque al incrementar la concentración de la propiedad, 
se reduce el atrincheramiento gerencial para bajos niveles de concentración; se 
incrementa la expropiación a los minoritarios para niveles medios, y se alinean los 
intereses de los diferentes accionistas para niveles altos de concentración. 
- La concentración de propiedad y el riesgo de los bancos tienen una relación 
cuadrática, confirmando la hipótesis de que por encima de un umbral de participación 
accionarial, los incentivos de los accionistas para corregir una situación de aversión al 
riesgo por parte de la gerencia predominan sobre los intereses de éstos últimos. 
- Existe una clara interacción entre la concentración de la propiedad y medidas 
de regulación bancaria tales como las restricciones de capital, la competencia bancaria y 
el nivel de protección legal de los accionistas. El resultado bancario se ve influido por la 
anterior interacción. 
(II) Relacionadas con la efectividad de las medidas de regulación bancaria 
- Las regulaciones sobre requerimientos de capital son efectivas 
simultáneamente en reducir el riesgo y mejorar el resultado de los bancos. 
- La intensidad en los requerimientos de capital reduce el riesgo sólo a partir de 
un determinado umbral. 
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- La regulación asociada a la mejora de la supervisión oficial de los bancos 
incrementa el riesgo en lugar de reducirlo. 
- La supervisión por parte de los mercados financieros sobre los bancos 
complementa la regulación sobre restricciones de capital como mecanismo para reducir 
el riesgo en la actividad crediticia de los bancos. 
- Los grados adecuados de desarrollo financiero, eficacia del sistema legal, y 
competencia en la industria bancaria de un país, son mecanismos que mejoran la 
efectividad de las regulaciones asociadas a los requerimientos de capital así como a la 
supervisión por parte de los mercados para reducir el riesgo de los préstamos bancarios. 
(III) Conectadas con la relación entre disciplina de mercado y política 
crediticia de los bancos 
- Los retornos anormales de las acciones de los bancos son significativos en los 
días próximos a un anuncio de préstamo, siendo que los retornos positivos son mayores 
y más frecuentes en países donde las regulaciones que promueven la supervisión del 
mercado sobre los bancos están más desarrolladas, mientras que los retornos negativos 
son mayores y más frecuentes donde tales regulaciones son poco desarrolladas. Esto 
ratifica la idea de que más regulaciones que promuevan la supervisión del mercado 
sobre los bancos (tales como divulgación obligatoria de estados contables y otras 
informaciones, auditoría externa, protección de depositantes, deuda subordinada y 
disciplina) mejorarían la calidad de las señales de mercado, e inducirían a los gerentes 
de los bancos a que implementasen mejores prácticas crediticias. 
- La supervisión del mercado sobre los bancos es especialmente importante en 
países con sistemas legales o mercados de acciones poco desarrollados, baja 
concentración de la industria bancaria, o fuerte supervisión oficial sobre los bancos. 
Por tanto, de esta tesis podemos extraer las siguientes conclusiones principales: 
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(1) Los bancos se comportan de forma similar a las empresas no financieras, ya 
que responden a los mismos problemas de agencia y tienen mecanismos de gobierno 
corporativo semejantes. 
(2) Las regulaciones sobre restricciones de capital tienen un papel beneficioso en 
la obtención de la eficiencia bancaria, tanto desde la perspectiva sistémica del regulador, 
que busca la estabilidad financiera, como desde la perspectiva individual de los 
accionistas de los bancos, que buscan la mejora del resultado. 
(3) Ocurren interacciones complejas entre las regulaciones bancarias, más allá de 
las simples complementariedades defendidas por los proponentes de los tres pilares de 
Basilea II. 
(4) Las regulaciones que estimulan la supervisión externa del mercado sobre los 
bancos hacen más sensibles las reacciones en los precios de las acciones de los bancos 
ante cambios en la política bancaria que supongan variaciones en el riesgo bancario. De 
esta forma, dichas regulaciones recompensan mediante ganancias de capital las buenas 
noticias relacionadas con la actividad crediticia de los bancos, e inducen, a través de las 
reacciones en los precios de las acciones, a la realización de buenas prácticas crediticias. 
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Chapter One 
 
General Introduction 
 
 The existence of banks as financial intermediaries and the functioning of the 
banking system are argued to be of great importance in determining a country‘s 
economic growth and stability (Allen and Gale, 2000; Levine, 2006). Governments and 
national institutions all over the world are aware of the important role played by 
financial institutions and impose several regulations on the banking sector. More 
formally, Santos (2001) summarizes that the need for bank regulations is grounded on 
two basic reasons: first, the risk of a systemic crisis that would spread along all the 
economy; second, the inability of depositors to monitor banks.  
 Despite the substantial regulation that has been imposed on the banking industry, 
financial firms have received little research effort on key aspects of their functioning. 
For instance, John and Qian (2003) observe that, although an increasing literature has 
examined various aspects of the corporate governance of manufacturing firms in the 
United States and abroad, the corporate governance of banks and financial institutions 
has received relatively less focus. In the same line, Gorton and Whinton (2003) verified 
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that corporate governance issues in financial intermediaries and the intersection of 
governance and alleged incentives for moral hazard have yet to be fully explored. In 
addition, more research is needed on how legal, regulatory, and supervisory policies 
influence the governance of banks, according to Levine (2003). 
Remarkably, the existence of regulations constraining the action of banks may 
make the corporate governance of these institutions different from non-financial firms. 
However, the debate whether banks are different from non-financial firms is far from 
conclusive and goes back to Fama (1985)‘s famous question: “What’s different about 
banks?”. On the one hand, some authors (Macey and O‘Hara, 2003; John and Qian, 
2003; Levine, 2003) argue that banks are different because they are heavily regulated, 
highly levered and more opaque than non-financial firms. On the other hand, authors 
like Caprio et al (2007) find that ―the same core corporate control mechanisms that 
influence the governance of non-financial firms also influence bank operations.‖. 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
functioning of banks, by providing empirical evidence of how specific dimensions of 
bank activity are affected by internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
Specifically, three different essays are conducted in order to help explain banks‘ 
outcomes. In the first one, we offer evidence that better characterizes banks when 
compared to non-financial firms, by studying the influence of ownership concentration 
on both the risk and performance of banks, in the presence of broad bank regulations 
and other country-level conditions that shape bank industry. In the second one, we help 
to characterize bank lending practices through the assessment of the relative importance 
that three different types of broad bank regulations (capital requirements, official 
supervision and external private monitoring) have on the determination of loan contracts 
terms (spread and maturity). In the third essay, we provide evidence of the market 
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monitoring of banks through equity markets‘ price reactions to loan announcements, as 
well as evidence of banks‘ responses to these market reactions in the direction of 
pursuing sound risk-taking practices. A general overview of each of these essays, which 
are presented in Chapters 2 through 4, and discussion of the overall conclusions that can 
be drawn from the thesis are presented bellow. 
In the first essay, that corresponds to Chapter 2, we shed new light to the debate 
whether banks are different or not from non-financial firms by analyzing the connection 
of banks‘ ownership structure with both risk and performance. We derive four empirical 
hypotheses to be tested, taking as the starting point the traditional risk shifting 
theoretical hypothesis, according to which shareholders in a limited liability firm have 
incentives to increase risk (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Esty, 1998). Then, we incorporate 
theoretical predictions from agency theory stating how the risk and performance of 
firms are affected by  conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and conflicts of interest  between controlling and minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Faccio and Stolin, 2006). Our hypotheses also 
accommodate the prediction of Burkart et al. (1997), who argue that excessive 
monitoring can result in the loss of managerial discretion and this may hinder banks‘ 
performance and optimal risk levels. We also take into account the idea that 
expropriation in general is costly (Burkart et al., 1998), and this inhibits expropriation 
by controlling shareholders for highly concentrated ownership structures. Finally, we 
allow for the influence of bank regulations and shareholders‘ protection laws and their 
interactions with ownership concentration on banks‘ risk and performance, to derive 
some contentions that rely on authors like Shleifer and Wolfenzon, (2002) John et al. 
(2000); Caprio et al., (2007), Claessens et al. (2000) and La Porta et al., (2002). To test 
our hypotheses, we make use of a sample of 4,681 bank-year observations of ownership 
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and accounting information produced by a set of 795 commercial banks located in 47 
countries, in the period from 1997 to 2007. This database allows the use of dynamic 
panel data estimation techniques to control for endogeneity problems that emerge 
naturally in the ownership-performance analysis (Coles et al., 2006, 2007). We perform 
the analysis employing the so-called Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The estimation techniques used in the analysis, as well as the 
comprehensiveness of our sample, which includes not only large, but also medium and 
small commercial banks across a large set of countries observed in a 11-year period, is a 
distinctive feature of our study in comparison with others like Laeven and Levine 
(2006) and Caprio et al. (2007).  
In the context of the heavy regulations imposed on the banking industry all over 
the world, which is argued to differentiate banks from non-financial firms, Chapter 3 is 
devoted to examine how diverse regulations grouped in three broad concepts, namely 
capital requirements, official supervision and private monitoring, influence the risk 
characteristics of syndicated loan contracts (spread and maturity). There are three 
important motivations for undertaking this study: (i) The lack of consensus of the 
theoretical and empirical research on the effects of capital regulations on bank solvency 
and risk taking (VanHoose, 2006); (ii) the scarcity of evidence on the effects of 
supervision on bank lending and risk taking, and (iii) the little research effort dedicated 
to analyze joint interactions among the three regulatory mechanisms and to develop the 
second and third pillars of Basel II Capital Accord (Basel Committee, 2004).  
The analysis of Chapter 3 builds on the empirical work of Barth et al (2006), 
who seek to achieve a better understanding of the forces influencing bank regulatory 
and supervisory choices. However, besides having a much more limited scope than that 
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study, our approach differs from their country-level approach by using transaction-level 
data across countries. Our study relies on the cross-country surveys on bank regulation 
and supervision performed by Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008) as its source of data on 
bank regulations. We use the broad indices proposed by those same authors (Barth et 
al., 2006, chapter 4) to measure the country‘s degree of adoption of bank regulations 
regarding capital requirements, official supervision and private monitoring. The 
adoption of these indices is intended to reflect the widely consensual Basel II‘s general 
framework of structuring bank regulation and supervision in the three pillars of risk-
based capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline. The indices are 
merged to a sample of 46,453 loans extended by 278 large commercial banks of 39 
countries, during the period from 1998 to 2006. Then, we perform OLS regression 
analysis in order to help explaining how spread and maturity of loan contracts are 
affected by bank regulations. Furthermore, given the comprehensiveness of our dataset, 
we are able to extend our analysis by examining complementarities and interactions 
between bank regulatory mechanisms themselves and between these and country factors 
such as the levels of bank competition, financial development and legal enforcement.  
It is a well established result that capital markets may play a role in shaping the 
risk-taking behaviour of banks. Bank regulatory authorities and committees on bank 
regulation around the world (e.g. the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and the US 
and European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees) are aware of this issue and 
recommend the implementation of appropriate mechanisms promoting bank 
transparency and market discipline on banks. Nevertheless, there is not a consensus on 
the appropriate degree of reliance that should be placed on market discipline as a bank 
supervisory mechanism. In fact, Flannery (2001) remarks that the available empirical 
work is inconclusive on whether the market does a better or a worse job than the 
Chapter One: General Introduction 
6 
 
regulator in assessing bank quality. Chapter 4 concentrates on the market discipline 
dimension of bank regulation to offer empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the two 
stages that drive the process of market discipline of banks, in a context of equity 
markets reactions to bank loan announcements.  
According to the frameworks of Flannery (2001) and Hamalainen et al. (2005), 
the first stage of market discipline is the ―market monitoring‖ or the ―recognition 
phase‖, and refers to the situation where ‗investors accurately evaluate changes in a 
firm‘s condition and incorporate those assessments promptly into security prices‘ 
(Flannery, 2001, p. 110). The second stage is referred as ―market influence‖ or the 
―control phase‖, and consists of ‗the process by which outside claimants influence a 
firm‘s actions‘ (Flannery, 2001, p. 110). We adhere to this two-stage process of market 
discipline and seek to make a contribution to the literature by analyzing our results in 
the light of this framework. The literature has identified four necessary conditions for 
market discipline to occur, according to Hamalainen et al. (2005). Three conditions are 
associated to the recognition phase: first one is the existence of unrestricted and 
efficient capital markets; second condition refers to the public disclosure of bank capital 
structure and risk exposures; third condition states that market participants must not 
believe that the borrower would be bailed out in the case of an actual or impending 
default. The remaining condition refers to the control phase, and it is simply that banks 
must respond to market signals produced in the recognition phase, in a manner 
consistent with their solvency.  
Chapter 4 employs event-study techniques to assess market reactions in stock 
prices of 119 banks located in 35 countries to 1,354 loan announcements made in the 
1998-2006 period. Then, we employ OLS regression analysis to explain how price 
reactions to loan announcements are conditioned by the country‘s degree of adoption of 
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regulations that promote the external private monitoring of banks. The variable 
measuring such degree is an index proposed by Barth et al. (2006) that assesses the 
existence of regulatory requirements of information and accounting disclosure, external 
auditing, depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and discipline. Other country-
level and bank-level variables are added to the bank regulations and loan-level 
information to construct a cross-country setting  appropriate to the assessment of the 
role of private monitoring regulations on abnormal returns . 
Among the conclusions achieved by the empirical essays, we emphasize the 
following: (1) banks behave in the same way as firms in general, as they face similar 
agency problems and use similar corporate governance mechanisms to solve them; (2) 
capital regulations, bank competition and shareholders protection laws interact with 
ownership concentration to influence the performance of banks; (3) capital regulations 
have a beneficial role in attaining bank efficiency, both from the systemic perspective of 
regulators, who seek to attain financial stability, and the perspective of shareholders, 
who want to improve performance; (4) adequate levels of financial development, law 
enforcement, and competition in the banking industry, are mechanisms that make 
capital regulations more effective in reducing the risk of loan contracts; (5) although, by 
itself, external private monitoring on banks increases the risk of loan contracts, its 
interaction with both capital regulations stringency and banking competition highlights 
its importance as a complementary mechanism in the reduction of the risk of lending; 
(6) the different types of bank regulations aimed at influencing the risk taking behaviour 
of banks are not simple complements, as advocated by proponents of reinforcing pillars 
of Basel II, and there are complex interactions among them; (7) bank regulations that 
promote the external private monitoring of banks – e.g., regulatory requirements of 
information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, depositor protection, use of 
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subordinated debt, and discipline – play a role in influencing bank stock market 
reactions to banks‘ risk taking decisions; (8) stock markets react positively to good 
news related to sound bank lending, with intensity proportional to the degree of 
implementation of regulations that promote the private monitoring of banks; (9) 
regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks induce, through enhanced market 
reactions, the pursuing of sound lending practices on the part of banks‘ managers. 
Chapter 5 makes a general conclusion of this thesis, highlighting the main 
findings, contributions and implications achieved by the studies, as well as proposing 
lines for future research. 
Finally, despite the related issues covered by the three essays, we clarify that 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are independent studies, in the sense that each of them consists of a 
complete empirical research that conveys independent conclusions, and is conducted on 
its own specific setting, specially designed for its purposes. As consequence, each of 
these chapters can be read separately.  
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Banks’ Ownership Structure, Risk and Performance 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The study of risk and performance of banks is of great relevance, since banks‘ 
investment decisions are argued to influence economic growth and stability (Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Levine, 2006). Too little bank risk taking may hinder economic growth, 
whereas too much bank risk threatens economic stability. Hence, it makes sense for 
governments and institutions to regulate banks with the purpose of shaping and 
influencing bank risk taking and performance and attain economic growth and stability. 
Remarkably, the existence of regulations constraining the action of banks may 
make the governance of these institutions different from non-financial firms‘ corporate 
governance. However, the debate whether banks are different from non-financial firms 
is far from conclusive and goes back to Fama (1985)‘s famous question regarding 
“what’s different about banks?”. On the one hand, some authors (Macey and O‘Hara, 
2003; John and Qian, 2003; Levine, 2003) argue that banks are different because they 
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are heavily regulated, highly levered and more opaque than non-financial firms. On the 
other hand, authors like Caprio et al (2007) find that ―the same core corporate control 
mechanisms that influence the governance of non-financial firms also influence bank 
operations.‖. 
This chapter tries to shed new light to this debate by analyzing the connection 
between banks‘ ownership structure and risk as well as performance using a rich 
database of 795 banks from 47 different countries for the period from 1997 to 2007. 
This database allows the use of dynamic panel data estimation techniques to control for 
endogeneity problems that emerge naturally in the ownership-performance analysis 
(Coles et al., 2006, 2007). Specifically, we first search for empirical evidence of linear 
and/or non-linear effects of ownership concentration – measured through the main 
shareholder‘s equity holdings - on risk and performance of banks. Second, we examine 
the influence of country-specific shareholders protection laws and bank regulations on 
risk and performance of banks.  
Concerning bank performance, we do find evidence of a cubic relationship 
between ownership concentration and bank performance (positive, negative and 
positive). Such evidence is supportive of theoretical hypotheses of monitoring effect at 
low ownership concentration, expropriation or loss of managerial discretion effects 
from moderate to high ownership concentration, and high costs (and absence) of 
expropriation at very high concentrated ownership. A similar cubic relationship between 
performance and insider ownership was found by Morck et al. (1988) for non-financial 
firms. 
Concerning bank risk taking, we find evidence of a U-shaped relationship 
between earnings volatility and ownership concentration. For main shareholder‘s equity 
stakes of 25% and above, bank risk taking increases with ownership concentration. This 
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finding supports the argument that shareholder‘s incentive to take risk prevails when her 
equity stake in the bank is above a threshold. Also, we found a positive linear effect of 
ownership concentration on risk for small banks. Unlike Laeven and Levine (2006), we 
did not find the same evidence for large banks. Still regarding bank risk taking, we find 
that ownership concentration increases the risk of banks located in countries where legal 
protection of shareholders is more developed.  
Regarding shareholders‘ protection laws affecting bank performance, we find 
that they interact with ownership concentration to influence the performance of banks 
with dispersed ownership structure. For this sub-sample of banks, our evidence is that 
increasing ownership concentration is more important to increase bank performance 
when protection of shareholders is low. Such evidence is very similar to the one Caprio 
et al. (2007) find for large banks. Turning to bank regulations, we find that ownership 
concentration is more important to increase the performance of banks with dispersed 
ownership structures when either capital regulations are stricter or competition in the 
bank industry is stronger.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the most 
relevant literature akin to the objectives of this work. Section 2.3 describes the sample, 
variables and empirical models to be tested. The methodology employed in the 
empirical analysis performed is in Section 2.4. The results obtained are presented in 
Section 2.5. In the final section of the chapter, we lay out the main conclusions of this 
research and discuss the significance of our results. 
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2.2  Theoretical context 
 
To examine banks‘ risk taking behaviour, we first rely on the traditional risk 
shifting theoretical hypothesis, by which shareholders in a limited liability firm have 
incentives to increase risk (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Esty, 1998), as they can experience 
unlimited gains, but no losses. Therefore, if managers act in the interests of 
shareholders, in principle they should seek to maximize shareholders‘ wealth, by 
choosing to undertake the riskier projects available. Of course, such risk shifting 
behaviour is detrimental to creditors‘ interests, unless these are able to effectively 
monitor managers. In the case of banks, the study of risk shifting is of special relevance, 
as banks are in general higher levered when compared to non financial firms, which 
means banks‘ shareholders may experience incentives to shift high levels of risk. 
According to agency theory, risk taking behaviour is influenced by conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Instead of maximizing 
shareholders‘ wealth, managers can pursue their own interests, by enjoying private 
benefits of control or preserving specific acquired human capital (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Kane, 1985). In addition, managers bear the specific risk of the firms they 
manage, and for such they are expected to be more risk averse than shareholders with a 
diversified investment portfolio. Thus, if no mechanisms to align the interests of 
managers to the ones of shareholders are present, such as executive compensation 
contracts or effectively monitoring of managerial actions, managers would have 
incentives to take low levels of risk. Therefore, a firm controlled or actively monitored 
by shareholders is expected to take more risk than a firm where managers‘ individual 
interests prevail. By these same arguments, a shareholder that participates in the 
management of the firm would experience opposite risk incentives, suggesting that such 
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shareholder would have an attitude to take less risk than a shareholder not involved in 
management. Another mechanism to solve the conflict of interests between shareholders 
and managers is the equity ownership by managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). By such mechanism, interests of shareholders and managers 
converge as managers‘ shareholdings increases, resulting in more risk taking. However, 
increasing levels of managers‘ equity ownership may provide them with voting power 
sufficient to pursue personal objectives, resulting in less risk taking, expropriation of 
shareholders, and entrenchment. 
Incentives to risk taking are also influenced by ownership structure, investor 
protection laws and bank regulations. Conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders are argued to be more important in firms with dispersed ownership 
structures, as coordination problem hinders effectively monitoring of managerial actions 
by small shareholders, who have to rely on external monitoring through the market for 
corporate control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1988). By contrast, conflicts between 
managers and shareholders are expected to be less important in firms with concentrated 
ownership structure, as controlling shareholders have strong incentives to monitor 
managers, and even replace them in the case of poor performance (Franks et al, 2001). 
Because shareholders‘ interests are likely to prevail in firms in which the ownership 
concentration is high enough, we expect these firms take more risk than ones with a 
dispersed ownership structure. The considerations made by Burkart et al. (1997), 
however, point that as the monitoring effort exerted by a large shareholder increases, 
managerial initiative to pursue new investment opportunities decreases. In other words, 
too much monitoring reduces managers‘ initiative to seek firm-specific investments, 
which is detrimental to firm value. This can be translated in terms of less risk taking by 
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managers at least when ownership concentration is not too high. These arguments lead 
to the first hypothesis to be tested in this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Bank risk taking is low at low to moderate levels of ownership 
concentration, when managers’ interests prevail and/or there is loss of managerial 
discretion, and bank risk taking increases with levels of ownership concentration above 
the threshold where shareholders’ interests prevail. 
 
In addition, investor protection laws and banking regulations can also play a role 
in shaping the risk taking attitude of banks. Some studies point that a legal system that 
protect small shareholders can substitute for the existence of a large shareholder that 
monitors management (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; John et al., 2000; Caprio et al., 
2007). Therefore, the role of a large shareholder in increasing risk taking by managers is 
expected to be more important in countries without effective legal protection of 
shareholders. Finally, banking regulations aimed to avoid financial instability can affect 
banks‘ risk taking behaviour. Despite the considerable empirical research on how 
ownership structure and other corporate governance factors affect financial institutions‘ 
risk taking behaviour
1
, evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and 
bank risk in the presence of other country-level governance mechanisms is scarce. Only 
the study of Laeven and Levine (2006) analyzes the relationship between bank risk 
taking and ownership structure, legal protection of investors and banking regulations 
across a large set of countries. Thus, our second hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
 
                                                          
1
 Saunders et al. (1990); Anderson and Fraser (2000), Brewer and Saidenberg (1996), Chen et al. (1998), 
Demsetz et al. (1996) Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Knopf and Teall, 1996; Cebenoyan et al. (1999), 
Gorton and Rosen (1995), Sullivan and Spong (1998, 2007). 
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Hypothesis 2: The relationship between ownership concentration and risk is 
reinforced if the country’s levels of shareholder legal protection, banking regulations 
promoting financial stability, or other country governance mechanisms are 
underdeveloped. 
 
The second element for evaluating bank‘s efficiency is its performance. Then, it 
is also of interest to understand how banks‘ performance is related with ownership 
structure, legal investor protection and bank regulations. Such issue, although linked to 
the previous risk taking discussion, deserves a separate investigation, as it may provide 
conclusions regarding bank corporate finance efficiency. There is little empirical 
evidence on the issue, contrasting with the extensive research available on the 
relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure of non financial 
firms (for a review, see Miguel et al., 2004). As previously argued, monitoring of 
managerial actions is difficult in a firm with dispersed ownership structure. On the 
contrary, a concentrated ownership structure providing effective monitoring in principle 
is expected to enhance firm performance. However, another potential conflict of 
interests arises in firms with concentrated ownership, as the controlling shareholders 
may engage in activities that expropriate minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Faccio and Stolin, 2006). Therefore, concentration of ownership may also have a 
negative impact on corporate performance, due to expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders. Thus, these theoretical hypotheses of 
monitoring and expropriation have opposite predictions regarding the relationship 
between ownership concentration and performance. In their model for the role of large 
shareholders, Burkart et al. (1997) challenge the view that monitoring is purely 
beneficial, by describing a trade-off between the benefits of monitoring and the ones of 
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managerial discretion. As previously stated, the excess of monitoring may be 
detrimental to firm value, as it reduces managers‘ initiative to seek firm-specific 
investments. They propose the ownership structure as a commitment device to delegate 
a certain degree of control to management. The mentioned theories suggest that a non 
linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is possible. 
In fact, Miguel et al (2004) predict and find empirical evidence of a quadratic 
relationship, in which performance (firm value) increases at low levels of ownership 
concentration (due to the monitoring effect), and decreases at high levels (as a result of 
the expropriation effect). However, relying also on the theoretical argument that 
expropriation in general is costly (Burkart et al., 1998), we should expect less severe 
expropriation in a high concentrated ownership structure. Therefore, a cubic relationship 
between ownership concentration and performance is possible. We propose the 
following hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Bank performance increases with ownership concentration at low 
levels of concentration due to effective monitoring by shareholders, decreases at 
intermediate levels of concentration due to expropriation of minority shareholders 
and/or less managerial discretion, and increases at high levels of concentration due to 
disincentives to internalize high costs of expropriation.  
 
According to Miguel et al. (2004), there is no previous empirical evidence of the 
proposed hypothesis. Performance or firm value is also argued to increase in the 
presence of strong shareholder protection laws aimed to avoid expropriation by 
controlling owners (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002). Therefore, the 
effectiveness of shareholder protection laws affects the relationship between ownership 
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structure and performance. The unique characteristics of banks, however, may interfere 
in such relationship, as argued by Caprio et al. (2007). First, due to the higher opacity 
and complexity of banks (Morgan, 2002), investor protection laws alone may not 
provide effective protection to small shareholders. Second, heavy regulations imposed 
on banks may substitute for, or interfere with investor protection laws, or make these 
latter superfluous. As a consequence, it is not clear that we should expect a positive 
impact of investor protection laws on banks‘ performance and valuation, as it is the case 
for non financial firms. In addition, given the uniqueness of banks, regulations 
themselves may interfere in the relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance, rendering banks different from non-financial firms. In principle, the focus 
of bank regulations is to attain financial stability, but the issue of whether bank 
efficiency is also improved as a consequence of bank regulations is important. Finally, 
we can expect that other country level mechanisms such as competition in the banking 
industry may interact with, complement or substitute ownership concentration in 
inducing banks‘ managers to attain performance. In order to investigate the influence of 
banks‘ peculiarities on performance, we propose a last hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The country’s levels of implementation of legal protection of 
shareholders, bank regulations and other governance mechanisms, strengthens the 
relationship between banks’ ownership structure and performance.  
 
With the purpose of providing a broader picture of how risk taking and 
expropriation incentives are shaping banks‘ performance, this chapter analyses how 
both risk and performance are affected by ownership concentration, investor protection 
laws and bank regulations. It has similarities with the studies of Laeven and Levine 
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(2006) and Caprio et al. (2007), both in purposes and in the cross country coverage of 
the databases used. However, it differs from those in three aspects. First, our database 
comprises not only large and often publicly listed banks, but also medium, small and 
not listed commercial banks around 47 countries out of the 49 ones for which La Porta 
et al. (1998) report data on legal protection of shareholders. As noticed by La Porta et 
al. (2002) and recognized by Caprio et al. (2007), focusing on largest firms makes it 
harder to find a relationship between investor protection and firm value because large 
corporations have alternative governance mechanisms for limiting expropriation of 
minority shareholders, such as public scrutiny, reputation-building, foreign 
shareholdings, and listing on international exchanges. Second, our risk analysis relies on 
the volatility of earnings as the relevant measure of risk, instead of Z-Score as in Laeven 
and Levine (2006). Our belief is that Z-Score is rather a measure of stability, which may 
not convey a correct picture of bank risk taking behaviour. Last, the methodology used 
for both risk taking and performance analyses is based on panel data. More specifically, 
we perform dynamic panel data estimations through the Generalized Method of 
Moments. We believe that panel data analysis is able to control for omitted variables 
and endogeneity, an important issue when jointly analyzing ownership structure and 
performance (Coles et al., 2007). 
 
2.3  Data description 
 
A sample of banks around the world is drawn from the Bankscope database. The 
countries selected to conduct the cross country panel data studies are the ones for which 
La Porta et al. (1998) report data on legal protection of shareholders (except New 
Zealand, as most banks there are owned by Australian banks). Such selection of 
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countries also allows comparability with the studies of Laeven and Levine (2006) and 
Caprio et al. (2007). Departing from an initial database of all commercial banks from 
the 48 selected countries, we collected available annual data on largest owner‘s 
shareholdings and on accounting numbers for the period from 1994 to 2007. To avoid 
duplicity of data, while keeping as many observations as possible, only unconsolidated 
statements were considered when collecting accounting data. To avoid redundant data, 
banks which the largest owner is another bank in the same country with at least 10% of 
shareholdings were excluded from the sample. Risk and performance variables were 
generated using standard deviations over a moving window of four years, which 
reduced the time dimension of the panel to the period from 1997 to 2007. Then, the 
sample was again reduced after generating other bank-specific variables and deleting 
multivariate outliers using the Hadi and Simonoff (1993) method. Finally, due to 
methodological issues (explained in Section 2.4), we excluded banks for which the 
ownership concentration variable has null variance and banks with less than 3 years of 
observations. We ended up with an unbalanced panel of 795 banks located in 47 
different countries that correspond to 4,681 bank-year observations distributed in the 
1997-2007 period
2
. All regressions in this study were performed on such panel, or on 
sub-samples of it. 
 
2.3.1 Dependent variables  
Risk 
Earnings Volatility: it is the risk measure from which the main results 
concerning bank risk taking are derived and it consists of the standard deviation of the 
                                                          
2
 Canada ended up with no observations, mainly because banks there experienced no volatility in largest 
shareholder‘s equity participation in the period of analysis. 
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ratio of total earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to average total assets, 
computed over a moving window of 4 years. By using data from years 1994 to 2007, we 
were able to compute earnings volatility for the 11-year period from 1997 to 2007. 
Source: calculations on data from Bankscope. 
Z-Score: it is a ratio where the numerator is the sum of return on assets and the 
capital to asset ratio, while the denominator is the standard deviation of return on assets 
computed over a moving window of 4 years (e. g., see more of Z-Score in Boyd et al., 
1993). Return on assets is the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. It is often referred as 
a measure of firm stability (or distance to default). Source: calculations on data from 
Bankscope. 
Performance 
Risk-Adjusted ROA: the bank‘s ratio of return on average assets before taxes to 
the standard deviation of this same return. The standard deviation is computed over a 
moving window of 4 years. Source: calculations on data from Bankscope. 
 
2.3.2 Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables used to explain bank risk and performance are grouped in 
two sets: bank specific and country specific variables. First set includes a measure of 
ownership concentration, given by the equity participation of the largest shareholder, 
and other controls at the bank level. Second set includes bank regulations and measures 
of legal and economic development of the countries where banks are established. Bank 
regulations variables are indices representing three broad regulations: capital 
requirements stringency, official supervisory power, and regulations promoting the 
private monitoring of banks. The rationale behind choosing these indices is to represent 
the concepts underlying the approach of three reinforcing pillars adopted by Basel II 
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(Basel, 2001), although such indices do not measure adherence to Basel II. They were 
constructed following Barth et al. (2006) for three periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 
2004-2007), using data from three surveys on bank regulation and supervision 
conducted by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2001, 2006, 2008). Additional country 
specific variables are the level of legal protection of shareholders, as well as the 
enforcement of law, and measures of the country‘s financial and economic 
development. Finally, two proxies of competition in each country‘s banking industry are 
included. A detailed description of each explanatory variable used in this study is 
provided in Appendix A. As required by the regression techniques used in this study, 
year dummies are also included as explanatory variables in all regressions. 
 
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in the selected panel 
(4,681 observations, 795 banks). We notice that ownership concentration variable has a 
mean of 58.72%, which is relatively high. Mean leverage is at 89.36%, a value that 
supports the view that banks are highly levered (Macey and O‘Hara, 2003; John and 
Qian, 2003; Levine, 2003).  
Table 2.2 shows mean values of bank-level variables by country, whereas Table 
2.3 shows means of country-specific variables. Given the diversity of countries included 
in the sample, Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 shows that heterogeneity observed on both 
dependent and explanatory variables across observations and countries is appropriate for 
conducting an econometric analysis. 
 
Chapter Two: Banks’ Ownership Structure, Risk and Performance 
22 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics  
(Panel with 4,681 observations of 795 banks around 47 countries, in the 1997-2007 period) 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Percentile 
10% 
Percentile 
25% 
Median Percentile 
75% 
Percentile 
90% 
Earnings Volatility (x102) 0.98 1.83 0.00 40.88 0.12 0.22 0.44 1.02 2.29 
Z-Score 38.99 118.83 -5.02 5583.42 3.88 9.21 20.40 41.40 75.55 
Risk-Adjusted ROA  3.16 3.83 -7.76 25.59 -0.13 0.56 2.40 4.47 7.60 
Own. Concentration (%) 58.72 35.56 0.01 100.00 5.01 27.30 57.76 99.21 100.00 
Revenue Growth 0.13 0.41 -2.01 2.46 -0.23 -0.06 0.09 0.27 0.56 
Total Assets (bn USD) 15.50 68.20 0.01 1680 0.13 0.35 1.35 6.87 29.00 
Leverage (%) 89.36 8.51 43.02 118.72 78.75 87.50 92.06 94.59 96.12 
State Owned 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital 6.42 1.67 2.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 
Official 10.80 2.35 4.00 14.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 13.00 14.00 
Private Monitoring 7.98 1.22 5.00 11.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 
Shareholders Rights 0.43 0.18 0.08 1.00 0.27 0.28 0.41 0.52 0.68 
Rule of Law 0.83 1.00 -1.67 2.04 -0.78 -0.04 1.30 1.68 1.86 
Log (GDP) 6.16 1.47 0.62 9.55 4.44 5.16 5.97 7.55 8.27 
Log (GDP per capita) 9.25 1.48 5.06 11.19 6.77 8.15 10.02 10.41 10.55 
GDP growth 3.06 3.04 -13.13 21.18 0.25 1.31 2.86 4.56 6.27 
Bank Concentration 0.59 0.19 0.21 1.00 0.35 0.42 0.59 0.71 0.86 
Number of Banks 542 1319 8 10,500 26 52 190 342 907 
Country-Average ROA 1.15 2.35 -26.76 23.39 -0.09 0.62 1.23 1.91 2.72 
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Table 2.2 – Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean of bank-specific variables) 
 
  Country Obs Banks 
Earnings 
Volatility 
(102) 
Risk-
Adjusted 
ROA 
Z-
Score 
Own. 
Conc. 
(%) 
Revenue 
Growth 
Total 
Assets (bn 
USD) 
Lever 
(%). 
State 
Owned 
1 ARGENTINA 168 35 3.58 0.95 11.23 72.89 0.17 1.13 83.62 0.20 
2 AUSTRALIA 80 10 0.27 5.66 36.30 20.66 0.13 54.60 93.51 0.00 
3 AUSTRIA 141 21 0.75 5.24 47.40 65.37 0.20 2.70 89.83 0.00 
4 BELGIUM 88 13 0.54 3.10 24.79 92.03 0.16 10.80 92.76 0.00 
5 BRAZIL 256 48 2.57 2.14 14.25 75.26 0.14 6.95 85.30 0.16 
6 CHILE 64 10 0.33 6.17 40.90 66.67 0.13 5.52 90.87 0.00 
7 COLOMBIA 74 12 1.48 1.57 15.31 73.35 0.09 2.13 86.96 0.07 
8 DENMARK 141 23 0.34 4.81 36.42 34.23 0.11 11.90 89.28 0.00 
9 ECUADOR 38 6 2.05 2.57 18.20 55.48 0.19 0.51 88.51 0.00 
10 EGYPT 113 17 0.53 3.48 38.80 54.49 0.11 1.72 91.16 0.00 
11 FINLAND 12 2 0.41 5.38 31.06 15.48 0.08 1.60 94.13 0.00 
12 FRANCE 414 75 0.81 3.15 47.24 77.91 0.12 25.30 87.74 0.00 
13 GERMANY 548 75 0.54 2.93 89.68 70.40 0.09 30.70 91.23 0.07 
14 GREECE 63 10 0.83 2.17 18.34 44.69 0.22 14.50 92.02 0.00 
15 HONG KONG 20 3 0.50 5.02 46.70 69.53 0.02 4.89 82.93 0.00 
16 INDIA 175 32 0.58 3.31 17.10 61.45 0.19 7.35 94.80 0.42 
17 INDONESIA 195 34 2.06 3.42 23.97 61.96 0.18 1.33 86.22 0.02 
18 IRELAND 34 5 0.13 4.41 53.60 94.60 0.17 6.23 91.52 0.00 
19 ISRAEL 56 8 0.22 3.14 36.91 46.85 0.10 19.50 92.71 0.14 
20 ITALY 29 8 0.39 2.69 39.06 72.75 0.17 12.30 87.00 0.00 
21 JAPAN 391 77 0.34 1.36 29.42 7.11 0.01 33.90 95.29 0.00 
22 JORDAN 20 4 0.43 6.16 42.99 20.95 0.16 6.09 91.03 0.00 
23 KENYA 44 8 0.97 4.38 37.60 41.16 0.04 0.14 84.30 0.07 
24 SOUTH KOREA 62 12 1.00 1.48 12.16 38.51 0.24 44.80 94.64 0.15 
25 MALAYSIA 44 7 0.47 4.59 30.63 50.72 0.19 10.90 90.73 0.00 
26 MEXICO 6 2 2.17 2.26 14.88 100.00 0.37 15.30 78.31 0.00 
27 NETHERLANDS 22 5 0.24 4.68 49.78 77.59 0.28 1.95 91.56 0.00 
28 NIGERIA 81 15 1.21 3.49 15.01 51.68 0.20 0.59 88.06 0.00 
29 NORWAY 31 5 0.33 2.31 18.69 49.68 0.11 10.20 92.47 0.00 
30 PAKISTAN 97 17 0.74 3.80 20.53 58.28 0.20 1.29 93.35 0.12 
31 PERU 28 6 0.70 3.14 27.46 77.66 0.17 3.13 89.94 0.00 
32 PHILIPPINES 57 10 0.76 2.90 35.39 42.86 0.08 1.36 85.69 0.00 
33 PORTUGAL 70 11 0.50 3.12 42.35 68.18 0.16 13.20 91.48 0.07 
34 SINGAPORE 14 2 0.32 5.39 41.87 14.05 0.07 38.80 88.78 0.00 
35 SOUTH AFRICA 10 1 1.53 -0.25 6.83 88.45 0.04 0.08 91.33 0.00 
36 SPAIN 202 33 0.65 3.82 54.91 69.67 0.11 13.20 88.75 0.00 
37 SRI LANKA 33 5 0.65 4.11 25.30 18.29 0.16 0.67 91.72 0.09 
38 SWEDEN 23 4 0.54 2.38 12.70 33.51 0.03 76.20 95.68 0.17 
39 SWITZERLAND 342 51 1.09 4.72 54.42 77.12 0.14 11.80 79.87 0.04 
40 TAIWAN 104 19 0.34 2.09 31.31 23.94 0.10 12.00 92.84 0.05 
41 THAILAND 75 12 1.21 0.30 6.50 51.73 0.24 11.90 93.51 0.21 
42 TURKEY 37 8 2.92 1.53 7.42 56.40 0.34 10.40 84.65 0.00 
43 UNITED KINGDOM 21 4 0.36 2.71 32.10 55.46 0.07 0.24 86.07 0.00 
44 URUGUAY 39 7 2.96 0.65 9.92 85.23 0.16 0.45 92.37 0.08 
45 USA 81 16 0.37 5.94 43.49 66.85 0.18 12.40 89.95 0.00 
46 VENEZUELA 28 5 2.12 3.20 12.32 42.94 0.24 2.57 86.92 0.00 
47 ZIMBABWE 10 2 2.73 4.61 10.72 40.52 0.63 0.67 91.41 0.00 
  Whole Sample 4,681 795 0.98 3.16 38.99 58.72 0.13 15.50 89.36 0.06 
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Table 2.3 – Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean of country-specific variables)  
 
 Country Capital Official 
Private 
Monit. 
Sh 
Rights 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Fin. 
Develop 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Bank 
Conc. 
(%) 
Number 
of 
Banks 
1 ARGENTINA 6.7 9.5 8.3 0.44 -0.49 8.31 5,340 41.6 80 
2 AUSTRALIA 6.4 11.2 9.7 0.79 1.76 9.70 24,989 77.5 52 
3 AUSTRIA 7.2 11.7 6.0 0.21 1.83 6.00 31,720 66.5 911 
4 BELGIUM 5.8 10.9 7.0 0.54 1.44 7.00 30,245 83.6 110 
5 BRAZIL 6.6 13.7 8.7 0.29 -0.34 8.68 4,074 44.3 180 
6 CHILE 5.8 10.8 7.4 0.63 1.17 7.39 5,822 52.4 27 
7 COLOMBIA 5.4 13.0 9.0 0.58 -0.80 9.00 2,571 38.7 27 
8 DENMARK 7.0 9.0 8.3 0.47 1.87 8.32 37,573 77.7 181 
9 ECUADOR 10.0 14.0 9.0 0.08 -0.73 9.00 2,028 60.1 23 
10 EGYPT 5.0 13.3 8.7 0.49 -0.06 8.70 1,402 57.0 41 
11 FINLAND 4.5 8.0 8.8 0.46 1.89 8.75 32,478 97.3 10 
12 FRANCE 6.0 7.4 6.5 0.38 1.34 6.50 29,237 55.7 365 
13 GERMANY 6.4 8.6 7.8 0.28 1.71 7.75 29,280 67.3 1,887 
14 GREECE 5.1 10.7 7.5 0.23 0.73 7.54 17,393 88.5 28 
15 HONGKONG 6.4 11.0 8.7 0.96 1.17 8.70 24,953 63.1 163 
16 INDIA 7.6 9.1 6.8 0.55 0.12 6.80 495 34.5 97 
17 INDONESIA 6.2 12.6 8.6 0.68 -0.86 8.60 1,091 54.6 145 
18 IRELAND 3.9 11.2 8.9 0.79 1.63 8.85 41,807 55.0 52 
19 ISRAEL 5.5 8.0 9.6 0.71 0.90 9.57 19,153 73.9 23 
20 ITALY 5.0 7.0 8.0 0.39 0.57 8.00 29,828 40.6 797 
21 JAPAN 6.1 12.0 9.0 0.48 1.35 9.00 33,739 37.6 234 
22 JORDAN 7.7 10.4 7.0 0.16 0.36 7.00 1,933 87.5 20 
23 KENYA 7.2 13.3 7.6 0.22 -1.02 7.61 463 56.9 46 
24 SOUTH KOREA  4.2 10.8 9.9 0.46 0.73 9.90 13,054 44.4 20 
25 MALAYSIA 4.2 11.8 9.0 0.95 0.47 9.00 4,645 42.7 29 
26 MEXICO 8.0 9.0 7.0 0.18 -0.47 7.00 5,530 61.1 52 
27 NETHERLANDS 5.3 6.5 8.6 0.21 1.75 8.64 34,717 70.5 447 
28 NIGERIA 7.9 12.0 7.4 0.52 -1.38 7.36 450 39.8 75 
29 NORWAY 6.9 8.7 7.3 0.44 1.93 7.29 46,621 91.9 15 
30 PAKISTAN 7.6 13.2 8.2 0.41 -0.82 8.21 572 56.4 38 
31 PERU 4.3 12.0 7.0 0.41 -0.66 7.00 2,716 73.8 13 
32 PHILIPPINES 5.8 11.4 8.1 0.24 -0.50 8.14 1,053 72.4 44 
33 PORTUGAL 7.0 13.7 6.9 0.49 1.16 6.89 14,071 79.8 59 
34 SINGAPORE 7.1 8.7 8.9 1.00 1.60 8.86 23,163 91.6 127 
35 SOUTHAFRICA 8.5 7.0 9.1 0.81 0.15 9.10 3,901 86.4 49 
36 SPAIN 9.6 9.6 8.3 0.37 1.26 8.29 19,316 74.1 287 
37 SRILANKA 6.3 8.2 8.3 0.41 0.02 8.30 1,017 66.8 24 
38 SWEDEN 3.0 6.4 6.7 0.34 1.82 6.65 32,585 95.5 25 
39 SWITZERLAND 6.4 13.7 7.6 0.27 1.98 7.64 43,711 85.8 369 
40 TAIWAN 5.5 11.0 8.2 0.56 0.85 8.23 13,830 27.7 39 
41 THAILAND 5.6 9.6 8.0 0.85 0.22 7.96 2,256 48.6 27 
42 TURKEY 5.8 13.7 7.8 0.43 0.01 7.78 5,870 71.5 53 
43 UNITED KINGDOM 6.6 9.9 9.8 0.93 1.73 9.76 31,769 58.4 386 
44 URUGUAY 6.0 12.4 9.0 0.17 0.50 9.00 5,817 50.8 19 
45 USA 6.7 13.0 9.3 0.65 1.60 9.31 37,503 24.5 8,740 
46 VENEZUELA 3.7 12.3 5.3 0.09 -1.05 5.25 4,701 41.5 19 
47 ZIMBABWE 5.3 13.8 9.0 0.44 -1.22 9.00 354 69.7 16 
 WholeSample 6.2 10.7 8.1 0.48 0.58 8.11 16,103 62.5 350 
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Table 2.4 contains the matrix of correlations between the variables. Regarding 
dependent variables, we first observe that risk variables of Earnings Volatility and Z-
Score have a negative correlation of 9%. Although a negative correlation between these 
variables was expected, its value is not as high as one could expect, which highlights the 
difference in approaches of measuring bank risk through earnings volatility or distance 
to default (Z-Score). It is remarkable the important negative correlations of Earnings 
Volatility with both Size and Leverage. It suggests that lower risk is associated with 
larger banks, which seems reasonable. Table 2.4 also shows that higher levered banks 
are associated with lower risk, which in principle is unexpected. However, from a 
reverse causality perspective, it is reasonable that sound banks can afford more 
leveraged financial structure. On the other hand, leverage does not appear significantly 
correlated with bank performance. Also remarkable are the important negative 
correlations of Earnings Volatility with Rule of Law, Financial Development and 
Log(GDP per capita), together with the positive correlations of these latter with 
performance measured by Risk-Adjusted ROA, suggesting that banks in more legally 
and economically developed countries experience lower risk and better performance. 
Concerning competition in the banking industry, negative correlations of Earnings 
Volatility, and positive correlations of Risk-Adjusted ROA with both Bank 
Concentration and Log(Number of Banks) in principle are ambiguous. However, these 
proxies for competition reveal a very small and positive correlation of 3%, indicating 
that a regression analysis is necessary to clearly identify the relationship between these 
variables. Finally, Shareholders Rights correlates negatively with Earnings Volatility 
but has no correlation with performance. 
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Table 2.4 – Correlation Matrix (Panel with 4,681 observations of 795 banks located in 47 countries, in the 1997-2007 period) 
 
 Earn. 
Volat. 
Z-
Score 
Risk-
Adj. 
ROA 
Own. 
Conc. 
Reven. 
Growth 
Size Lever. Shar. 
Rights 
Capital Official Private 
Monit. 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Fin. 
Devel. 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Bank 
Conc. 
Log 
Number 
Banks 
GDP 
Growth 
Earnings Volatility 
1                 
Z-Score 
-0.09* 1                
Risk-Adjusted ROA 
-0.22* 0.22* 1               
Own. Concentration 
0.13* 0.03* -0.02 1              
Revenue Growth 
0.03 -0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 1             
Size 
-0.24* -0.03 0.01 -0.31* 0.02 1            
Leverage 
-0.23* -0.03* -0.01 -0.2* 0.01 0.53* 1           
Shareholder Rights 
-0.07* -0.07* 0.00 -0.17* 0.01 0.23* 0.14* 1          
Capital 
-0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.07* -0.03 -0.11* -0.04* -0.13* 1         
Official 
0.12* -0.07* 0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.03 -0.12* 0.00 0.07* 1        
Private Monitoring 
0.03* -0.03 -0.08* -0.21* -0.03 0.18* 0.03* 0.31* 0.09* 0.25* 1       
Rule of Law 
-0.28* 0.13* 0.11* -0.01 -0.06* 0.16* 0.06* -0.16* -0.01 -0.31* -0.13* 1      
Financial Develop. 
-0.23* 0.11* 0.06* -0.01 -0.05* 0.12* -0.02 -0.13* 0.00 -0.09* -0.02 0.8* 1     
Log GDP per capita 
-0.19* 0.11* 0.05* 0.01 -0.05* 0.19* -0.01 -0.21* -0.06* -0.24* -0.01 0.89* 0.73* 1    
Bank Concentration 
-0.07* 0.08* 0.14* 0.16* 0.02 -0.15* -0.15* -0.28* 0.08* -0.08* -0.15* 0.42* 0.44* 0.34* 1   
Log Number Banks 
-0.09* 0.12* 0.08* 0.16* -0.05* -0.11* -0.07* -0.3* 0.11* -0.16* -0.24* 0.53* 0.45* 0.51* 0.03* 1  
GDP Growth 
0.04* -0.04* 0.07* 0.01 0.14* 0.01 0.03* 0.18* 0.02 0.08* -0.02 -0.32* -0.35* -0.32* -0.1* -0.27* 1 
Country-Av. ROA 
-0.02 0.01 0.12* 0.09* 0.1* -0.04* -0.07* 0.02 -0.08* 0.11* -0.09* 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.11* 0.11* 0.26* 
* Significant at the 5% level.
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2.4 Methodology 
 
The methodology chosen to derive the results in this chapter is based on panel 
data analysis. More specifically, we perform dynamic panel estimations using the so-
called system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), a combination of the 
estimation techniques proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Our choice is first justified by the nature of the database available, which 
consists of observations of bank accounting and ownership variables distributed 
throughout a period of 14 years (from 1994 to 2007). As described in the previous 
section, an unbalanced panel composed of 4,681 bank-year observations, comprising 
795 banks, along 11 years (from 1997 to 2007) was obtained after generating variables 
for bank risk and performance, and eliminating multivariate outliers.  
A key variable on the analyses performed is the Ownership Concentration, 
defined as the sum of the direct and indirect fractions of bank‘s voting rights held by its 
largest shareholder. A concern would arise in using panel data techniques, if this 
variable were stable over time. However, for the panel used, there is variability in the 
Ownership Concentration variable for almost 80% of the banks. Yet we excluded from 
our sample the banks for which Ownership Concentration has no variability. 
The main justification for the use of panel data analyses is that this technique is 
able to mitigate the influence of spurious characteristics in the relation between 
managers and shareholders. Similarly to Coles et al. (2006, 2007), we assume that risk, 
performance and ownership structure are jointly determined. It means that applying 
OLS techniques to our data would produce biased coefficients, provided that regressors 
are endogenous to the dependent variables. Following Roodman (2006), additional 
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features of our data have driven our choice to system GMM, instead of traditional 
random or fixed effects panel data estimation. First, our dependent variables (risk and 
performance) are dynamic, in the sense that they depend on past realizations. This is 
intuitively true, as risk and performance are likely to experience time clustering. Also, 
our risk and performance measures depend on their past value by construction, as they 
consist or include a standard deviation calculated in a moving window of four periods. 
The problem is that, unlike GMM estimation, OLS or the so-called Within Groups 
estimator of a fixed effects panel estimation cannot eliminate the dynamic panel bias 
that arises when pre-determined variables are included as regressors. Second, other bank 
specific variables are suspected to be endogenous or not strictly exogenous, such as 
Leverage, Size and Revenue Growth. Third, the panel used has few time periods and a 
large number of observations. Fourth, our specification is overidentified, as there are 
more instruments than parameters, which generates a system of moment conditions with 
more equations than variables, a condition to use GMM estimation. Fifth, system GMM 
estimation allows for the inclusion of time-invariant regressors, without 
(asymptotically) affecting the coefficients estimates for other regressors. Such a feature 
is suitable for our database, as variables for bank regulations and investor protection 
laws experience low variation over time. Finally, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
within banks, but not across them, are assumed. 
All panel regressions performed in this study use system GMM, which means 
that a system of two equations is used for each model – the original equation and a 
transformed one. Pre-determined and not strictly exogenous transformed variables of 
the transformed equation are instrumented with their available lags in levels, whereas 
the variables in levels of the original equation are instrumented with suitable lags of 
their own first differences. The use of system GMM is argued to dramatically improve 
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efficiency, respect to the so-called difference GMM, which consists only of the 
transformed equation. In this study, the transformation used in the second equation is 
the forward orthogonal deviations, which preserves the sample size of our unbalanced 
panel. We adopt the two-step estimation procedure with the finite-sample correction of 
standard errors proposed by Windmeijer (2005), which produces less biased coefficients 
and lower standard errors. To avoid problems of low precision of estimated coefficients 
when the number of periods is small we excluded from our sample banks with less than 
3 years of observations (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
For all regressions, one lag of the dependent variable was included as a regressor 
(pre-determined variable). The choice of the two different sets of instruments respective 
to their equations, adopted the following procedure. Lags of pre-determined variables 
and Ownership Concentration were always considered as instruments to the 
transformed equation (i.e., they are in the so-called GMM instruments set). In general, 
Revenue Growth, Leverage and Size, which are bank specific variables suspected to be 
not strictly exogenous, are also included as GMM instruments. The remaining variables 
are considered strictly exogenous and are instrumented by the so-called IV-styled 
instruments. This set of instruments includes the transformed and the level of each 
strictly exogenous variable. 
Regressions were run using the ―xtabond2‖ program implemented by Roodman 
(2006). All regressions specifications are overidentified according to the Hansen test of 
overidentification restrictions (Hansen, 1982). Also, all the GMM and IV-styled 
instruments sets chosen are valid, as confirmed by the ―difference in Hansen‖ test 
performed for each set of each regression (Hansen, 1982). Finally, the Arellano-Bond 
test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term (aside from the fixed effect) 
is reported for each regression. 
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2.5 Results 
 
This section presents and comments the results of our separate analyses of bank 
risk and performance and their relationships with ownership concentration, shareholders 
protections laws and banking regulations. 
 
2.5.1 Bank risk taking 
2.5.1.1 The role of ownership concentration 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, in Table 2.5 we examine the relationship between 
ownership concentration and risk controlling by legal, bank regulations, and other bank 
and country specific variables. Column 1 shows the results of running a regression of 
Earnings Volatility on Ownership Concentration which includes only some bank and 
country specific explanatory variables. The results found do not provide evidence of 
ownership concentration linearly affecting bank risk. As shown in regression R2, the 
inclusion of Leverage and State Owned variables does not change this result. Finally, 
regression R3, which includes also bank regulations and shareholders rights variables, 
does not report a role for ownership concentration in explaining risk. Then, we 
expanded our model by including quadratic and cubic terms of Ownership 
Concentration to test for possible non-linear relationships with risk. Results in columns 
R4 and R5 of Table 2.5 support a quadratic relationship between ownership 
concentration and risk. Specifically, the relationship is U-shaped, with minimum 
Earnings Volatility occurring at the main owner‘s participation of 25%, according to 
regression R5. Figure 2.1 shows the effect of Ownership Concentration on Earnings 
Volatility. The evidence favours the risk-shifting hypothesis, given that bank risk taking 
increases as Ownership Concentration grows from values of 25% and above, suggesting 
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that largest shareholder experience increasing incentives to control or effectively 
monitor bank‘s managers according to her interests. On the other hand, bank risk is 
lower for values of Ownership Concentration below 50%, which favours the argument 
that private interests of managers prevail when ownership is dispersed. Also, it supports 
Burkart et al., (1997)‘s argument of less risk taking due to loss of managerial discretion 
under intense monitoring. We conclude that these results confirm Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 2.5 – Relationship between Bank Risk Taking, Ownership Structure, Laws, and 
Banking Regulations. 
Dependent variable: Earnings Volatility. GMM dynamic panel-data regressions over the period 
1997-2007. (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, Windmeijer‘s std errors 
correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
 
Independent variables (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) 
 Bank Specific      
1 Earnings Volatility (t-1) 87.33 *** 
(15.77) 
87.67 *** 
(15.39) 
77.83 *** 
(18.00) 
64.33 *** 
(17.80) 
64.09 *** 
(16.94) 
2 Ownership 
Concentration 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
-0.06 ** 
(0.03) 
3 Ownership 
Concentration^2    
0.0002 * 
(0.0001) 
0.001 * 
(0.001) 
4 Ownership 
Concentration^3     
0.00  
(0.00) 
5 Revenue Growth 0.08  
(0.19) 
0.09  
(0.20) 
-0.02  
(0.09) 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
6 Size -0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
-0.03 * 
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
7 Leverage 
 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.03) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
8 State Owned 
 
-0.05  
(0.10) 
-0.33  
(0.25) 
0.14  
(0.13) 
0.10  
(0.13) 
 Country Bank Regulations     
9 Capital 
  
-0.04 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
10 Official 
  
0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
11 Private Monitoring 
  
0.04 * 
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
0.03  
(0.02) 
 Other Country Specific     
12 Shareholders Rights 
  
-0.40  
(0.33) 
-0.17  
(0.19) 
-0.15  
(0.18) 
13 Rule of Law -0.09  
(0.16) 
-0.08  
(0.16) 
0.47  
(0.40) 
-0.18 * 
(0.10) 
-0.20 * 
(0.11) 
14 Financial Development 0.26  
(0.24) 
0.26  
(0.25) 
0.09  
(0.08) 
0.00  
(0.08) 
-0.01  
(0.08) 
15 Log (GDP) 0.19  
(0.19) 
0.18  
(0.20) 
0.14  
(0.10) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
16 Log (GDP per capita) 0.01  
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.52  
(0.33) 
-0.01  
(0.09) 
-0.01  
(0.09) 
17 GDP growth -0.06  
(0.06) 
-0.07  
(0.06) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
18 Bank Concentration -0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
0.26  
(0.22) 
0.15  
(0.28) 
0.28  
(0.24) 
19 Log (Number of Banks) 0.06  
(0.19) 
0.06  
(0.20) 
-0.04  
(0.07) 
0.02  
(0.04) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
20 Country-Average ROA 0.00  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.03) 
-0.03 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.01) 
      
Number of obs. 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323 4,323 
Number of groups (banks) 752 752 752 752 752 
Number of instruments 60 62 90 169 213 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2), L.(5, 
14, 16) 
1, L2(2), L.(5, 
14, 16) 
1, L2(2), L.(5, 
6, 7, 16) 
1, L2(2, 3) 1, L2(2, 3, 4) 
IV-style instruments 6-8, 13, 15-
20, year dum. 
6-8, 13, 15-
20, year dum. 
8-15, 17-20, 
year dummies 
4-20, year 
dummies 
5-20, year 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 43.05*** 36.42*** 11.42*** 17.91*** 18.37*** 
Arell.-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.58 
0.561 
0.59 
0.555 
0.07 
0.947 
0.17 
0.865 
0.15 
0.878 
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Figure 2.1 – U-Shaped Relationship between Bank Risk and Ownership Concentration 
 
 
 
 
2.5.1.2 Sub-samples  
We proceed our analysis of bank risk by performing regressions on sub-samples 
of our working panel. First we check if ownership concentration differently affects bank 
risk taking across country legal protection of shareholders. The first two columns of 
Table 2.6 present the results of regressions considering respectively banks in countries 
with high shareholders rights (anti-self dealing index greater than its median of 0.41), 
and low shareholders rights (index equal or lower than 0.41). Results show that 
Ownership Concentration increases Earnings Volatility when protection of shareholders 
is high. Such evidence does not support Hypothesis 2, which relies on the theoretical 
argument that effective legal protection of shareholders works as a substitute for the 
existence of a large shareholder that monitors management. Instead, these mechanisms 
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a better position to monitor managers if they are legally protected from self dealing on 
the part of managers. Interestingly, both capital regulations and official supervisory 
power are able to contain bank risk when shareholders‘ legal protection is high.  
The next four regressions assess the importance of ownership concentration to 
bank risk taking when considering subsets of large/small banks and publicly 
listed/unlisted banks. This is to recognize that the importance of a large shareholder that 
monitors managers and encourages bank risk taking depends on the presence of 
additional governance mechanisms to which often only large and publicly listed firms 
are subject. Third and fourth columns of Table 2.6 contain the results of regressions on 
large and small banks subsets, respectively. Sub-sample of large banks includes the 
ones which total assets are ranked below the median of the country total assets ranking 
distribution. Evidence for this subset is that ownership concentration does not help to 
explain bank risk, which conforms to Hypothesis 2, considering that probably other 
governance mechanisms work to shape risk taking behaviour of large banks. The 
sample of small banks is composed by banks which Size variable (logarithm of total 
assets) is lower than the median of this variable. Confirming Hypothesis 2, result in 
fourth column shows that ownership concentration helps to increase risk of small banks. 
Turning to the publicly listed/unlisted banks, the evidence points that ownership 
concentration is not important to explain risk in any of these sub-samples. This last 
result does not support Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 2.6 – Relationship between Bank Risk, Ownership Structure, Laws, and Bank 
Regulations (Sub-Samples) 
Dependent variable: Earnings Volatility. GMM dynamic panel-data regressions over the 
period 1997-2007. (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, Windmeijer‘s 
standard errors correction): Constant and year dummies omitted. All coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
  
 Shareholder Rights Size Public listing 
Independent variables High Low Large Small Listed Unlisted 
 Bank Specific       
1 Earnings Volatility (t-1) 45.24 *** 
(14.17) 
73.01 *** 
(12.30) 
37.45 *** 
(9.00) 
73.55 *** 
(8.00) 
47.56 ** 
(19.43) 
88.65 *** 
(4.87) 
2 Ownership 
Concentration 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
3 Revenue Growth 0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.10 * 
(0.06) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.07) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
-0.04  
(0.03) 
4 Size -0.26  
(0.19) 
0.07  
(0.06) 
-0.16  
(0.13) 
0.01  
(0.14) 
-0.24  
(0.16) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
5 Leverage 0.04 * 
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.05  
(0.04) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
6 State Owned -0.12  
(0.18) 
0.07  
(0.21) 
0.11  
(0.25) 
0.09  
(0.16) 
0.37  
(0.27) 
0.09  
(0.26) 
       
 Country Bank Regulations      
7 Capital -0.05 * 
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
8 Official -0.05 * 
(0.03) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.04  
(0.02) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.02) 
9 Private Monitoring 0.09 * 
(0.05) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
0.08 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.05  
(0.04) 
0.03  
(0.04) 
       
 Other Country Specific      
10 Shareholders Rights -0.67  
(0.45) 
-0.66  
(0.52) 
-0.11  
(0.24) 
-0.46 * 
(0.26) 
0.34  
(0.32) 
-0.27  
(0.38) 
11 Rule of Law -0.48 ** 
(0.19) 
-0.09  
(0.12) 
-0.35 *** 
(0.10) 
-0.19  
(0.13) 
-0.50 ** 
(0.22) 
0.12  
(0.16) 
12 Financial Development 0.18  
(0.18) 
0.11  
(0.30) 
-0.01  
(0.10) 
0.19  
(0.17) 
-0.06  
(0.13) 
0.40  
(0.42) 
13 Log (GDP) 0.13  
(0.18) 
0.09  
(0.06) 
0.09  
(0.13) 
-0.04  
(0.05) 
0.04  
(0.10) 
0.11  
(0.13) 
14 Log (GDP per capita) 0.13  
(0.10) 
-0.12  
(0.14) 
0.15 * 
(0.08) 
-0.07  
(0.07) 
0.30 * 
(0.17) 
-0.28  
(0.22) 
15 GDP growth 0.00  
(0.02) 
-0.04 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 *** 
(0.01) 
-0.06 *** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.02  
(0.02) 
16 Bank Concentration 0.42  
(0.42) 
0.19  
(0.33) 
0.01  
(0.22) 
-0.11  
(0.36) 
0.12  
(0.31) 
-0.31  
(0.44) 
17 Log (Number of Banks) -0.05  
(0.18) 
-0.06  
(0.05) 
-0.02  
(0.05) 
0.03  
(0.05) 
0.00  
(0.09) 
-0.04  
(0.08) 
18 Country-Average ROA -0.15 *** 
(0.04) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.09 ** 
(0.04) 
       
Number of obs. 2,139 2,184 2,192 2,118 1,679 2,644 
Number of groups (banks) 377 375 366 431 324 497 
Number of instruments 359 358 359 359 321 125 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2), 
L.(3, 4, 5) 
1, L2(2) 
IV-style instruments 6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
6-18, time 
dummies 
3-18, time 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 14.75*** 43.34*** 11.75*** 50.72*** 12.77*** 29.21*** 
Arell.-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
-0.24 
0.813 
0.93 
0.354 
0.16 
0.870 
0.85 
0.398 
-0.91 
0.362 
0.75 
0.456 
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2.5.1.3 The role of laws 
Regressions in Table 2.5 do not report a role for shareholders rights in 
explaining bank risk. However, when analyzing sub-samples regressions of Table 2.6, 
we first find that increasing shareholders rights reduces the risk of small banks. 
Considering that in average ownership is more concentrated in the subset of small banks 
(mean largest shareholder‘s stake of 67% versus 50% in large banks), this result may 
suggest that legal protection of shareholders is able to contain excessive risk taking by 
managers or controlling shareholders of small banks. Recall that for very high levels of 
ownership concentration the relationship between it and risk is increasing. However, 
this interpretation must be taken with caution, as the anti self-dealing index of Djankov 
et al. (2008) focus on publicly traded firms, while in our sample only 20% of small 
banks are listed.  
Concerning the degree of enforcement of laws, it is remarkable that Rule of Law 
reduces the risk of banks in the sub-samples of high legal protection of shareholders, 
large banks, as well as publicly listed banks, according to Table 2.6. The evidence 
supports a role for the effectiveness of legal systems in containing bank risk, that is 
complementary to shareholders protection laws and other governance mechanisms to 
which large and publicly listed banks are subjected. 
 
2.5.1.4 The role of bank regulations 
From regressions R3 to R5 in Table 2.5, we notice that capital regulatory 
restrictions reduce bank risk. Even though the Capital variable does not represent a 
perfect adherence to Basel II‘s first pillar, we believe the evidence supports Basel II‘s 
policy recommendation on the stringency of capital requirements to reduce bank risk 
taking and strengthen financial stability. Evidence from Table 2.6 tells that capital 
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regulations stringency reduces the risk of banks in countries with high legal protection 
of shareholders, and of large banks. As previously mentioned, it suggests that capital 
regulations complement shareholders‘ legal protection in reducing bank risk taking. In 
addition, it seems that capital regulations are more effective in reducing the risk of large 
banks. Regarding official supervisory power, there is evidence that it also behaves as a 
complement to shareholders protection laws in reducing bank risk. Regression R3 in 
Table 2.5 shows that the level of external private monitoring on banks has a positive 
effect on their Earnings Volatility. According to Table 2.6, this is especially true if 
shareholders‘ protection laws are high and banks are small, even though the significance 
of coefficients is not high. The evidence suggests that regulations promoting 
transparency and market discipline of banks induce them to take more risk. Such result 
does not support the role of private monitoring as a reinforcing mechanism to capital 
regulations and official supervisory power in reducing risk. Despite the evidence is not 
desirable from the perspective of regulatory authorities, the effectiveness of private 
monitoring to induce not only bank risk, but also performance is assessed in Section 
2.5.2.2. 
 
2.5.1.5 Z-Score analysis 
Regressions are also run on Z-Score as a dependent variable. For the complete 
sample, column R1 of Table 2.7 shows no evidence that ownership concentration 
influences Z-Score. We then decided to include Leverage as a regressor, as by 
construction, Z-Score is correlated with Leverage. Doing so, ownership concentration 
still does not have any impact on Z-Score, as shown in column R2, even though 
Leverage appears negatively influencing Z-Score. After, we search for a similar 
evidence of Laeven and Levine (2006), who find a negative relationship between main 
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owner‘s cash flow rights (which is supposed to be highly correlated with ownership 
concentration) and Z-Score, in a sample composed by large banks. For such, we 
restricted the sample to the largest banks in each country (banks ranked bellow the 
median of country‘s ranking of bank total assets). Confirming Laeven and Levine 
(2006), regression R3 of Table 2.6 shows a negative and significant coefficient for 
ownership concentration. However, including Leverage renders Ownership 
Concentration not significant (regression R4). Such finding may suggest that the results 
of Laeven and Levine (2006) should be interpreted taking into account that they do not 
consider leverage as an explanatory factor of bank stability through Z-Score. 
All regressions in Table 2.7 show a significant positive impact of Rule of Law on 
Z-Score. Together with the previously mentioned evidence of a decreasing impact of 
Rule of Law on Earnings Volatility, we conclude that, from a prudential point of view, 
Rule of Law has a beneficial role in terms of promoting bank soundness. 
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Table 2.7 – Relationship between Z-Score, Own. Concentration, Laws, and 
Regulations. 
Dependent variable: Z-Score. GMM dynamic panel-data regressions over the period 1997-2007. 
(Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations transform, Windmeijer‘s standard errors 
correction): (R1): All the sample; (R2): All the sample, including Leverage; (R3): Large Banks; 
(R4) Large Banks, including Leverage. Constant and year dummies omitted.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
Independent variables (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) 
 Bank Specific     
1 Z-Score (t-1) 0.29 ** 
(0.13) 
0.29 ** 
(0.13) 
0.55 *** 
(0.04) 
0.57 *** 
(0.06) 
2 Ownership Concentration 0.02  
(0.25) 
0.03  
(0.25) 
-0.13 * 
(0.08) 
-0.08  
(0.07) 
3 Revenue Growth -2.80  
(7.21) 
-2.05  
(7.10) 
0.30  
(0.47) 
-0.41  
(0.80) 
4 Size -0.63  
(1.36) 
0.53  
(1.34) 
-1.10 ** 
(0.49) 
-0.42  
(0.67) 
5 Leverage 
 
-0.49 *** 
(0.15)  
-0.29  
(0.27) 
6 State Owned 4.21  
(7.72) 
3.21  
(7.68)   
      
 Country Bank Regulations     
7 Capital 0.11  
(0.59) 
0.14  
(0.59) 
0.45  
(0.31) 
0.40  
(0.31) 
8 Official -0.55  
(0.57) 
-0.67  
(0.59) 
-0.24  
(0.35) 
-0.29  
(0.38) 
9 Private Monitoring 0.62  
(1.08) 
0.58  
(1.08) 
-0.45  
(0.68) 
-0.17  
(0.85) 
      
 Other Country Specific     
10 Shareholders Rights -2.73  
(5.84) 
-3.32  
(5.83) 
-2.19  
(3.99) 
-4.81  
(4.11) 
11 Rule of Law 6.70 ** 
(2.83) 
8.06 *** 
(2.89) 
4.90 *** 
(1.44) 
5.91 *** 
(1.56) 
12 Financial Development 1.06  
(4.75) 
0.83  
(4.84)   
13 Log (GDP) -0.71  
(1.91) 
-0.65  
(1.92)   
14 Log (GDP per capita) -1.12  
(2.19) 
-2.27  
(2.22) 
-1.01  
(0.92) 
-1.40  
(1.05) 
15 GDP growth -0.08  
(0.44) 
-0.11  
(0.43)   
16 Bank Concentration 6.81  
(7.84) 
5.45  
(7.73)   
17 Log (Number of Banks) 2.14  
(1.73) 
2.13  
(1.72)   
18 Country-Average ROA 0.21  
(0.51) 
0.08  
(0.51) 
0.22  
(0.16) 
0.27  
(0.22) 
     
Number of obs. 4,681 4,681 2,314 2,314 
Number of groups (banks) 795 795 382 382 
Number of instruments 56 57 180 262 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2),  
L(3, 4) 
1, L2(2),  
L(3, 4) 
L(1, 3),  
L2(2) 
L(1, 3, 5),  
L2(2) 
IV-style instruments 6-18, year 
dummies 
5-18, year 
dummies 
4, 7-11, 14, 
18, year dum. 
4, 7-11, 14, 
18, year dum. 
F (variables; groups - 1) 6.32*** 6.83*** 25.67*** 23.85*** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 1st 
differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.51 
0.613 
0.50 
0.615 
1.65 
0.101 
1.64 
0.102 
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2.5.2 Bank Performance 
2.5.2.1 The role of ownership concentration 
In this section, we analyze the effect of ownership concentration on performance 
in order to contrast Hypotheses 3 and 4. Such analysis will also help us clarifying 
whether riskier taking decisions are always aimed at improving firm value. Instead, they 
may be the result of misbehaviour or inefficiencies resulting from the conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers, such as asset substitution, expropriation 
and entrenchment. In the case of banks, these problems might be worse due to higher 
opacity and leverage. Therefore, we extend our analysis by looking at how bank 
performance is affected by ownership concentration and other governance mechanisms.  
Table 2.8 shows the results of contrasting Hypothesis 3. The evidence found 
conforms to the previous hypothesis and supports a cubic relationship between 
ownership concentration and bank performance. Significance of linear, quadratic and 
cubic coefficients is attained at least at the 5% level considering different sets of 
regressors. For the estimation including all regressors (column R4 of Table 2.8), the 
correspondent equation relating bank performance to ownership concentration support a 
positive effect of ownership concentration on performance, when the largest 
shareholder‘s stake increases until around 30%. This effect occurs probably due to 
effective monitoring by the main shareholder (e. g., Burkart et al., 1997). For values of 
ownership concentration from around 30% to around 85%, bank performance decreases, 
supporting the hypotheses of expropriation of minority shareholders by the main 
shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Faccio and Stolin, 2004), or alternatively, of 
increasing costs of managerial loss of discretion (Burkart et al., 1997). From values of 
ownership concentration from 85% to 100%, bank performance increases, giving 
support to the prediction that expropriation is reduced as a consequence of its increasing 
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costs imposed to the main shareholder (Burkart et al., 1998). Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
cubic shape obtained for the relationship between performance and ownership 
concentration. 
 
2.5.2.2 Interactions  
It is argued in section 2 that the importance of agency problems is likely to differ 
contingent on firms‘ ownership concentration structures. On the one hand, conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers are more important in dispersed ownership 
structures, respect to concentrated ownership structures. This is so because in the latter 
shareholders‘ interests are likely to prevail. On the other hand, conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders are likely to be worse in firms with concentrated 
ownership structures. Therefore, in order to help deriving conclusions regarding the role 
of shareholders protection laws, bank regulations and competition on performance, we 
run regressions including the interaction of ownership concentration with variables for 
shareholders rights, bank regulations, and competition on two separate sub-samples of 
banks. The first sub-sample includes banks with dispersed ownership structures (main 
owner with an equity stake up to 50%), while the second includes banks with 
concentrated ownership structures (main owner‘s stake greater than 50%). 
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Table 2.8 – Cubic Relationship between Bank Performance and Ownership 
Concentration, controlled for Laws, Banking Regulations, and Bank specific factors 
Dependent variable: Risk-Adjusted ROA (Return over Average Assets). GMM dynamic panel-
data regressions
 
over the period 1997-2007 (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations 
transform, Windmeijer‘s standard errors correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 
1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
Independent variables (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) 
 Bank Specific     
1 Risk-Adjusted ROA (t-1) 33.73 *** 
(9.51) 
31.40 *** 
(8.81) 
33.87 *** 
(9.23) 
31.40 *** 
(8.95) 
2 Own. Concentration 38.87 *** 
(11.47) 
35.64 ** 
(16.67) 
39.60 *** 
(13.80) 
36.92 ** 
(17.30) 
3 Own. Concentration ^2 -0.87 *** 
(0.27) 
-0.83 ** 
(0.38) 
-0.90 *** 
(0.33) 
-0.84 ** 
(0.39) 
4 Own. Concentration ^3 0.005 *** 
(0.002) 
0.005 ** 
(0.002) 
0.005 *** 
(0.002) 
0.005 ** 
(0.002) 
5 Revenue Growth 0.94 *** 
(0.33) 
0.15  
(5.39) 
2.93  
(4.36) 
-0.02  
(5.40) 
6 Size 43.30  
(29.16) 
58.06 * 
(30.41) 
52.79 * 
(30.66) 
56.17 * 
(31.02) 
7 Leverage -7.10  
(5.02) 
-8.07 ** 
(3.74) 
-7.40  
(4.70) 
-8.13 ** 
(3.62) 
8 State Owned -41.60  
(45.89) 
-63.86  
(44.91) 
-66.05  
(45.95) 
-66.51  
(47.44) 
 Country Bank Regulations     
9 Capital   14.66 *** 
(4.72) 
10.32 ** 
(4.12) 
10 Official   2.31  
(3.77) 
4.39  
(5.06) 
11 Private Monitoring   -32.59 *** 
(12.58) 
-17.01 ** 
(8.22) 
 Other Country Specific     
12 Shareholders Rights    56.04  
(67.13) 
13 Rule of Law  94.56 *** 
(25.18)  
88.69 *** 
(25.60) 
14 Financial Development  -94.92 *** 
(32.46)  
-91.43 *** 
(31.25) 
15 Log (GDP)  -63.18 *** 
(20.06)  
-53.90 *** 
(20.83) 
16 Log (GDP per capita)  -24.04  
(18.43)  
-14.82  
(17.46) 
17 GDP growth  2.06  
(2.67)  
1.80  
(2.63) 
18 Bank Concentration  -29.00  
(76.69)  
-48.74  
(75.19) 
19 Log (Number of Banks)  60.41 ** 
(24.51)  
50.16 ** 
(23.45) 
20 Country-Average ROA  6.42 * 
(3.35)  
6.30 * 
(3.30) 
     
Number of obs. 4,681 
Number of groups (banks) 795 
Number of instruments 363 443 438 447 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(6, 7) 
1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(5, 6, 7) 
1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(5, 6, 7) 
1, L2(2, 3, 4), 
L(5, 6, 7) 
IV-style instruments 5, year 
dummies 
8, 13-20, year 
dummies 
8-11, year 
dummies 
8-20, year 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 14.96 *** 14.85 *** 14.82 *** 13.07 *** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.97 
0.332 
0.97 
0.333 
0.95 
0.343 
0.97 
0.332 
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Figure 2.2 – Cubic Relationship between Bank Performance and Ownership 
Concentration  
 
 
For the whole sample, we did not find evidence that the level of protection of 
shareholders influence bank performance (regression R4 of Table 2.8). However, there 
is evidence that shareholders rights and its interaction with ownership concentration 
matter for performance of banks with dispersed ownership structure. Coefficients for 
ownership concentration and shareholders rights enter positively and significant when 
explaining performance, whereas the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and 
significant (first regression of Table 2.9). These results tell, first, that an increase in 
ownership concentration improves performance of banks with dispersed ownership, 
supporting again the effectiveness of monitoring in aligning shareholders‘ and 
managers‘ interests. Second, increasing the protection of shareholders also improves 
performance. And third, the negative interaction term tells us that the positive effect of 
ownership concentration on performance is more important when shareholders rights 
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are low. Alternatively, increasing ownership concentration is less important to 
performance of banks in countries with strong legal protection of shareholders. Such 
evidence is very similar to the one of Caprio et al. (2007), except that they consider 
large banks with any ownership structure (not only dispersed ownership), and firm 
value instead of performance. The magnitude of the coefficients are such that at levels 
of ownership concentration below 26%, it is necessary a level of shareholders rights 
above its median to keep an increasing relationship between the net effect of these 
variables and performance. On the other hand, for levels of ownership concentration 
above 26%, the net effect of shareholders rights and ownership concentration on 
performance is increasing only if shareholders rights variable is below its median. This 
result suggests substitutive roles of ownership concentration and shareholders rights to 
increase bank performance, which does not support Hypothesis 4. We did not find any 
evidence for the role of shareholders rights in banks with concentrated ownership 
structures (regressions are not reported). 
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Table 2.9 – Banks with Dispersed Ownership Structures: The Effect of Shareholders 
Protection Laws, Capital Regulations and Competition on Bank Performance  
Dependent variable: Risk-Adjusted ROA (Return over Average Assets). GMM dynamic panel-
data regressions over the period 1997-2007. (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations 
transform, Windmeijer‘s standard errors correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 
1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
Independent variables Shareholders Rights Capital Log (Number Banks) 
1 Risk-Adjusted ROA (t-1) 47.85 *** 
(4.26) 
50.55 *** 
(4.03) 
48.50 *** 
(4.45) 
 Interaction    
2 Ownership Concentration 19.05 ** 
(7.77) 
-8.72 *** 
(3.22) 
-6.61 * 
(4.05) 
3 Shareholders Rights 1,033 ** 
(437.16) 
97.88 
(67.81) 
-19.14 
(94.18) 
4 Capital 1.99 
(5.50) 
-25.87 * 
(14.95) 
6.85 
(5.54) 
5 Log (Number of Banks) 52.33 * 
(28.89) 
59.28 *** 
(17.51) 
37.27 
(37.96) 
6 Own. Concentration * 
Shareholders Rights 
-39.39 ** 
(16.68)   
7 Own. Concentration * 
Capital  
1.26 *** 
(0.47)  
8 Own. Concentration * Log 
(Number of Banks)   
1.46 * 
(0.79) 
 Other Bank and Country Specific  
9 Revenue Growth -19.44 
(41.08) 
29.73 
(22.47) 
-11.53 
(40.41) 
10 Size 35.90 
(33.92) 
19.70 
(19.25) 
59.00 * 
(35.39) 
11 Leverage -0.16 
(4.31) 
3.22 
(3.36) 
-0.61 
(5.32) 
12 State Owned -71.85 
(86.88) 
29.09 
(70.14) 
-74.76 
(90.70) 
13 Official -4.47 
(6.09) 
3.20 
(5.09) 
-2.73 
(6.36) 
14 Private Monitoring -10.24 
(11.47) 
-9.28 
(9.06) 
6.24 
(10.66) 
15 Rule of Law -13.22 
(44.16) 
20.81 
(33.51) 
9.13 
(40.14) 
16 Financial Development -57.73 
(39.57) 
-82.33 *** 
(29.18) 
-108.05 *** 
(40.69) 
17 Log (GDP) -80.12 *** 
(27.06) 
-61.50 *** 
(18.99) 
-95.47 *** 
(28.02) 
18 Log (GDP per capita) 32.74 
(22.89) 
16.67 
(22.46) 
25.10 
(21.77) 
19 GDP growth 3.55 
(2.41) 
2.90 
(2.10) 
2.83 
(2.49) 
20 Bank Concentration -83.12 
(82.59) 
94.40 
(75.47) 
-86.54 
(89.58) 
21 Country-Average ROA 15.12 *** 
(4.48) 
8.58 ** 
(3.62) 
8.46 * 
(4.40) 
Number of obs. 1,844 1,844 1,844 
Number of groups (banks) 353 353 353 
Number of instruments 81 340 82 
GMM-style instruments L2.(1), 4 
L(5, 6, 7) 
L2(1), 9, L(10, 
11, 12) 
L2(1), 9, L(10, 11, 12) 
IV-style instruments 2, 3, 8-19, year 
dummies 
2, 4-8, 12-20, 
year dummies 
2, 4-8, 12-20, year 
dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 14.74*** 19.64*** 14.19*** 
Arell.-Bond test for AR(2) in  
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
1.28 
0.201 
1.27 
0.203 
1.26 
0.209 
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Regressions R3 and R4 in Table 2.8 report a role for some bank regulations in 
explaining bank performance. First, the stringency of capital regulations has a positive 
impact on Risk-Adjusted ROA. Such evidence supports a beneficial role of capital 
regulations in attaining bank efficiency. Recall that we previously found that capital 
regulations stringency reduces bank risk (see Section 2.5.1.4). Considering that Basel 
II‘s policy recommendations focus on limiting bank risk taking to promote financial 
stability, our results go beyond and offer a strong argument to strengthen capital 
regulations: to improve bank efficiency, in addition to attain financial stability. In other 
words, capital regulations stringency is beneficial either from the systemic viewpoint of 
the regulator, as from the individual bank‘s viewpoint of performance improving. 
Again, we clarify that capital regulations stringency in this study is represented by the 
index proposed by Barth et al. (2006), which does not represent a perfect adherence to 
Basel II‘s first pillar. Table 2.9 provides additional evidence on the influence of capital 
regulations stringency on the performance of banks with dispersed ownership structures 
(largest shareholder‘s stake lower than or equal to 50%). The interaction of Capital with 
Ownership Concentration is positive when influencing Risk-Adjusted ROA. It means 
that increasing both capital regulations stringency and ownership concentration helps to 
increase performance. For the selected sub-sample, ownership concentration linearly 
decreases performance, even though from Figure 2.2 we observe that there are ranges of 
increasing and decreasing performance with respect to ownership concentration. The 
positive interaction term tells that the decreasing effect of ownership concentration on 
performance is less important if capital regulations are more stringent. Irrespective of 
the relationship between ownership concentration and performance for levels of 
ownership concentration below 50%, we conclude that capital regulations and 
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ownership concentration complement each other to increase the performance of banks, 
which provides support to Hypothesis 4. 
Second evidence is the negative influence of Private Monitoring on bank 
performance, according to regressions R3 and R4 in Table 2.8. Together with the 
previous evidence of the positive influence of private monitoring on bank risk (see 
Section 2.5.1.4), we conclude for a detrimental role of private monitoring from the 
perspectives of both the regulatory authorities and the banks. It may be the case that the 
excess of transparency hinders competitive advantages of banks in seeking investments 
opportunities, in the sense that a certain level of information opaqueness is necessary 
for banks to provide added-value services (Bruni and Paterno, 1995). 
Finally, bank competition measured by the number of banks in a country has a 
positive impact on bank performance, according to regressions R2 and R4 in Table 2.8. 
Furthermore, last column of Table 2.9 shows that Log(Number of Banks) interacts 
positively with Ownership Concentration to increase the performance of banks with 
dispersed ownership structure. It means that the decreasing effect of ownership 
concentration in bank performance is less important if the bank industry is more 
competitive. Again, even though performance is initially increasing and then decreasing 
with respect to levels of ownership concentration below 50% (see Figure 2.2), the 
complementary relation given by the positive interaction between competition and 
ownership concentration supports Hypothesis 4. 
 
2.5.2.3 Robustness check for cubic relationship  
The inclusion of quadratic and cubic terms of the Ownership Concentration 
variable in regressions of Table 2.8 may be a concern if multicollinearity between these 
variables is high enough to invalidate the cubic relationship obtained. Therefore, in 
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order to check the robustness of the cubic relationship between ownership concentration 
and bank performance obtained in regression R4 of Table 2.8, we perform piece-wise 
regressions to assess the linear relationship between these variables in each of the three 
different ranges of ownership concentration characterized in Figure 2.2. In the first 
range, where Ownership Concentration is between 0 and 30%, Risk-Adjusted ROA 
increases with Ownership Concentration. The second range has Ownership 
Concentration varying between 30% and 85% and is characterized by a negative 
relationship between Risk-Adjusted ROA and Ownership Concentration. In the third 
range, that includes values of Ownership Concentration from 85% to 100%, the linear 
relationship between the variables is positive. Table 2.10 report the results of the three 
separate piece-wise linear regressions for checking the sign of the linear relationship 
between Ownership Concentration and Risk-Adjusted ROA. The signs of the 
coefficients of Ownership Concentration for each range coincide with the signs of the 
net effect of this variable on bank performance, in each range of the cubic relationship 
represented in Figure 2.2. Moreover, the coefficients are significant for second and third 
ranges. Therefore, results in Table 2.10 assure the robustness of the cubic relationship 
between ownership concentration and bank performance previously obtained. 
Chapter Two: Banks’ Ownership Structure, Risk and Performance 
49 
 
Table 2.10 – Robustness Check for Cubic Relationship between Bank Performance and 
Ownership Concentration. 
Dependent variable: Risk-Adjusted ROA (Return over Average Assets). GMM dynamic panel-
data regressions
 
over the period 1997-2007 (Two-step system GMM, orthogonal deviations 
transform, Windmeijer‘s standard errors correction). Constant and year dummies omitted. All 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 
1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
Independent variables Own. Conc <=30 30<Own. Conc <85  Own. Conc >=85 
 Bank Specific    
1 Risk-Adjusted ROA (t-1) 48.73 *** 
(4.75) 
22.96 ** 
(9.95) 
34.58 *** 
(6.45) 
2 Own. Concentration 0.05  
(1.15) 
-3.62 ** 
(1.84) 
2.78 * 
(1.91) 
3 Revenue Growth -13.16  
(74.45) 
7.57 * 
(4.15) 
9.53  
(11.46) 
4 Size 7.12  
(8.10) 
56.54  
(45.07) 
23.43 *** 
(7.23) 
5 Leverage -2.45  
(2.06) 
-6.52  
(7.24) 
-2.12 ** 
(1.05) 
6 State Owned 48.73 *** 
(4.75) 
-86.92  
(89.72) 
-8.15  
(30.72) 
 Country Bank Regulations    
7 Capital 148.88  
(132.66) 
4.46  
(7.01) 
7.20  
(5.52) 
8 Official 14.55 ** 
(7.02) 
-4.41  
(11.10) 
11.36 ** 
(5.01) 
9 Private Monitoring 3.72  
(6.20) 
-15.68  
(13.41) 
-3.44  
(10.55) 
 Other Country Specific    
10 Shareholders Rights 73.43  
(78.77) 
-39.30  
(125.21) 
107.69  
(78.06) 
11 Rule of Law 40.78  
(46.65) 
100.33 * 
(52.44) 
75.00 ** 
(31.24) 
12 Financial Development -75.96 *** 
(28.27) 
-61.20  
(72.44) 
-10.76  
(50.94) 
13 Log (GDP) -31.71  
(23.18) 
-84.24 ** 
(33.67) 
-19.25  
(18.54) 
14 Log (GDP per capita) 11.54  
(29.87) 
-37.29  
(35.87) 
-13.22  
(18.31) 
15 GDP growth 4.54  
(4.05) 
1.03  
(4.13) 
3.57  
(3.62) 
16 Bank Concentration -1.38  
(130.24) 
18.62  
(86.55) 
-121.19  
(80.05) 
17 Log (Number of Banks) 16.16  
(15.83) 
80.47 ** 
(37.58) 
14.46  
(14.63) 
18 Country-Average ROA 21.35 ** 
(9.94) 
1.67  
(4.47) 
6.43  
(4.20) 
    
Number of obs. 1,167 1,540 1,553 
Number of groups (banks) 231 305 301 
Number of instruments 156 287 197 
GMM-style  instruments 1, L2(2), L(3) 1, L2(2), L(4, 5) 1, L2(2), L(3) 
IV-style instruments 4-18,  
year dummies 
3, 6-18,  
year dummies 
4-18,  
year dummies 
F (variables; groups - 1) 25.65*** 7.13*** 8.72*** 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
1st differences (z; Pr > z) 
0.99 
0.323 
0.68 
0.497 
1.12 
0.261 
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2.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter examines the relationships between banks‘ ownership 
concentration, risk and performance, controlling for legal protection of shareholders, 
bank regulations and other bank and country specific characteristics. We derive our 
results performing dynamic panel data estimations on a database composed of 4,681 
bank-year observations, generated by 795 banks located in 47 countries in the period 
from 1997 to 2007. Our analysis departs from studying the effect of ownership 
concentration (measured by the equity stake of the bank‘s largest shareholder) on bank 
risk (measured by earnings volatility), and concludes that these variables have a non-
linear U-shaped relationship. Bank risk increases at values of ownership concentration 
above 25%. This finding supports a role for ownership concentration as a mechanism of 
aligning the interests of managers to those of shareholders, who have intrinsic 
incentives to risk-shifting. Results also show that ownership concentration increases 
bank risk when legal protection of shareholders is high, suggesting that these 
mechanisms complement each other to increase bank risk taking, through effective 
monitoring of managers by shareholders if these are legally better protected from self 
dealing on the part of managers. In addition, evidence tells that the risk of small banks 
increases with ownership concentration. Contrasting with previous evidence of Laeven 
and Levine (2006), the result does not hold for large banks, which suggests that these 
are probably subjected to other governance mechanisms that shape their risk taking 
behaviour.  
Regarding the relationship between bank ownership structure and performance 
(measured by the risk-adjusted return on assets), we borrow from Morck et al. (1988) to 
propose a cubic relationship between both variables. We explain this S-shape 
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relationship relying on the two main agency problems that appear within an 
organization, independently whether it is financial or non-financial. The first problem 
appears between managers and shareholders in the absence of appropriate incentives or 
sufficient monitoring to align manager‘s interest with that of shareholders (we can 
define it as agency problem one, APO). The second agency problem appears between 
controlling and minority shareholders, when expropriation by controlling shareholders 
at the expense of minority shareholders takes place (we can define it as agency problem 
two, APT). The role of corporate governance mechanisms, like ownership structure, is 
to mitigate both agency costs (Shleiffer and Vishny, 1997). In particular, when 
ownership structure is dispersed, the APO is particularly harmful. In this situation, an 
increase in ownership concentration reduces the free-riding in monitoring that appears 
in dispersed ownership structures. As a consequence, APO is alleviated, and 
performance should improve. This logic applies until the point where the ownership 
concentration is high enough such that shareholders with a significant stake 
(blockholders) emerge. These blockholders have power high enough to force the firm to 
follow practices that only favour blockholders‘ interests (APT). In this situation, the 
APT is more important than the APO and becomes particularly important as the 
ownership concentration increases. The result is a decrease in performance. Finally, 
when ownership concentration is quite large, the large stake of blockholders hinders 
their incentives to internalize a very significant proportion of the expropriation costs. 
This should lead to an improvement in performance. An alternative explanation for a 
decrease in performance for moderate levels of ownership concentration is the trade-off 
between the benefits of monitoring and those of managerial discretion, proposed by 
Burkart et al. (1997). In other words, as monitoring by shareholders increases, managers 
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have less discretion and initiative to seek new investment opportunities, which reflects 
in performance deterioration. 
The results confirm our arguments and we find evidence of a cubic relationship 
between ownership concentration and bank performance. Our findings indicate that the 
expropriation (and/or loss of managerial discretion) region is between 30% and 85%. 
This is remarkable given that for a significant proportion of banks (around 40%), the 
total stake of the three largest shareholders falls in that region. Such evidence gives us a 
warning signal of the seriousness of the problem in financial institutions, particularly in 
countries with a weak corporate governance system. This kind of situation introduces 
inefficiencies in the functioning of banks that may have perverse effect on the overall 
financial system. To investigate these issues in a deeper level should be the subject of 
some future research.  
Regarding the influence of country factors and its interactions with ownership 
concentration on bank performance, we first find that ownership concentration is more 
important to increase the performance of banks with dispersed ownership structures 
when the legal protection of minority shareholders is low, which is evidence similar to 
that obtained by Caprio et al. (2007). 
Second, the stringency of capital regulations has a positive impact on bank 
performance, which supports a beneficial role of capital regulations in attaining bank 
efficiency. Together with the evidence that capital regulations stringency reduces bank 
risk, the results offer a strong argument for strengthening capital regulations, provided 
that it is beneficial either from the systemic perspective of regulatory authorities, who 
seek to attain financial stability, as from the individual bank‘s perspective of 
performance improving. Moreover, capital regulations stringency interacts positively 
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with ownership concentration to increase performance of banks with dispersed 
ownership structure. 
Third, we report a negative influence of external private monitoring of banks on 
their performance. Together with the evidence of the positive influence of private 
monitoring on bank risk, we conclude for a detrimental role of private monitoring from 
the perspectives of both the regulatory authorities and the banks. It seems that the 
excess of transparency hinders banks‘ competitive advantages that otherwise would 
derive from a certain level of information opaqueness. 
Lastly, bank competition measured by the number of banks in a country has a 
positive impact on bank performance. In addition, competition interacts positively with 
ownership concentration to increase the performance of banks with dispersed ownership 
structure.  
A final comment is that our results help to shed a light on the issue of whether 
banks are different from non-financial firms. We obtained a non-linear (cubic) 
relationship between ownership concentration and bank performance that do not 
importantly diverge from the empirical evidence available for firms in general (see a 
survey by Miguel et al. 2004). Therefore, even presenting unique characteristics that 
make them differ from non-financial firms (e. g., higher leverage, greater opacity and 
heavy regulations), our evidence indicates that banks behave in the same way as firms 
in general, in response to the same agency problems and similar corporate governance 
mechanisms they are subjected, when compared with non-financial firms.  
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The existence of banks as financial intermediaries and the functioning of the 
banking system are argued to be of great importance in determining a country‘s 
economic growth and stability (Allen and Gale, 2000; Levine, 2006). More specifically, 
the credit channel plays a pivotal role in the transmission of the monetary policy, which 
is a basic element for achieving a sustained economic growth (e.g., Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995), as well as financial stability. Governments and national institutions all 
over the world are aware of the important role played by financial institutions and 
impose several regulations on the banking sector. More formally, the need for 
regulation is grounded on two basic reasons: first, the risk of a systemic crisis that 
would spread along all the economy; second, the inability of depositors to monitor 
banks (Santos, 2001). This study is interested in looking at how the functioning of credit 
markets is affected by bank regulations.  
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The recent international financial crisis triggered a necessary and urgent debate on 
the restructuring of financial systems. The roles that prudential regulation on capital 
requirements, official supervision and market discipline should play in achieving the 
ultimate regulations‘ purposes of guaranteeing financial stability and supporting 
economic growth are at the core of the discussion. Despite the current urgency of the 
issue, such discussion is already in place at least since the revision of the 1988 Basel 
Capital Accord, which led to a revised framework, the Basel II Capital Accord (Basel 
Committee, 2004). This accord establishes three bank regulatory pillars, representing 
capital requirements, supervisory review process, and market discipline. The effort 
devoted by Basel II in achieving bank regulatory convergence is not without criticisms, 
such as the high reliance that Basel II puts on supervisors to ask banks to hold capital 
above the minimum required. The critics
3
 see this reliance as an attempt to replace the 
market by supervisors or by the complicated formulae proposed by Pillar I. Also, the 
international standard status of Basel II and the widespread trend for its adoption make 
such an emphasis on supervision a challenge to the ability of developing countries in 
spending high resources on more sophisticated bank supervisory systems. Moreover, the 
emphasis on supervision implies the assumption that the public interest is to prevail, 
which could not be the case in weak institutional environments, where high supervisory 
discretion could lead to venal and systematic corruption. On the top of that, the current 
global financial crisis reveals serious problems with the mix between capital regulation, 
supervision and market discipline. The failure of that mix to avoid such a big crisis is 
leading many officials and politicians to advocate for a movement towards more 
regulation and supervision, as well as the critics to Basel II are probably revaluating 
their views. 
                                                          
3
 For instance, see SFRC (1999), Rochet (2003), Kane (1997, 2002, 2004), Herring (2004). 
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Our study contributes to the debate on the efficiency of the three mentioned bank 
regulatory mechanisms by adding empirical evidence on their relative importance, the 
complementarities among them, as well as their interactions with the institutional 
environments they are inserted in. Our purpose, similarly to Barth et al (2006), is to 
achieve a better understanding of the forces influencing bank regulatory and supervisory 
choices and how these are translated into the credit policies adopted by financial 
institutions. We provide evidence of the effects of the aforementioned broad regulations 
on loan characteristics such as spread and maturity, using a large sample composed of 
syndicated loan contracts initiated by 278 large commercial banks around 39 countries, 
to borrowers in 83 countries, in the period from 1998 to 2006. 
The main results indicate that the stringency of capital regulations have an inverse 
U-shaped relationship with the priced risk measures of loan contracts. Regarding bank 
supervision, we find that official supervisory power is associated with riskier loan 
contracts. Both official supervisory power and private monitoring interact negatively 
with capital stringency to reduce risk term of loans (decrease spread and increase 
maturity). Given the nonlinear relationships between capital stringency and risk 
measures (inverse U-shaped with spread and direct U-shaped with maturity) we found 
that official supervisory power and private monitoring interact differently with capital 
stringency to influence risk measures of loan contracts, depending on different levels of 
capital stringency. For low levels of the latter, both supervisory power and private 
monitoring are substitutes to capital stringency when reducing the risk measures of 
loans. For high levels of capital stringency, supervisory power and private monitoring 
are complements to capital to reduce the risk terms of loans. Evidence on interactions 
between regulations and other country-level factors points that capital stringency 
decreases priced risk loan characteristics (decreases spread and increases maturity) 
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especially in countries with high levels of legal enforcement, financial development and 
competition.  
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
related literature and empirical hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 describes the sample 
and variables used to conduct our empirical analyses. Methodology used to derive the 
results is detailed in Section 3.4. Results are presented in Section 3.5. The final section 
of the chapter presents the main conclusions of this research and offers a discussion of 
the significance of our results.  
 
3.2  Related Literature 
 
The purpose of this empirical study is twofold: (i) to investigate the individual 
effects of bank regulations regarding capital requirements, supervisory power and 
private monitoring of banks on the characteristics of loan contracts, and (ii) to examine 
possible interactions between these three broad bank regulations and other institutional 
country mechanisms affecting the characteristics of loans. Accordingly, in this section 
we first briefly review the main theories on the separate influence of the three bank 
regulations on bank lending. Then, we present the theoretical arguments that point to 
possible interactions, substitutability, complementarities, and trade-offs between those 
regulations themselves and other mechanisms affecting bank lending, such as 
competition in the bank industry and country legal and financial systems development. 
We then concentrate on the empirical related literature. Finally, we propose the 
empirical hypotheses to be tested in our analysis. 
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3.2.1 Bank Capital Regulation 
Despite the lack of consensus on whether and how banks need to be regulated, 
two justifications for regulating banks are often presented: the risk of a systemic crisis 
and the inability of depositors to monitor banks (Santos, 2001). The use of a deposit 
insurance scheme by governments is probably the most adopted proposal to avoid bank 
runs. Although very successful in protecting banks from runs, deposit insurance is not 
without a cost, as it implies moral hazard on the part of banks. That is because the 
deposit insurance provider bears the risk to protect depositors from losses, which 
inhibits depositors‘ incentive to monitor banks. The consequence is an increase in the 
risk taking incentives of banks. If the insurance premium is not fairly priced, the risk 
taking incentives are even higher, as the full cost of risk is not internalized by the bank. 
Such risk-shifting incentive cannot be removed by charging fairly priced insurance 
premiums given that information asymmetry makes them impossible to be computed 
(Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992), or undesirable from a welfare point of view 
(Freixas and Rochet, 1995). In this context, bank capital regulation arises as a 
mechanism to prevent bank failures and their potential externalities, by influencing bank 
risk taking. Nevertheless, theoretical research on the effects of capital regulations on 
bank performance, risk and stability has produced contradictory results
4
. With respect to 
this research, a conclusion of VanHoose (2006) states that ―the intellectual foundation 
for bank capital regulation in general and for the proposed Basel II system specifically 
is not particularly strong. Instead of expanding the scope and complexity of the current 
system of capital regulation, it may be time to contemplate alternative approaches to 
bolstering the safety and soundness of the banking system.‖ We depart from VanHoose 
                                                          
4
 Santos (2001) and VanHoose (2006) provide comprehensive reviews of the theoretical literature on the 
effects of bank capital regulation on the risk-taking behaviour and solvency of banks. 
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(2006)‘s conclusion as a motivation to undertake this empirical research using a more 
comprehensive scope of bank regulation. 
The empirical evidence of the effects of capital regulation on bank lending is not 
consensual. For instance, different analyses of the credit crunch occurred in the United 
States in the early 1990s produced contrasting results. Some studies conclude that the 
introduction of capital requirements resulted in a reduction in loan supply, as a 
consequence of increase in capital ratios. Peek and Rosengren (1995a, 1995b) conclude 
that a decrease in loan supply induced by capital regulation, together with lower loan 
demand caused the decline in lending. Similar evidence is offered by Brinkmann and 
Horvitz (1995), Furlong (1992), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Lown and Peristiani 
(1996) and Hiuri et al. (2002). The contrasting evidence comes from Berger and Udell 
(1994), who attribute the credit crunch to a decline in loan demand and to other factors 
affecting loan supply. Wagster (1999) also concludes that other factors excluding capital 
regulation generated the credit crunch in the U.S. His study looks at other countries and 
find mixed evidence. The review of Jackson et al. (1999) examines many studies 
looking at the effects of capital regulation on capital ratios and reaches a mixed 
conclusion: in the short term, banks reduce lending to adjust to a tightened capital 
requirement, but do not maintain higher capital ratios in the mid term. Ashcraft (2001), 
and Flannery and Rangan (2004) find little evidence of the influence of U.S. capital 
regulations on capital ratios, respectively for the 1980s and more recent years.  
Concerning the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking, the evidence is 
mixed as well, although the majority of studies point to an overall increase in risk after 
the implementation of the Basel I capital regulation framework. Hendricks and Hirtle 
(1997) find evidence in favour of risk reducing, but argue that the benefits are likely to 
be small, as most banks only slightly increase their capital ratios in response to capital 
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regulations. On a sample of 98 U.S. bank holding companies in the 1975-1986 period, 
Furlong (1988) concludes that less risk-averse banks did not increase their asset risk in 
response to the introduction of capital regulation in the 1980s. Sheldon (1996) finds 
little evidence that Basel I capital regulation reduced asset risk on a cross-country 
sample in the 1987-1994 period. According to Jackson et al. (1999), a weakness of 
these two studies is that they do not control for many potential influences on bank risk-
taking. Barth et al. (2004, 2006) minimize this problem by using a sample of survey 
data across 107 countries, which allows them to include controls for the effects that 
different country regulatory policies may produce in the functioning of banking 
systems. Their results regarding whether capital regulation induces banks to take less 
risk are mixed. Although they find that more stringent capital requirements are related 
to fewer nonperforming loans, they do not find a relation between stringent capital 
regulations and the likelihood of a banking crisis.  
 
3.2.2 Bank Supervision 
Under the public interest view of regulation
5
, bank supervision arises as an 
activity capable of overcoming inherent failures of financial markets. In such approach 
to regulation, bank supervisors have the proper incentives, abilities and the necessary 
                                                          
5
 There are two approaches underlying the research on regulation. The public interest approach to bank 
regulation thinking considers that regulation serves to the public interest of improving social welfare, by 
boosting economic development, preventing systemic crises and protecting depositors. This approach 
assumes the existence of market failures and that governments have the incentives and capabilities to 
overcome those failures. Opposed to that view, the private interest approach arises by viewing regulation 
as a product, subject to supply and demand forces. In this view, the private interests of the regulator and 
bankers prevail over the public interest, when determining bank regulations. It is the case for political 
and/or regulatory capture, which can lead to venal and systematic corruption. In practice, it is reasonable 
to view regulations to experience a dynamic process of responding to different incentives along the time, 
fluctuating between the extreme approaches (Kane, 1997). See Barth et al. (2006, chapter 2) for a review 
on public and private interest approaches to regulation. 
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powers to accomplish their purposes of ensuring safety and soundness of the banking 
system (Barth et al., 2006). More specifically, supervision plays a role in reducing 
excessive bank risk-taking and promoting bank performance and stability. In this view, 
powerful and independent supervisory agencies are desirable, in order to avoid 
regulators suffering the political pressure of bankers. By contrast, the private interest 
view assumes that supervisors may use their power to serve either their own private 
interests or the ones of bankers and politicians. The consequences of powerful 
supervision in this view are poor bank performance and increased corruption. Research 
on bank supervision is scarce and limited to few empirical studies and to the discussion 
of conceptual issues underlying the Basel II‘s proposal for the supervisory review 
process, known as Pillar II. By identifying implicit assumptions in some criticisms to 
the proposal of Pillar II (e.g. SFRC, 2001 and Hamalainen et al., 2003), VanHoose 
(2007) proposes a discussion on three conceptual issues underlying the appropriateness 
of the supervisory review process. The first issue refers to the question if rules are 
preferred over discretion in the supervisory process. It is raised by a common criticism 
that Pillar II proposal gives a lot of discretion to banks and supervisors, which could 
result in increased risk arbitrage and regulatory forbearance. The second issue is related 
to the first and asks how tough a policy rule really should be. There is theoretical 
disagreement whether prompt closing troubled banks is an optimal supervisory policy
6
. 
The third conceptual issue refers to whether international coordination of regulatory and 
supervisory rules is appropriate. The existent research on this issue is scarce
7
.  
Empirical evidence about the effects of supervision on bank lending and risk-
taking is very limited. DeYoung et al. (2001) find that government supervisory 
                                                          
6
 See Sleet and Smith (2000), Kocherlakota and Shim (2005) and Shim (2006) 
7
 See Holthausen and Rønde (2005) and Dell‘Aricia and Marquez (2006) 
Chapter Three: Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts 
62 
 
examinations of large commercial banks produce new, value-relevant information. 
Although debt prices do not immediately reflect this information, the implied regulatory 
actions are priced by the market. Berger et al. (2000) compares the timeliness and 
accuracy of government assessments of bank condition against market evaluations. 
They find that supervisors and bond rating agencies both acquire some information that 
would help the other group forecast changes in bank condition. However, supervisory 
assessments and market indicators are not strongly interrelated. In addition, supervisory 
assessments are less accurate than either stock or bond market indicators in predicting 
future changes in performance. Both studies considered only large U.S. banking firms. 
By contrast, Barth et al. (2006) use a large sample of banks and countries, including 
emerging ones, to derive conclusions regarding the effectiveness of bank supervision. 
They find that empowering direct official supervision of banks does not boost bank 
development. 
 
3.2.3 Private Monitoring of Banks 
The reliance on the private monitoring of banks, a mechanism related to market 
discipline, is argued to be an alternative way to restrict excessive risk-taking behaviour 
of banks. From the private interest view of regulation, such reliance is argued to have a 
greater importance, as supervisors and regulators are assumed to succumb to bankers‘ 
and politicians‘ interests. Herring (2004) argues that ―one of the principal merits of 
market discipline is that bank directors and managers are faced with the burden of 
proving to the market that the bank is not taking excessive risks rather than subjecting 
officials to the burden of proving, in a review process, that the bank is taking excessive 
risks.‖ (pp. 365-366). Hamalainen et al. (2003) describe many potential social benefits 
of market discipline. Among the most important ones, we mention: first, the possible 
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reduction in moral hazard resulting form deposit insurance; second, the threat of market 
discipline provides constant pressure on management to improve cost efficiency; third, 
if the market discipline process is faster than regulatory actions, it may help regulators 
to screen ―bad banks‖ from ―good banks‖, and promote the aforementioned Herring 
(2004)‘s shift of the burden of proof. Among the potential negative effects of market 
discipline, the most important is the possibility of a bank run resulting from reactions of 
fund suppliers to widespread perceptions of higher failure probabilities
8
. Another 
undesirable effect is when market participants and regulators take misguided reactions 
as a consequence of persistent false market signals sent by fund suppliers. The market 
discipline concept applied to banking refers mainly to the reactions of fund suppliers – 
depositors, debt holders, shareholders – in order to induce banks to solve a perceived 
deterioration in bank solvency. These reactions may be the reduction in the amount that 
funds suppliers maintain in the bank, the maintenance of the same amount but at a 
higher rate of return, or the entire interruption of funds supply to the bank. Some 
conditions for fund suppliers to be able to engage in market monitoring are necessary, 
such as the existence of open and active markets capable to provide visibility of bank 
risk of insolvency to all fund suppliers, regulations promoting bank transparency and 
the release of correct information at appropriate times, and a no-bailout policy of 
depositors or banks (Flannery, 2001). Despite the variety of conclusions from the 
academic research regarding the relative effectiveness and desirability of relying on 
market discipline as a mechanism of bank regulation, VanHoose (2007) observes that 
Basel II has ignored the potentially useful signalling roles of market discipline. He 
warns that market discipline aspects of Basel II represent at best minimal innovations 
                                                          
8
 In the model of Chen and Hasan (2006), greater information transparency of banks tends to boost the 
likelihood of bank runs, unless bank informational disclosures clarify to depositors that the problem is 
idiosyncratic. 
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for most well-developed banking systems. However, he argues that countries with less 
developed banking systems are more likely to benefit from Basel II‘s pillar III 
recommendations.  
Turning to the empirical evidence on market discipline in banking, the review of 
Flannery (1998) of mid 1990s research concludes for the existence of supporting 
evidence to a role for market discipline in supplementing regulatory supervision. This 
kind of evidence generally tests if suppliers of funds are able to perceive changes in 
banks‘ risk profiles. In this regard, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) show that investors can 
rationally distinguish among risks taken by U.S. banks, by looking at the spreads 
between yields on subordinated debt and treasury bonds with the same maturities as 
indicators of capital adequacy and predictors of bank condition. It is especially true if 
subordinated debt is perceived as not being guaranteed by the government. Distinguin et 
al. (2006) find evidence that market-based indicators can help predicting the degree of 
bank stress, as long as the bank does not heavily rely on uninsured deposits. Morgan 
and Stiroh (2001) examine market spreads on new bonds issued by U.S. banks and bank 
holding companies in primary markets to conclude that debt markets provide clear 
signals of asset risk differentials across banks. In evaluating subordinated-debt spreads 
as indicators of bank risk, Evanoff and Wall (2001) conclude that these are better 
predictors of regulatory ratings than capital ratios. 
 
3.2.4 Mix and interactions between mechanisms 
Although the many criticisms to the proposed approaches of Basel II, its general 
framework of structuring bank regulation and supervision in three pillars – risk-based 
capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline - is widely consensual 
and accepted. The basic assumption of this framework is that the three pillars will 
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reinforce each other and result in effective improvements for bank safety and 
soundness. In other words, they are assumed to be complements. An obvious implicit 
assumption is that the intended result may not be achieved unless all pillars are 
sufficiently well designed and structured (VanHoose, 2007). Some authors, like 
Llewellyn and Mayes (2003), examined the conditions for market discipline and prompt 
corrective action to be complements. However, little research effort was dedicated to 
analyze joint interactions among the three regulatory mechanisms. Also, little effort was 
made by both the academic researchers and the Basel Committee to develop the second 
and third pillars, which raises concerns regarding the appropriateness of the proposals of 
Basel II in achieving its purposes. Next, we present the academic contributions to the 
issue of how the mechanisms of capital requirements, supervision and market discipline 
mix and interact, and the correspondent implications to bank behaviour. 
 
Substitutability 
Calem and Rob (1999) find a role for market discipline in reducing the risk-
taking incentives of undercapitalized banks. Milne (2002) claims a role for ex post 
penalties imposed by supervisors in case capital requirements are not fulfilled. He 
argues that such a mechanism is likely to be more efficient in reducing risk-taking 
incentives than toughening capital requirements tied to asset risks. In their theory of 
bank capital based on the financial fragility as essential for banks to create liquidity, 
Diamond and Rajan (2000) also indicate a role for prompt corrective action, in the 
presence of deposit insurance. Dowd (2000) points that the problem of financial 
fragility introduced by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) can be fully solved if banks 
keep a sufficient large capital cushion. Marini (2003) extends the analysis of Dowd 
(2000) to conclude that market-capitalized banks are also protected from insolvency 
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crisis. The arguments of Dowd and Marini offer the conclusion that market-capitalized 
levels of bank capital can substitute for both supervision and deposit insurance. 
 
Contingent complementarities 
Campbell et al. (1992) provide interesting results on the combination of capital 
requirements and monitoring in the optimal contract: first, as bank assets‘ risk increases, 
it is optimal for depositors to increase both capital and monitoring, i.e., the mechanisms 
are complementary. Second, as incentive problems with monitors increase, depositors 
should increase capital requirements at the expense of monitoring, i.e., the mechanisms 
are substitutes. 
 
Complementarities 
 Some studies explicitly incorporate the mechanisms of the three pillars of Basel 
II. The dynamic model of Estrella (2004) finds that higher capital requirements only 
partially align bank behaviour to regulator‘s objectives. Extra regulatory effort directed 
to less capitalized banks and market discipline alleviate the problem, although not 
sufficiently to attain the regulator‘s first best desired outcome. As proposed by the 
author, a complete alignment to the regulator‘s interest can be achieved if a regulatory 
commitment to an ex post penalty is applied. The comprehensive and ambitious study of 
Decamps et al. (2004) proposes a dynamic model based on continuous-time cash flows 
to examine interactions between the three pillars of Basel II. The authors interpret 
capital requirements as a closure threshold. They show that market discipline can be 
used to reduce the closure threshold, especially if there is a risk for regulatory 
forbearance. Regarding the second pillar, the authors suggest a mechanism of indirect 
market discipline, where supervisors can modulate the intensity of their interventions 
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based on reliable signals given by market prices of the securities issued by banks. In his 
analysis of pillars II and III of Basel II, VanHoose (2007) argues that the market 
discipline pillar does not go far enough in the right direction, while the supervisory-
process pillar goes too far in exactly the wrong direction. He suggests that ―the market-
discipline pillar would be significantly improved by requiring national regulators to 
begin studying the informational properties of market signals in bank debt markets for 
possible use in corrective-action policies‖ (p. 32). 
 
Interaction between bank regulations and country-level governance 
 There are some considerations concerning the interaction of bank regulations 
with other country-level aspects related to the economic and legal environments where 
banks operate. As previously mentioned, the idea that high reliance on market discipline 
can substitute for regulatory and supervisory power emerges from the private interest 
view of bank regulation. An important related issue is whether excessive reliance on 
market discipline is appropriate for countries with weak legal and financial systems, and 
poor accounting standards (Barth et al., 2006). The public interest view advocates for 
reliance on official supervisors to monitor the banking systems in weak institutional 
environments. It is argued that in such settings, great reliance on private monitoring 
leads to exploitation of small savers and consequently, to less bank development. The 
counter argument from the private interest view is that powerful supervisors are more 
likely to benefit private interests precisely in less institutionally developed countries. 
Caprio and Honohan (2004) go further and claim that for many reasons low developed 
countries may be better positioned to exercise market discipline: the lower complexity 
and the size of the banking and financial markets facilitate monitoring; the absence or 
low credibility of deposit insurance stimulates market monitoring; the presence of many 
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foreign banks may result in more information disclosure. Barth et al. (2006) conclude 
that only empirical testing can resolve the debate. These authors offer a kind of 
reconciliation of bank supervision and market discipline when commenting the results 
of their empirical analysis: ―[S]upervision works best when it facilitates market 
monitoring‖. Our study also offers a contribution in respect of this. 
There is some evidence on the joint effects of bank regulations. Concerning the 
1990s U.S. credit crunch, Furfine (2001) concludes that toughened supervision had a 
larger influence on banks‘ balance sheet choices than explicit capital requirements. 
Barrios and Blanco (2003) used different models to assess the response of bank capital 
to market forces versus capital constraints. They concluded that the 76 Spanish 
commercial banks in their sample were unconstrained by capital regulation between 
1985 and 1991, as the market-based model better fitted the data. Similarly, Beatty and 
Gron (2001) find that the introduction of risk-based capital regulations did not influence 
the behaviour of 438 U.S. bank holding companies between 1986 and 1995. 
We conclude this section with a brief description of some features of the 
empirical analysis we perform in this chapter. Our analysis builds on the empirical work 
of Barth et al (2006). However, besides having a much more limited scope than that 
study, our approach differs from theirs by using transaction-level data across countries, 
instead of taking essentially a country-level approach. Our study relies on the cross-
country surveys on bank regulation and supervision performed by Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008) as its source of data on bank regulations. These surveys consist of hundreds 
of rules regarding bank regulation and supervision adopted by more than 100 countries 
around the world. To measure bank regulatory and supervisory policies, we borrow the 
approach proposed by those same authors (Barth et al., 2006, chapter 4), which consists 
in using broader indices as empirical proxies rather than an ―examine-every-rule‖ 
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approach. They argue that the broader approach is statistically preferred, as many 
individual rules would render impossible the identification of their independent impact 
on bank operations. Furthermore, it is also preferred from a theoretical viewpoint, as 
there are only few broad concepts of bank regulation and supervision. Finally, the 
broader approach is specifically appropriate for this study, as our focus is to measure 
how three broad regulatory mechanisms influence some loan contracts features. These 
mechanisms mirror the Basel II‘s three pillars framework, although our study is not 
making an assessment of the specific effectiveness of Basel II. Instead, our empirical 
approach relies on explanatory variables represented by the indices for Capital 
Requirements Stringency, Official Supervisory Power and Private Monitoring, 
suggested by Barth et al. (2006), to represent respectively bank capital regulations, 
supervisory power and market discipline. 
 
3.2.5 Empirical hypotheses  
We propose the following hypotheses to be tested in our sample. We take the 
public interest view to regulation when deriving them. Such approach implies that the 
hypotheses proposed are not necessarily the ones mainly expected by theory. Our 
purpose is not favouring the public interest view. On the contrary, it is to impose an 
arbitrary impartial discipline able to avoid driving the conclusions to any direction. We 
believe the evidence to be obtained is useful as a test of the theoretically well grounded 
hypotheses. It is also important in shedding a light on the weak or ambiguously 
theoretically grounded ones. 
From a public interest view, the regulations imposed on banks by countries are 
mechanisms capable to contain risk-taking behaviour of banks and, ultimately, to help 
assuring banks‘ soundness, financial stability and economic growth. In a context of 
Chapter Three: Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts 
70 
 
bank lending across a set of countries, we propose the following hypotheses to examine 
whether each of the bank regulations measures is associated with loan priced risk 
characteristics, represented by spread and maturity: 
 
H1: More stringent capital regulations reduce priced risk characteristics of loan 
contracts. Hence, they reduce loan spreads and increase loan maturities. 
 
H2: Higher official supervisory power reduces priced risk characteristics of 
loan contracts. Hence, it reduces loan spreads and increase loan maturities. 
 
H3: More private monitoring on banks reduces priced risk characteristics of 
loan contracts. Hence, it reduces loan spreads and increase loan maturities. 
 
Provided that the influence of bank regulations on bank risk-taking behaviour is 
not a consensual issue, either from a theoretical viewpoint and the empirical evidence 
available, we consider checking the existence of nonlinear relationships between bank 
regulations and the risk characteristics of loan contracts.  
Furthermore, given the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we are able to extend 
our analysis by examining complementarities and interactions between both regulatory 
mechanisms themselves, and other country factors. For such, we rely on enriching the 
assessment of the previous hypotheses by introducing interaction terms between bank 
regulations themselves and between these and country factors such as the levels of bank 
competition, financial development and legal enforcement, as well as considering sub-
samples across these same country factors.  
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Similarly to Barth et al (2006), one limitation of our study is to use bank 
regulations variables that are constructed based on a survey of statutory powers, which 
does not necessarily reflect how regulations work on the ground. Accordingly, our 
findings have to be analyzed with caution. In any case, by conducting econometric 
analyses on a novel sample that mergers country and transaction-level data, we believe 
we make a contribution to the literature on the evidence of how bank regulations 
influence lending practices of banks. 
 
3.3 Data description 
 
The main source of our data is the LPC Reuters DealScan database, which 
provides detailed data on loans made all over the world by banks to large firms. Such 
loan level information includes many features of loan contracts, such as lender and 
borrower identities, dates of origination, purpose of loan, deal amounts, number of 
lenders, lender deal share, spreads, loan maturity, covenants, and borrower sector and 
ratings. To conduct our cross-country study on bank regulations, we adopt the loan deal 
as the unit of analysis. At the same time, we are interested in the behaviour of banks. 
Therefore, our sample selection consisted in taking, whenever possible, the 15 largest 
commercial banks or banking holding companies in terms of total assets, in 39 of the 49 
countries included in the study of La Porta et al. (1998)
9
. Besides establishing a limit in 
the number of countries included in the study, we believe that such selection allows 
comparability with other cross-country studies, mainly related to the ―law and finance‖ 
literature. Then, we collected information on all confirmed loan deals originated by 
                                                          
9
 New Zealand was excluded because most banks there are owned by Australian banks. Scarcity of data 
motivated the exclusion of Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Zimbabwe. 
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those banks from 1998 to 2006. Such selection of period is motivated by the availability 
of bank regulations data, which consist of surveys made by the World Bank in the years 
2000, 2003 and 2007 (Barth et al., 2001, 2006, 2008). We assume that country bank 
regulations reported by those surveys are in place for the following 3-year periods: 1998 
to 2000, 2001 to 2003 and 2004 to 2006. Hence, yearly bank regulations variables 
representing each country‘s capital requirements stringency, official supervisory power 
and the level of private monitoring are added to the database. Similarly, other country-
level variables are included, namely, the borrower country‘s sovereign debt rating, the 
level of legal protection of creditors in borrower country, and proxies for lender 
country‘s level of financial development, and borrower country‘s economic 
development, economy size, and business cycle. Finally, bank-level characteristics are 
collected from the Bankscope database, and hand-matched with the loan deal level 
information. Raw data from DealScan was filtered to allow only confirmed loans, and 
to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and in the public sectors (first digit of 
SIC code equal to 6 or 9). These loans are dropped because the risks of firms in these 
sectors are argued to be very different from other firms, as they are likely to be 
government owned or government protected monopolies (Qian and Strahan, 2007). 
Considering that some banks have no loans reported by DealScan, and that in fact less 
than 15 banks were included for some countries, we ended up with a sample of 46,453 
loans originated by 278 banks around 39 countries, to borrowers distributed in 83 
countries, during the period from 1998 and 2006. What follows is a description of the 
variables used in the analyses. 
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Dependent Variables 
 The following variables represent the loan contract characteristics selected to be 
examined if they are affected by bank regulations, after controlling by other country-
level, loan-level, lender-specific and borrower-specific characteristics: 
- Spread: this variable corresponds to the ―All-in Spread Drawn‖ information 
available for each deal in the DealScan database It consists of the base points in 
excess of the interbank market rate that is asked by lenders to borrowers in a 
deal. It also incorporates any charged fees associated to the loan. The Spread 
variable is assumed to reflect the risk that a lender prices to the borrower in a 
specific loan contract. 
- Log of Maturity: it is the logarithm of the maturity of a loan, expressed in 
number of months. As well as the Spread variable, Maturity is supposed to be a 
contract feature that reflects the risk priced by the lender to the borrower in a 
loan. 
 
Explanatory Variables  
 When studying the influence of bank regulations on loan contracts 
characteristics, we include four different sets of explanatory variables: country-level, 
lender-specific, borrower-specific, and loan-level. The first set includes country-level 
variables reflecting: (1) some supply-side factors that may affect the availability of 
funds and the loan contracts characteristics, i.e., the conditions in which lenders want to 
extend loans to borrowers. The variables that represent the focus of this study, namely, 
the country-level bank regulations, are included in this set, as well as institutional 
variables at the lender country level such as financial development, legal enforcement 
and bank competition; (2) demand-side factors, such as the level of economic 
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development, the business cycle, and sovereign credit ratings in borrowers‘ countries. 
The second set consists of lender-specific characteristics, such as its size and leverage, 
which represent supply-side factors at the loan deal level, and likely influence loan 
contracts features. The third set of explanatory variables refers to borrower-specific 
characteristics representing both demand-side and credit risk factors, essential to 
determine loan contracts characteristics. The fourth set of variables includes 
characteristics of the loans, other than those used as dependent variables, which also 
relate to demand-side and credit risk factors determining loan contract features. 
Additionally, year dummies are included as explanatory variables. Appendix B provides 
a detailed description of all explanatory variables, grouped in the described sets. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Basic descriptive statistics of the main variables is provided by Table 3.1. It 
shows that the average spread of the deals is 188.8 basis points over LIBOR, while 
average maturity is 55.3 months (3.7 on a log scale). The mean deal amount is at 396 
millions of US dollars (the mean of the logarithm of deal amount is 18.8), with a high 
percentage of loans (63%) made to borrowers located in the same country as the lender. 
Regarding the variables describing banks‘ characteristics, the average annual total assets 
of a bank are 204 billions of US dollars (the mean of the logarithm of bank total assets 
over the whole sample of deals is 20), while mean leverage is at 94%. The variables on 
regulatory measures indicate that Capital stringency has a mean value of 6.4 in a range 
between 2 and 10, Official supervisory power has a mean value of 11.1, ranging from 4 
to 14, and Private Monitoring has a mean value of 8.8 and ranges from 5 to 11. On the 
borrowers‘ side, Table 3.1 indicates that La Porta et al (1998).‘s Creditor Rights index 
has a mean value of 1.5, ranging from 0 to 4 and that the Sovereign Rating Score of 
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credit risk has a mean value of 2.4, ranging from 1 to 24. Finally, the set of 
macroeconomic variables related to a borrower country‘s GDP indicates a wide 
dispersion of values among the borrowers‘ countries. 
In general, our heterogeneous sample of countries offers high enough variability 
across the different variables for conducting an econometric analysis. Table 3.2 presents 
the mean values of bank regulations and other institutional country level variables, for 
each lender country in our sample, while Table 3.3 shows country mean values of 
variables describing macroeconomic and creditors‘ rights conditions of borrower 
countries. 
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Percentile 
10% 
Percentile 
25% 
Median Percentile 
75% 
Percentile 
90% 
Spread (basis points) 32,354 188.80 172.98 -295 15,000 40 75 155 250 350 
Log of Maturity (months) 41,965 3.66 0.82 0 10.09 2.48 3.18 4.01 4.09 4.43 
Capital 46,453 6.38 1.25 2 10 5 6 6 7 7 
Official 46,453 11.14 2.36 4 14 7 9 12 13 13 
Private Monitoring 46,453 8.79 1.36 5 11 7 8 9 10 10 
Log of Deal Amount 46,453 18.76 1.47 0 24.61 16.86 17.81 18.81 19.74 20.61 
Lender Size (Log of Assets) 46,453 20.03 1.06 13.09 21.40 18.75 19.62 20.27 20.81 21.10 
Lender Leverage 46,453 0.94 0.03 0.51 1.25 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.97 
Borrower Rating Score* 46,453 1.22 2.13 0 6 0 0 0 3 5 
Creditor Rights 46,453 1.49 1.00 0 4 1 1 1 2 3 
Financial Development  46,453 0.84 0.42 0 2.01 0.48 0.52 0.85 1.10 1.45 
Log of GDP 46,453 8.06 1.56 1.05 9.49 5.70 7.03 9.08 9.26 9.43 
Log of GDP per capita 46,453 10.19 0.75 5.95 11.41 9.51 10.22 10.46 10.54 10.64 
GDP growth 46,453 3.06 1.81 -13.13 30.55 0.88 1.99 3.04 3.85 4.53 
Sovereign Rating Score 46,453 2.43 2.87 1 24 1 1 1 3 6 
Same Country 46,453 0.63 0.48 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
* Zero if unrated. 
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Table 3.2 – Lender Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean of country-specific variables in 
the 1998-2006 period) 
 
  Country Capital Official 
Private  
Monitoring 
Financial 
Development 
Rule of 
Law 
Number 
of Banks 
1 ARGENTINA 7.5 9.8 8.3 0.17 -0.37 88 
2 AUSTRALIA 6.4 11.5 9.8 0.88 1.77 52 
3 AUSTRIA 7.8 12.1 6.0 1.03 1.83 921 
4 BELGIUM 6.6 11.1 7.0 0.75 1.41 112 
5 BRAZIL 6.6 13.7 8.7 0.30 -0.34 181 
6 CANADA 4.0 7.5 9.0 1.02 1.77 63 
7 CHILE 5.6 10.6 7.3 0.59 1.16 28 
8 DENMARK 7.1 8.9 9.3 1.10 1.87 181 
9 EGYPT 5.0 13.2 9.0 0.48 -0.06 41 
10 FINLAND 4.7 7.7 9.1 0.59 1.89 10 
11 FRANCE 6.0 7.3 6.2 0.86 1.35 366 
12 GERMANY 6.3 8.8 7.5 1.13 1.70 1999 
13 GREECE 4.9 10.6 7.2 0.57 0.74 27 
14 HONG KONG 6.0 11.0 8.5 1.53 1.18 164 
15 INDIA 7.6 9.2 6.9 0.29 0.12 96 
16 INDONESIA 5.9 12.3 8.4 0.28 -0.85 148 
17 IRELAND 4.9 10.5 9.2 1.09 1.61 53 
18 ISRAEL 5.5 8.3 9.6 0.80 0.88 22 
19 ITALY 5.4 6.6 7.2 0.74 0.72 845 
20 JAPAN 6.4 12.0 9.4 1.44 1.39 248 
21 JORDAN 7.7 10.1 7.4 0.72 0.37 20 
22 KOREA (South) 4.5 10.5 10.0 0.79 0.72 20 
23 MALAYSIA 3.9 11.6 9.3 1.28 0.46 29 
24 MEXICO 7.4 9.5 7.9 0.17 -0.45 38 
25 NETHERLANDS 5.3 7.1 8.2 1.55 1.75 586 
26 NORWAY 7.5 8.7 7.5 0.70 1.93 15 
27 PAKISTAN 8.5 13.3 8.5 0.24 -0.82 38 
28 PHILIPPINES 5.6 11.3 8.5 0.35 -0.46 45 
29 PORTUGAL 6.8 13.6 7.5 1.22 1.16 59 
30 SINGAPORE 7.2 9.6 8.9 1.03 1.62 125 
31 SOUTH AFRICA 8.3 6.4 9.2 0.65 0.15 51 
32 SPAIN 9.6 9.6 8.3 1.03 1.25 286 
33 SWEDEN 2.9 6.3 6.9 0.74 1.83 25 
34 SWITZERLAND 6.2 13.6 8.1 1.61 1.98 370 
35 TAIWAN 5.8 11.3 8.3 . 0.84 40 
36 THAILAND 5.6 9.7 8.3 1.14 0.24 26 
37 UNITED KINGDOM 6.7 10.1 9.6 1.34 1.73 394 
38 USA 6.7 13.0 9.2 0.51 1.60 8697 
39 VENEZUELA 3.9 12.1 5.6 0.10 -0.90 24 
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Table 3.3 – Borrower Country Descriptive Statistics (Number of loans and mean of variables across the 1998-2006 period)  
  Country Loans 
Creditor 
Rights 
GDP 
(bn USD) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Sovereign 
Score 
   
Country Loans 
Creditor 
Rights 
GDP 
(bn USD) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Sovereign 
Score 
1 Argentina 178 1 220 5,939 2.80 18.89  43 Kuwait 15 - 48 18,479 5.80 4.78 
2 Australia 1,218 1 500 25,346 3.55 2.56  44 Latvia 4 - 11 4,551 7.75 8.22 
3 Austria 42 3 241 29,761 2.26 1.00  45 Lithuania 11 - 17 4,799 6.54 9.22 
4 Azerbaijan 5 - 8 970 12.28 12.25  46 Luxembourg 51 - 27 59,068 5.40 1.00 
5 Bahrain 19 - 9 13,444 6.51 8.00  47 Malaysia 412 4 107 4,401 4.42 8.67 
6 Belgium 128 2 292 28,156 2.33 3.11  48 Mali 3 - 4 330 5.09 16.00 
7 Bolivia 4 - 9 994 3.26 16.00  49 Malta 3 - 5 11,753 1.29 6.00 
8 Brazil 356 1 718 4,096 2.57 13.67  50 Mexico 381 0 608 6,089 3.62 10.56 
9 Bulgaria 19 - 18 2,311 3.89 11.71  51 Netherlands 558 2 488 30,389 2.59 1.00 
10 Cameroon 2 - 13 766 4.05 15.00  52 New Zealand 129 3 73 18,396 3.04 2.20 
11 Canada 1,490 1 837 26,670 3.46 2.00  53 Nigeria 3 4 67 518 7.32 13.00 
12 Chile 213 2 88 5,653 3.94 6.78  54 Norway 197 2 213 46,757 2.70 1.00 
13 China 293 - 1,549 1,205 9.21 6.89  55 Panama 32 - 13 4,226 5.08 11.00 
14 Colombia 51 0 97 2,241 2.64 11.22  56 Papua New Guinea 8 - 4 747 0.82 14.57 
15 Costa Rica 8 - 17 4,256 5.34 12.00  57 Peru 39 0 64 2,447 3.88 12.38 
16 Croatia 38 - 27 6,054 4.00 10.22  58 Philippines 190 0 83 1,051 4.18 11.50 
17 Cyprus 5 - 12 16,970 3.75 4.50  59 Poland 100 - 217 5,669 4.26 8.11 
18 Czech Republic 67 - 84 8,233 2.87 7.56  60 Portugal 53 1 143 13,761 2.25 3.00 
19 Denmark 64 3 201 37,423 2.17 1.67  61 Romania 57 - 59 2,706 2.66 13.11 
20 Dominican Rep. 1 - 21 2,548 6.00 14.00  62 Russia 288 - 456 3,147 5.06 12.67 
21 Ecuador 4 4 27 2,082 3.37 16.67  63 Saudi Arabia 19 - 216 10,023 3.35 5.50 
22 Egypt 46 4 89 1,350 5.03 10.56  64 Serbia 1 - 20 2,475 2.30 13.00 
23 El Salvador 9 - 14 2,209 2.91 11.00  65 Singapore 398 4 99 24,010 5.39 1.56 
24 Estonia 7 - 9 6,445 7.81 7.50  66 Slovakia 30 - 31 5,731 4.37 9.75 
25 Finland 140 1 153 29,366 3.77 1.11  67 Slovenia 13 - 29 14,317 4.21 5.44 
26 France 1,225 0 1,675 27,987 2.31 1.00  68 South Africa 66 3 166 3,655 3.45 9.78 
27 Germany 770 3 2,323 28,212 1.44 1.00  69 Spain 757 2 797 19,083 3.83 1.78 
28 Ghana 8 - 8 406 4.89 14.50  70 Sri Lanka 1 3 18 973 4.87 13.00 
29 Greece 195 1 175 15,898 4.09 6.56  71 Sweden 250 2 291 32,532 3.22 2.22 
30 Hong Kong 580 4 170 25,265 3.74 4.33  72 Switzerland 209 1 304 42,144 1.92 1.00 
31 Hungary 51 - 72 7,074 4.42 7.67  73 Taiwan 1,039 2 315 14,037 4.38 5.00 
32 Iceland 19 - 11 36,989 4.60 4.00  74 Thailand 366 3 144 2,270 2.79 9.44 
33 India 239 4 559 538 6.53 11.14  75 Tunisia 15 - 23 2,393 4.88 9.33 
34 Indonesia 109 4 216 1,019 2.69 14.89  76 Turkey 79 2 316 4,907 4.44 14.00 
35 Iran 39 - 134 2,042 4.71 13.75  77 Turkmenistan 1 - 9 1,934 12.24 15.00 
36 Ireland 94 1 135 34,184 7.24 1.11  78 USA 23,432 1 10,501 36,553 3.12 1.00 
37 Israel 24 4 118 18,274 3.58 7.00  79 Ukraine 30 - 54 1,134 4.65 14.17 
38 Italy 406 2 1,393 24,257 1.50 3.44  80 United Kingdom 2,167 4 1,737 29,236 2.85 1.00 
39 Jamaica 2 - 8 3,133 0.92 14.00  81 Uruguay 10 2 18 5,350 1.84 10.00 
40 Japan 6,069 2 4,299 33,819 1.12 2.44  82 Venezuela 53 - 113 4,536 3.01 14.00 
41 Kazakhstan 31 - 34 2,249 7.48 11.44  83 Vietnam 16 - 38 476 7.12 13.00 
42 Korea (South) 699 3 583 12,286 4.37 7.22   Total 46,453      
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Initial evidence of the correlation between variables is shown in Table 3.4. 
Remarkably, the variable for Capital requirements stringency shows a slightly negative 
correlation with the loan Spread, which suggests that, when forced to improve their 
level of capitalization, banks become sound and can afford to demand lower interest 
rates to borrowing firms. Concerning the other variables of bank regulations (Official 
supervisory power and Private Monitoring), they are positively correlated with Spread, 
and negatively correlated with loan Maturity. Hence, contrary to the Capital regulation 
measure, banks seem to transfer the pressure they suffer from Official supervision and 
Private Monitoring to their loans by increasing loan interest rates and shortening loan 
maturities. It is noticeable the positive correlations between bank regulations 
themselves, especially Capital with Official (26%) and Official with Private Monitoring 
(43%). In principle, these correlations seem to support the bank regulatory policy 
approach of reinforcing mechanisms designed to influence bank behaviour. Regarding 
other country level controls, the level of Financial Development of the lender country 
has respectively small negative and positive correlations with Spread and Maturity, 
suggesting that the higher the level of Financial Development, the less risky are loan 
contracts. Turning to borrower country-specific controls, we notice that the Creditor 
Rights variable is weakly negatively correlated with Spread and positively correlated 
with Maturity. It might indicate that protecting creditors is beneficial in terms of 
reduction of risk taking in lending. Finally, given the extremely high negative 
correlation between borrower country Sovereign Credit Score and Log of GDP per 
capita (-88%), we decided to not include the last variable in the regressions to avoid 
problems of multicollinearity.  
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Table 3.4 – Correlation Matrix (Sample of 46,453 loans made by 278 banks of 39 countries, in the 1998-2006 period) 
 
 Spread  Matur. Capital Official Private 
Monit. 
Deal 
amount 
Lender 
Size 
Lender 
Lever. 
Borr. 
Score 
Credit. 
Rights 
Fin. 
Devel. 
Log of 
GDP pc 
GDP 
Growth 
Spread 1             
Log of Maturity  0.15 1            
Capital -0.04 0.10 1           
Official 0.03 -0.11 0.26 1          
Private Monitoring 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.43 1         
Log of Deal Amount -0.17 0.06 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 1        
Lender Size  0.00 -0.05 0.19 -0.01 0.09 0.20 1       
Lender Leverage -0.08 0.03 -0.14 -0.56 -0.39 0.11 0.24 1      
Borrower Rating Score 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.38 0.17 -0.04 1     
(borrower) Cred. Rights -0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.16 -0.21 1    
(lender) Fin. Develop.  -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.33 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.50 -0.04 0.27 1   
(borrower) Log GDP pc 0.02 -0.09 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.32 -0.10 0.17 -0.13 -0.05 1  
(borrower) GDP growth -0.04 0.13 0.14 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 0.00* -0.09 -0.33 1 
(borrower) Sov. Score 0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.23 0.12 -0.20 0.11 0.07 -0.88 0.20 
* Not Significant (at the 5% level). 
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3.4  Methodology 
 
Our sample is structured in individual observations of loan deals originated 
across a 9-year period. One or more banks participate in each deal, and each bank 
participates in more than one deal, in each year
10
. Therefore, the loan deal is the level of 
analysis that allows the best use of the information available, regarding each individual 
loan characteristics
11
. Each loan deal is a unique event that produces the characteristics 
of a loan contract and for such it is treated as a separate individual. This invalidates any 
possibility of using fixed effects techniques across deals. 
We concluded that OLS regression is the method of analysis more suitable to our 
sample. We pooled all individual observations distributed across the 1998-2006 period 
to undertake single regressions. Year dummies were included in all regressions to take 
into account possible cyclical and time specific factors not captured by the explanatory 
variables. It is assumed that observations are independent across banks, but not 
necessarily independent within the same bank. Hence, robust standard errors clustered 
by banks are reported in all regressions. 
We recognize that many loan characteristics are jointly determined, which raises 
a concern for possible endogeneity of regressors if those characteristics are used as 
explanatory variables. We minimize this issue by simply restricting the loan-specific 
explanatory variables to the deal amount and dummies for most common deal purposes 
                                                          
10
 Although the same loan may be extended by many banks (e.g., a syndicated loan), there is no loan 
replication in the sample, i.e., a loan deal is included only once. 
11
 An alternative analysis could be panel regressions on bank-level data across the 1998-2006 period. That 
would require the aggregation of information about the deals in which a bank participates in each year. 
Such aggregation, however, would imply losing of information. 
Chapter Three: Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts 
82 
 
and deal types (see Appendix B). We do not use loan Spread or Maturity as independent 
variables, i.e., each one appears only once in each regression, always as a dependent 
variable. Otherwise, more sophisticated techniques would be required, instead of plain 
OLS regressions. We also believe that the problem of omitted variables as a source of 
endogeneity is minimized with the use of a comprehensive set of regressors grouped in 
country-level, lender-specific, borrower-specific, and loan-level explanatory variables 
representing supply and demand side factors affecting loan contract features. Problems 
of reverse causality are not a concern, as the majority of our explanatory variables are at 
the country-level, whereas the dependent variables are at the transaction level. 
The cross-country characteristic of our sample reveals another source of 
concern, which is the high dispersion in the number of observations per country. High 
economic developed lender countries have in general much more observations than low 
developed ones. For example, banks in the U.S. participate in 39 % of the loans. A 
problem exists if these banks drive the overall results by putting more weight on the 
country explanatory variables. To tackle this problem, we performed a robustness check 
by running all the regressions excluding U.S. lenders. The (unreported) results are not 
substantially changed, and validate the conclusions of this chapter. 
 
3.5  Results 
 
To test hypotheses H1 to H3 proposed in Section 3.2, we ran OLS regressions of 
loan Spread and Maturity on bank regulations variables, while controlling for the 
country, lender, borrower and loan specific factors described in Section 3.3. The 
regressions are for the whole period (1998-2006), and encompass the three Barth et al. 
Chapter Three: Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts 
83 
 
(2001, 2006, 2008) surveys sub-periods of 1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006. 
Results are in Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5 – Relationship between Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts Characteristics 
Dependent variables in columns. OLS regressions
+
 over the period 1998-2006. Robust standard 
errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific 
controls (industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted.  
Explanatory  Spread  Log of Maturity a 
Variables R1 R2 R3 R4 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
 
1 Capital  -6.63 *** 
(2.05) 
19.26 * 
(10.85) 
4.10 *** 
(1.00) 
-7.97 ** 
(3.39) 
2 Capital ^2 
 
-2.05 ** 
(0.83)  
0.95 *** 
(0.28) 
3 Official -0.02  
(2.58) 
-0.74  
(2.69) 
-2.12 *** 
(0.58) 
-1.72 *** 
(0.55) 
4 Private 
Monitoring 
1.62  
(3.26) 
0.20  
(3.08) 
-0.31  
(0.98) 
0.28  
(0.92) 
      
 Lender, borrower and loan specific  
5 Lender Log 
(Assets) 
0.32  
(3.13) 
-0.98  
(3.04) 
-2.60 ** 
(1.01) 
-1.99 * 
(1.06) 
6 Lender 
Leverage 
-2.24  
(2.61) 
-1.94  
(2.61) 
-0.85  
(0.80) 
-0.91  
(0.79) 
7 Borrower 
Rating 
6.81 *** 
(0.79) 
6.78 *** 
(0.77) 
2.46 *** 
(0.50) 
2.46 *** 
(0.49) 
8 Log (Deal 
Amount) 
-20.83 *** 
(1.27) 
-20.90 *** 
(1.27) 
6.47 *** 
(1.08) 
6.41 *** 
(1.08) 
9 Same Country -12.10 ** 
(5.15) 
-12.15 ** 
(5.11) 
-1.71  
(3.50) 
-1.37  
(3.46) 
     
 Borrower Country Specific (except b)  
10 Creditor Rights -1.91  
(1.76) 
-2.35  
(1.72) 
-0.16  
(1.01) 
0.10  
(0.96) 
11 Creditor Rights 
missing 
-2.54  
(10.03) 
-5.37  
(9.90) 
-0.23  
(4.88) 
1.13  
(4.82) 
12 Log (GDP) 19.35 *** 
(1.94) 
18.98 *** 
(1.88) 
-4.48 *** 
(0.82) 
-4.29 *** 
(0.81) 
13 GDP growth -4.33 *** 
(1.05) 
-4.20 *** 
(1.05) 
1.67 *** 
(0.49) 
1.58 *** 
(0.49) 
14 Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
7.15 *** 
(1.05) 
7.09 *** 
(1.04) 
-2.82 *** 
(0.66) 
-2.79 *** 
(0.66) 
15 Lender Country 
Fin. Develop. b 
-12.81  
(10.98) 
-14.75  
(11.14) 
3.03  
(3.45) 
4.05  
(3.59) 
     
Observations 32,354 32,354 41,965 41,965 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.35 
   + 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
   a
 Coefficients and standard errors of Log (Maturity) regressions are multiplied by 100. 
 
Regression R1 of Table 3.5 shows that Capital requirements stringency is 
negatively related to loan Spread. However, the inclusion of a quadratic term in 
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regression R2 of Table 3.5 reveals an inverse U-shaped relationship between Capital 
requirements and Spread, with the maximum Spread occurring at a Capital level of 4.9, 
which is in the 10%-quantile of the sample. It means that countries with low or high 
levels of Capital stringency are the ones that experience lower Spread, whereas 
intermediate levels of Capital are associated with higher loan Spread.  
The results concerning the effect of Capital on loan Maturity are very similar. 
Regression R4 in Table 3.5 shows a U-shaped relationship between Capital 
requirements and Maturity, with minimum Maturity at a Capital level of 4.2, which is 
also in the 10%-quantile of the sample. It means that loans in countries with low or high 
levels of Capital stringency experience longer maturities.  
Respectively for loan Spread and Maturity, the inverse and direct U-shaped 
relationships with Capital stringency found in Regressions R2 and R4 in Table 3.5, 
reveal a consistency between loan spread and maturity as risk measures. Theoretically, 
it may be supported by the so-called ―signalling hypothesis‖ (Dennis et al., 2000), by 
which a longer maturity is a signal of good credit quality, which in turn translates to a 
lower loan rate.  
Summing up, these results show an inverse U-shaped relationship between loan 
risk characteristics and Capital requirements stringency: low priced risk terms of loan 
contracts, represented by low Spread and long Maturity, are associated with either low 
or high Capital requirements stringency, while loan contracts with higher risk 
characteristics prevail when the stringency of Capital regulations is moderate. Although 
consistent, these results do not unambiguously support hypothesis H1. For medium to 
high levels of Capital stringency, risk measures behave as proposed by the public 
interest view of regulation implicit in H1, i.e., risk measures decrease as Capital 
stringency grows. Nevertheless, the low risk reflected in loan contracts in countries with 
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low Capital stringency and its increasing behaviour up to medium levels of Capital 
stringency threatens this view, although it is well grounded in some theoretical models, 
notably the ones that emphasize the role of banks as monitors for moral hazard risks. 
For instance, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) argue that the issuance of equity to meet 
capital requirements decrease loan monitoring incentives as a result of the dilution of 
insiders‘ shareholders stake. One of the consequences is higher loan loss probabilities, 
which reflect in higher spreads. Another interpretation for the increasing relationship 
between risk measures and capital stringency for low to medium levels of the latter is 
that banks react to moderate capital regulations stringency by increasing spreads and 
shortening maturities, without changing their credit policies in the direction of 
strengthening loan screening and monitoring, which in turn would result in less risky 
loan contracts. Under this interpretation, only when capital regulations stringency is 
sufficiently large, banks strengthen their credit policies. A third possible explanation for 
the observation of riskier loan contracts at moderate stringency of capital regulations 
may be that incentives to risk-shifting are greater at higher probabilities of default 
deriving from moderate levels of capital stringency. By contrast, at high stringency of 
capital regulations, probabilities of default are lower, resulting in lower incentives to 
risk-shifting and less risky loan contracts. 
Regarding the other regulatory measures, we do not find any relationships 
between loan Spread and Official supervisory power or Private Monitoring. However, 
Official supervisory power has a significant negative impact on loan Maturity. Together, 
the evidence found is against hypothesis H2, while hypothesis H3 is not supported. 
Concerning the role of bank supervision, it suggests that the private interest view 
prevails, in the sense that more empowered supervisors are associated to riskier bank 
lending, resulting in shorter maturities of loan contracts. Another interpretation may be 
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that official supervision induces more conservative behaviour on the part of banks, 
which mitigate risk through the reduction of loan maturity. More conclusions on the 
effects of the three bank regulatory indices on loan contracts characteristics are given 
later in this section, when interactions between them are introduced. 
Concerning control variables, borrowers with poor senior debt Rating obtain 
funds through loans with higher spreads, according to regressions R1 and R2 in Table 
3.5. These expected results for Spread contrast with the opposed ones obtained for loan 
Maturity. However, consistently with Diamond‘s (1991) model, borrowers may use 
short loan maturity as a way to improve their ratings. Note that we found lower spreads 
for better rated firms, but also shorter maturities, as lenders may want to update such 
favourable credit conditions to borrowers in a frequent basis, particularly larger banks, 
that have less soft information (negative coefficient for Lender Assets in regression R3 
of Table 3.5). The coefficient for Log of Deal Amount suggests that larger loan amounts 
are associated with loan contracts in better terms, which are captured by lower spreads 
and longer loan maturities. In addition, there is evidence that lower spreads are charged 
in loans extended to borrowers located in the same country as the lender, which 
suggests that problems of information asymmetry influence the risk terms of loan 
contracts. Concerning country-specific variables, the higher (worse) the Sovereign 
Credit Risk, the higher the loan contract risk measures (higher the Spread and shorter 
the Maturity), which is an expected result. Surprisingly, the variable for the economy 
size of borrower country, given by Log(GDP), has a positive effect on risk measures. 
On the other hand, variable GDP Growth reduces spreads and increases maturities, 
which supports an expected relationship between relaxed risk pricing and growth cycles. 
The lender country level of Financial Development does not enter significantly to 
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explain neither loan Spread nor Maturity. However, further analyses are offered for this 
variable later. 
Next, we seek to examine how interactions between bank regulations may affect 
loan spreads and maturity. We included interaction terms in the previous regressions 
and reported only the significant results in Table 3.6. From regression R3 in Table 3.6, 
we found again that Official supervisory power linearly decreases loan Maturity, but it 
interacts with Capital stringency to positively influence loan Maturity. Given the 
quadratic relationship between Capital and Maturity, we conclude that for low levels of 
Capital, where Maturity decreases with Capital, the opposite (positive) sign of the 
interaction term (Capital*Official) means that Capital decreases Maturity more for low 
levels of Official. In other words, it suggests that in countries where supervisory power 
is high, more stringent capital regulations are less prone to increase risk by decreasing 
maturity, which means these bank regulations work as substitutes. For higher levels of 
Capital, where Maturity increases with Capital, Official reinforces Capital to increase 
loan Maturity. Summing up, for low levels of capital stringency, official supervisory 
power counteracts with capital regulation to lower the decrease in loan maturity, while 
for high levels of capital stringency, the mechanisms reinforce each other to increase 
maturity.  
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Table 3.6 –Effect of Interactions between Bank Regulations on Loan Spread and Maturity 
Dependent variables: Spread and Log(Maturity). OLS regressions
+
 over the period 1998-2006. 
Robust standard errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other 
loan-specific controls (industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted.  
 Spread Log of Maturity a 
Explanatory Variables R1 R2 R3 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
 
1 Capital  47.07 *** 
(11.48) 
-16.39 *** 
(4.50) 
-12.91 *** 
(4.37) 
2 Capital^2 -1.71 ** 
(0.84) 
0.87 *** 
(0.31) 
0.78 *** 
(0.28) 
3 Official -1.20  
(2.26) 
-1.57 *** 
(0.56) 
-6.78 *** 
(2.18) 
4 Private Monitoring 22.97 *** 
(6.15) 
-6.32 ** 
(2.51) 
0.72  
(0.93) 
5 Capital x Official 
  
0.79 *** 
(0.30) 
6 Capital x  Private 
Monitoring 
-4.03 *** 
(1.29) 
1.17 ** 
(0.48) 
 
  
Lender, borrower and loan specific 
 
  
7 Lender Log (Assets) 1.08  
(3.15) 
-2.52 ** 
(1.11) 
-2.17 ** 
(1.06) 
8 Lender Leverage -3.22  
(2.72) 
-0.55  
(0.74) 
-0.60  
(0.74) 
9 Borrower Rating 6.72 *** 
(0.78) 
2.48 *** 
(0.49) 
2.41 *** 
(0.48) 
10 Log (Deal Amount) -20.75 *** 
(1.25) 
6.34 *** 
(1.09) 
6.37 *** 
(1.08) 
11 Same Country -10.75 ** 
(5.11) 
-1.52  
(3.48) 
-1.39  
(3.46) 
    
  Borrower Country Specific (except a)  
12 Creditor Rights -2.49  
(1.74) 
0.13  
(0.95) 
0.29  
(0.93) 
13 Creditor Rights missing -5.98  
(9.83) 
1.28  
(4.83) 
1.27  
(4.77) 
14 Log (GDP) 18.73 *** 
(1.84) 
-4.25 *** 
(0.81) 
-4.28 *** 
(0.79) 
15 GDP growth -4.43 *** 
(1.05) 
1.61 *** 
(0.49) 
1.53 *** 
(0.49) 
16 Sovereign Credit Risk 7.06 *** 
(1.02) 
-2.76 *** 
(0.66) 
-2.74 *** 
(0.65) 
17 Lender Country Fin. 
Develop. a 
-13.42  
(10.21) 
3.91  
(3.70) 
3.25  
(3.41) 
    
Observations 32,354 41,965 41,965 
R-squared 0.21 0.35 0.35 
    + 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
     a
 Coefficients and standard errors of Log (Maturity) regressions are multiplied by 100. 
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The evidence on interactions between capital stringency and private monitoring 
to influence risk comes both from spread and maturity measures. Regressions R1 and 
R2 in Table 3.6 convey the same message: for low levels of capital stringency, where 
Spread increases and Maturity decreases with Capital, Capital increases risk measures 
more for low levels of Private Monitoring; for high levels of capital stringency, Private 
Monitoring helps Capital to reduce loan risk characteristics (decreases spread and 
increases maturity). 
We conclude that the evidence regarding interactions between bank regulations 
is mixed. On the one hand, Capital and Official complement each other to reflect less 
risky loan contracts (through increasing loan Maturity) only when the level of Capital 
stringency is high. Similarly, Capital and Private Monitoring complement each other to 
reduce loan contract risk measures (through decreasing Spread and increasing Maturity) 
only when Capital stringency is high. On the other hand, Official and Private 
Monitoring behave as substitutes to Capital in reducing loan contracts risk measures 
when a country‘s level of Capital stringency is low.  
Results in Tables 3.7 to 3.9 provide evidence on interactions between regulations 
and other country-level factors. We split the sample in sub-samples of low and high 
Rule of Law, lender country Financial Development, and Competition (measured by 
lender country‘s logarithm of number of banks), according to their medians across 
lender countries. Concerning the influence of Capital stringency variable on loan 
contracts risk characteristics, the results show a sharp contrast between sub-samples of 
low and high values of those lender country variables. Regressions in second, fourth and 
sixth columns of both Tables 3.7 and 3.8 point that capital stringency decreases priced 
risk loan characteristics (i.e., decreases Spread and increases Maturity) especially in 
lender countries with high levels of legal enforcement (measured by Rule of Law), 
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financial development and competition. These findings are very reasonable, as they 
highlight the importance of a country‘s levels of financial development, enforcement of 
law, and banking industry competition, as mechanisms that enable the effectiveness of 
capital regulations in reducing loan risk terms. 
Table 3.7 –Bank Regulations and Loan Spread: sub-samples of high and low lender 
country Rule of Law, Financial Development and Competition.  
Dependent variable: Spread. OLS regressions
+
 over the period 1998-2006. Robust standard 
errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific 
controls (industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted. 
Explanatory  Rule of Law Financial Development  Competition  
Variables Low High Low High Low High 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
    
1 Capital  -0.66  
(5.92) 
-6.02 ** 
(2.32) 
-0.38  
(3.69) 
-6.63 *** 
(1.81) 
-6.30 ** 
(3.00) 
-6.03 ** 
(2.48) 
2 Official 11.76 ** 
(4.55) 
0.34  
(2.87) 
-6.63 ** 
(2.94) 
-1.43  
(2.41) 
0.13  
(2.64) 
1.49  
(3.27) 
3 Private 
Monitoring 
-3.89  
(7.01) 
1.48  
(3.30) 
7.77 * 
(4.04) 
-1.71  
(2.94) 
-12.75 ** 
(5.91) 
2.18  
(4.17) 
  
Lender, borrower and loan specific 
    
     
4 Lender Log 
(Assets) 
-17.51 ** 
(8.50) 
-1.16  
(3.86) 
-2.21  
(6.05) 
-9.66 ** 
(4.78) 
-11.02 ** 
(5.20) 
-3.03  
(4.14) 
5 Lender 
Leverage 
4.33 ** 
(1.89) 
-2.46  
(3.09) 
-4.79  
(4.52) 
4.56 ** 
(1.94) 
4.41 *** 
(1.63) 
-1.83  
(2.91) 
6 Borrower 
Rating 
3.96  
(10.44) 
6.68 *** 
(0.78) 
6.37 *** 
(1.10) 
8.06 *** 
(1.40) 
9.39 *** 
(1.81) 
6.53 *** 
(0.82) 
7 Log (Deal 
Amount) 
-5.51  
(4.77) 
-21.49 *** 
(1.26) 
-23.35 *** 
(1.44) 
-16.77 *** 
(2.05) 
-13.74 *** 
(3.48) 
-20.97 *** 
(1.29) 
8 Same Country -3.09  
(15.58) 
-12.95 ** 
(5.50) 
-33.21 *** 
(10.92) 
-16.92 *** 
(6.20) 
9.69  
(10.35) 
-15.50 ** 
(6.22) 
       
 Borrower Country Specific (except a)     
9 Creditor Rights -12.36 * 
(7.03) 
-2.65  
(2.03) 
-5.76  
(4.21) 
0.46  
(1.88) 
-3.79  
(5.38) 
-3.28  
(2.05) 
10 Creditor Rights 
missing 
-89.88 *** 
(32.31) 
0.15  
(9.96) 
-10.10  
(11.22) 
-11.53  
(12.53) 
-75.33 *** 
(24.87) 
-1.33  
(10.09) 
11 Log (GDP) 10.92 * 
(5.68) 
18.51 *** 
(1.88) 
23.09 *** 
(2.90) 
13.83 *** 
(1.81) 
25.07 *** 
(3.53) 
17.67 *** 
(2.02) 
12 GDP growth 2.50  
(2.28) 
-4.77 *** 
(1.07) 
-6.23 *** 
(1.67) 
-1.56  
(1.29) 
2.48  
(1.70) 
-4.69 *** 
(1.09) 
13 Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
11.27 *** 
(2.79) 
6.57 *** 
(1.14) 
5.48 *** 
(1.13) 
6.81 *** 
(1.40) 
14.57 *** 
(2.31) 
6.17 *** 
(1.10) 
14 Lender Country 
Fin. Develop. a 
105.19 ** 
(47.36) 
-12.41  
(11.39) 
-14.06  
(66.91) 
16.87  
(13.37) 
51.59  
(35.21) 
-12.95  
(12.52) 
       
Observations 1,674 30,514 16,531 14,028 2,638 29,666 
R-squared 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.21 
+ 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
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From the regressions in third column of Table 3.7, and first and third columns of 
Table 3.8, we conclude that private monitoring increases risk characteristics of loan 
contracts in countries with poor developed legal and financial systems. Such evidence 
on private monitoring supports the public interest view of regulation, according to 
which it is not recommended to rely on the external monitoring of markets to contain 
bank risk taking when financial development is not high enough. 
Table 3.8 –Lender Country Bank Regulations and Loan Maturity: sub-samples of high 
and low lender country Rule of Law, Financial Development and Competition.  
Dependent variable: Log of Maturity. OLS regressions
+
 over the period 1998-2006. Robust 
standard errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-
specific controls (industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted. All coefficients and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
Explanatory  Rule of Law Financial Development  Competition  
Variables Low High Low High Low High 
 Lender Country’s Bank Regulations     
1 Capital  -0.86  
(1.73) 
4.55 *** 
(1.30) 
-0.39  
(1.57) 
3.95 *** 
(0.59) 
-0.06  
(1.00) 
4.84 *** 
(1.50) 
2 Official -1.55  
(1.37) 
-2.49 *** 
(0.64) 
-0.11  
(0.90) 
-3.07 *** 
(0.85) 
-4.78 *** 
(1.17) 
-2.45 *** 
(0.76) 
3 Private 
Monitoring 
-8.22 *** 
(2.22) 
0.12  
(0.98) 
-7.45 *** 
(1.73) 
-1.55  
(0.95) 
-1.82  
(1.94) 
-0.11  
(1.22) 
 Lender, borrower and loan specific     
4 Lender Log 
(Assets) 
1.43  
(2.78) 
-0.26  
(1.60) 
-2.95 * 
(1.51) 
-4.26 *** 
(1.31) 
-2.86  
(2.07) 
0.01  
(1.57) 
5 Lender 
Leverage 
0.90  
(0.62) 
-1.33  
(0.98) 
-1.24  
(0.91) 
2.28 *** 
(0.87) 
2.30 ** 
(0.91) 
-1.50  
(0.95) 
6 Borrower 
Rating 
-3.04  
(2.19) 
2.36 *** 
(0.48) 
1.60 *** 
(0.36) 
2.15 *** 
(0.53) 
1.41  
(0.91) 
2.40 *** 
(0.50) 
7 Log (Deal 
Amount) 
8.98 *** 
(1.54) 
5.96 *** 
(1.14) 
9.92 *** 
(1.27) 
2.99 *** 
(0.68) 
7.74 *** 
(1.47) 
6.11 *** 
(1.14) 
8 Same Country 22.24 *** 
(5.73) 
-5.11  
(3.62) 
8.57 *** 
(3.10) 
-7.78 * 
(4.50) 
6.48  
(7.08) 
-4.10  
(3.84) 
 Borrower Country Specific (except a)     
9 Creditor Rights -4.74 ** 
(2.31) 
-0.38  
(1.09) 
0.01  
(1.28) 
0.81  
(0.97) 
-2.02  
(2.06) 
-0.45  
(0.99) 
10 Creditor Rights 
missing 
-12.49  
(11.20) 
4.00  
(5.41) 
5.52  
(8.84) 
-4.63  
(4.64) 
-4.57  
(11.36) 
2.16  
(5.15) 
11 Log (GDP) -7.35 *** 
(2.23) 
-4.19 *** 
(0.76) 
-5.17 *** 
(1.00) 
-5.10 *** 
(0.93) 
0.52  
(2.22) 
-4.73 *** 
(0.69) 
12 GDP growth -1.53  
(1.16) 
1.87 *** 
(0.51) 
1.47 ** 
(0.62) 
0.76  
(0.53) 
0.11  
(0.65) 
1.63 
***(0.55) 
13 Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
-0.40  
(0.93) 
-3.42 *** 
(0.73) 
-1.35 ** 
(0.53) 
-3.72 *** 
(0.55) 
1.03  
(1.03) 
-3.36 *** 
(0.70) 
14 Lender Country 
Fin. Develop. a 
23.88 * 
(12.55) 
2.74  
(3.94) 
-6.09  
(20.73) 
20.23 *** 
(6.51) 
16.44  
(12.67) 
2.90  
(4.10) 
Observations 2,186 39,578 17,180 23,403 3,520 38,306 
R-squared 0.24 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.22 0.36 
+ 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
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We extend our analysis of the influence of institutional factors at the lender 
country-level by including interaction terms between them and bank regulations 
variables in the regressions. There were no significant results for loan Spread, while 
loan Maturity appears affected by these interactions. It suggests that maybe loan Spread 
has lower sensibility to this kind of interactions, when compared to loan Maturity. 
Alternatively, it is the case that loan Spread is well explained by the basic determinants 
of Tables 3.5 and 3.6, with no room for interactions between bank regulations and other 
lender country factors. Table 3.9 reports the significant results for loan Maturity. In 
principle, Rule of Law is not significant to help explaining loan Maturity (results 
unreported). However, regression R1 in Table 3.9 shows that Rule of Law interacts with 
Capital regulations stringency to influence loan Maturity. Similarly to results in Table 
3.5, we found a direct U-shaped relationship between Capital and Maturity. The 
interaction term between Capital and Rule of Law is positive. Accordingly, at low levels 
of Capital stringency, for which Maturity decreases with Capital, the interaction 
produces an opposite effect, which means that Rule of Law interacts with Capital to 
alleviate the decrease in Maturity. For high levels of Capital stringency, at which 
Maturity increases with Capital, the interaction is in the same direction, which means 
that increasing both Rule of Law and Capital has a stronger impact in increasing loan 
Maturity. Therefore, Rule of Law has the unambiguous marginal effect of risk reduction, 
through its combination with Capital stringency to increase the Maturity of loan 
contracts. Figure 3.1 illustrates, for three different levels of Rule of Law, the joint effect 
of Capital and Rule of Law on loan Maturity
12
 according to regression R2. It is clear 
from Figure 3.1 that stricter capital regulations are more effective in increasing the 
                                                          
12
 The lines plotted in Figure 1 correspond to the joint effect of Capital and Rule of Law on Maturity. The 
dependent variable in regression R2 in Table 9 is the logarithm of loan maturity. Hence, the function 
plotted is a factor that, after multiplied by other factor including the remaining explanatory variables, 
equals loan maturity. 
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maturity of loan contracts when the country‘s legal system is more enforceable. 
Moreover, more stringent capital regulations in countries with poor rule of law 
experience a stronger decreasing impact on loan maturities, when compared to countries 
with higher rule of law. Together, the evidence from Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 shows that 
capital regulations are more effective in reducing the risk of lending when legal systems 
are more developed.  
Competition interacts with Capital stringency to positively influence loan 
Maturity, according to regression R2 in Table 3.9. At low levels of Capital, where 
Maturity decreases with Capital, the interaction term has the opposite effect on 
Maturity. Similarly to Rule of Law, Competition has an unambiguous marginal effect of 
decreasing risk of loan contracts, through its joint impact, with Capital stringency, of 
increasing loan Maturity. Figure 3.2 illustrates, for three different levels of Competition, 
the joint effect of Capital and Competition on loan Maturity found in regression R4 of 
Table 3.9. Together with the previous evidence of Tables 3.7 and 3.8, this finding 
supports the idea that more stringent capital regulations are more effective in reducing 
risk characteristics of loan contracts when bank industries are more competitive. Despite 
the negative coefficient of Competition alone, it is clear from Figure 3.2 that the 
positive interaction between it and Capital offsets that negative influence on Maturity 
when Competition is above median and Capital stringency level is greater than 4.  
Our last piece of evidence concerns the interaction of Private Monitoring with 
Rule of Law and Competition. Regressions R3 and R4 in Table 3.9 show positive 
coefficients for the interaction terms between these variables. Given that Private 
Monitoring has a negative coefficient, the effect of interactions is to counterbalance the 
decreasing impact of Private Monitoring on loan Maturity. Precisely, Private 
Monitoring linearly reduces loan Maturity, but this effect is more important when the 
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levels of either Rule of Law or Competition are low. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the 
models of, respectively, regressions R3 and R4. Due to negative coefficients of both 
Private Monitoring and Rule of Law, the combination of low Rule of Law and Private 
Monitoring up to a level of 10 produces the longest maturities. However, Figure 3.3 
shows that the interaction term is able to make increasing the relationship between 
Private Monitoring and loan Maturity when Rule of Law is above its mean.  On the 
other hand, due to a lower negative impact of Competition alone on Maturity (R4), 
when compared to the impact of Rule of Law alone (R3), only the combination of low 
Private Monitoring and low Competition produces the longest maturities. Figure 3.4 
shows that, for levels of Competition above its median, the positive effect of the 
interaction on loan Maturity more than offsets the negative individual impacts of both 
Private Monitoring and Competition on Maturity, resulting in an increasing relationship 
between Private Monitoring and loan Maturity. The evidence adds to that obtained in 
Table 3.6, and reinforces that, although external private monitoring on banks solely 
increases the risk characteristics of loan contracts, its interaction with either Capital 
stringency, Rule of Law, or Competition, highlights its importance as a complementary 
mechanism in the reduction of lending risk. 
Regression R5 in Table 3.9 shows that all previous interaction effects treated in 
regressions R1 to R4 are still present when they are simultaneously included in the same 
model. Finally, we conclude for the evidence of a complementary role of both bank 
competition and legal enforcement to bank regulations in achieving the reduction of 
priced risk characteristics of loan contracts. 
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Table 3.9 –Effects on Loan Maturity of Interactions between Bank Regulations, Rule of 
Law, and Competition 
Dependent variable: Log of Maturity. OLS regressions over the period 1998-2006. Robust 
standard errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-
specific controls (industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted. Coefficients and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
Explanatory Variables R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
  
Lender Country Specific 
  
1 Capital  -15.22 *** 
(4.76) 
-21.36 *** 
(5.45) 
-7.38 ** 
(3.71) 
-15.28 *** 
(4.04) 
-27.23 *** 
(6.20) 
2 Capital^2 0.85 *** 
(0.32) 
1.14 *** 
(0.29) 
0.89 *** 
(0.32) 
1.47 *** 
(0.32) 
1.14 *** 
(0.29) 
3 Official -2.04 *** 
(0.56) 
-2.19 *** 
(0.59) 
-1.44 ** 
(0.62) 
-1.79 *** 
(0.52) 
-2.00 *** 
(0.57) 
4 Private Monitoring 0.71  
(0.90) 
0.15  
(0.88) 
-7.01 ** 
(3.49) 
-7.80 ** 
(3.24) 
-15.08 *** 
(3.99) 
5 Rule of Law -43.01 *** 
(9.89)  
-47.06 ** 
(20.39)  
-90.61 *** 
(21.06) 
6 Competition 
 
-8.32 ** 
(3.64)  
-8.19 * 
(4.51) 
-16.29 *** 
(6.28) 
7 Capital x  
Rule of Law 
6.26 *** 
(1.72)    
4.65 *** 
(1.54) 
8 Capital x 
Competition 
 1.99 *** 
(0.65)   
1.84 *** 
(0.66) 
9 Priv. Monitoring x 
Rule of Law 
 
 
4.80 ** 
(2.29)  
6.01 *** 
(2.00) 
10 Priv. Monitoring x 
Competition 
 
  
1.39 ** 
(0.56) 
1.07 ** 
(0.51) 
 Lender, borrower and loan specific   
11 Lender Log (Assets) -1.57  
(1.06) 
-4.51 *** 
(1.23) 
-1.61  
(1.10) 
-5.16 *** 
(1.25) 
-4.50 *** 
(1.25) 
12 Lender Leverage -0.88  
(0.76) 
0.25  
(0.65) 
-0.93  
(0.76) 
0.60  
(0.66) 
0.72  
(0.61) 
13 Borrower Rating 2.43 *** 
(0.48) 
2.33 *** 
(0.44) 
2.50 *** 
(0.49) 
2.35 *** 
(0.45) 
2.33 *** 
(0.43) 
14 Log (Deal Amount) 6.30 *** 
(1.09) 
6.05 *** 
(1.12) 
6.42 *** 
(1.08) 
6.15 *** 
(1.14) 
5.93 *** 
(1.14) 
15 Same Country -1.88  
(3.15) 
-0.81  
(3.30) 
-1.89  
(3.17) 
-0.42  
(3.31) 
-1.57  
(3.13) 
 Borrower Country Specific (except a)   
16 Creditor Rights -0.42  
(0.90) 
0.23  
(0.88) 
-0.03  
(0.87) 
0.36  
(0.83) 
-0.17  
(0.81) 
17 Creditor Rights 
missing 
1.41  
(5.06) 
-0.80  
(4.77) 
1.79  
(5.07) 
-0.93  
(4.70) 
0.02  
(4.95) 
18 Log (GDP) -4.54 *** 
(0.76) 
-4.75 *** 
(0.74) 
-4.39 *** 
(0.77) 
-4.79 *** 
(0.75) 
-5.18 *** 
(0.72) 
19 GDP growth 1.59 *** 
(0.48) 
1.48 *** 
(0.48) 
1.60 *** 
(0.48) 
1.60 *** 
(0.48) 
1.55 *** 
(0.46) 
20 Sovereign Credit 
Risk 
-3.04 *** 
(0.57) 
-2.72 *** 
(0.61) 
-2.98 *** 
(0.57) 
-2.70 *** 
(0.62) 
-3.13 *** 
(0.58) 
21 a Lender Country Fin. 
Develop. 
3.65  
(3.65) 
13.43 *** 
(4.49) 
5.36  
(3.92) 
14.09 *** 
(4.23) 
17.38 *** 
(4.39) 
      
Observations 41,965 41,965 41,965 41,965 41,965 
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
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Figure 3.1 – Effects on Loan Maturity of Interaction between Capital regulations and Rule 
of Law 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Effects on Loan Maturity of Interaction between Capital regulations and 
Competition 
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Figure 3.3 – Effects on Maturity of Interaction between Private Monitoring and Rule of 
Law 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Effects on Maturity of Interaction between Private Monitoring and 
Competition 
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3.6  Conclusions 
In this chapter we empirically examined the effect that three broad bank 
regulations implemented by countries exert on banks‘ credit policies: the level of 
stringency of capital restrictions imposed to banks, the degree of the power that the 
official supervisor authority has to oversee and intervene in the functioning of banks, 
and the degree to which banks are exposed to external private monitoring, apart from 
official regulatory oversight. 
The results indicate that priced risk terms of loan contracts have an inverse U-
shaped relationship with capital regulations stringency. Precisely, we found evidence of 
loan contracts with lower spreads and longer maturities when the stringency of capital 
regulations is either low or high, while higher spreads and shorter maturities are 
associated to moderate levels of capital stringency. The decreasing behaviour of loan 
contracts‘ risk measures from moderate to high levels of capital stringency favours the 
view that strengthening capital regulations contains bank risk taking. However, the 
increasing behaviour of risk measures from low to medium levels of capital stringency 
opposes that view and supports the argument of a reduction in loan monitoring 
incentives by banks as a consequence of toughening capital requirements. However, it 
may be the case that higher risk measures in this region is simply the result of shifting 
the pressure of slightly stricter capital regulations to loan price terms, rather than the 
banks‘ reaction to capital toughening in the form of relaxing credit policies, which 
would be the case only if capital regulations become significantly stringent. Regarding 
the role of official supervision, we found that more empowered supervisors contribute 
to riskier bank lending, through the shortening of loan contracts‘ maturities. 
Interestingly, there is evidence of interactions between bank regulations influencing 
loan contracts risk terms: both official supervisory power and private monitoring behave 
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either as substitutes or complements to capital stringency to reduce loan contracts risk 
measures, depending whether capital stringency is respectively low or high. Together, 
this evidence reveals that, at high levels of capital regulations stringency, loan contracts 
tend to experience less risk as consequence of both the superior financial soundness of 
better-capitalized banks and the complementary roles of supervision and market 
discipline in containing bank risk-taking.  
This study provides a valuable piece of evidence on the interactions between 
bank regulations and other institutional country level factors when influencing bank 
lending. We found that a country‘s levels of financial development, enforcement of law, 
and competition in the banking industry, are mechanisms that enable the effectiveness 
of capital regulations in reducing loan contracts risk terms. Finally, we found that 
although external private monitoring on banks alone increases the risk characteristics of 
loan contracts, its interaction with both capital regulations stringency and banking 
competition highlights its importance as a complementary mechanism in the reduction 
of the risk of lending. 
The results suggest more complex interactions between bank regulations to 
influence risk taking behaviour than simply playing complementary roles, as advocated 
by proponents of reinforcing pillars of Basel II. Loan contracts in countries where 
capital regulations are more relaxed experience longer maturities, and this is especially 
true if official supervisory power is also low. Increasing capital stringency up to a 
moderate level shortens maturity but this effect is counterbalanced if official 
supervisory power is high, which suggests that official supervision substitutes capital in 
keeping loan maturities long. 
This chapter opens avenues for future research. The analysis presented is cross-
sectional, given that we have only three waves of data concerning the regulatory indices 
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used. If more data become available in the form of another survey of bank regulation 
and supervision, these can be incorporated to enhance our estimation techniques. A new 
survey would open the possibility for conducting a longitudinal analysis of how 
variations in regulatory measures produce changes in the credit policy followed by each 
individual bank, e.g., through fixed effects estimation. Such longitudinal approach will 
help tackling endogeneity issues of reverse causality related to the changes in regulation 
triggered by certain condition in the credit market and issues related to cost adjustments. 
Finally, issues of simultaneous versus sequential implementation of both capital 
requirements and supervision regulations will be properly addressed in a longitudinal 
study. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Bank Loan Announcements and Market Discipline 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
It is well established by the research on bank regulation that capital markets may 
play a role in shaping the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Bank regulatory authorities 
and committees on bank regulation around the world (e.g. the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision and the US and European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees) are 
aware of this issue and recommend the implementation of appropriate mechanisms 
promoting bank transparency and market discipline on banks. The international 
financial crisis that started in 2007 has challenged us into rethinking the functioning and 
regulation of financial and credit markets. At the center of the discussion are the roles 
that official supervision and market discipline should play in achieving financial 
stability.  
In this context, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether and how 
bank regulations favouring the private monitoring of banks effectively influence 
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financial markets‘ responses to bank risk-taking decisions. Specifically, we conduct an 
empirical analysis that estimates the effect of private monitoring of banks on the 
cumulative abnormal returns experienced by bank stocks following a loan 
announcement. Our sample includes 1,354 bank loan announcements made by 119 
banks located in 35 countries during the period from 1998 to 2006. Our measure of 
private monitoring is an index, proposed by Barth et al. (2006), that reflects the degree 
to which banks are exposed to external monitoring, apart from official regulatory and 
supervisory oversight. It comprises regulatory requirements of information and 
accounting disclosure, external auditing, depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, 
and discipline.  
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it helps to fill a gap in the 
literature by providing evidence of market price reactions to loan announcements, using 
event-study techniques. Second, by relating the bank regulations promoting the private 
monitoring of banks to the stock market reactions following bank loan announcements, 
it adds to the empirical research on market discipline of banks by providing evidence of 
the effectiveness of both recognition and control phases of market discipline, in the 
context of the two-stage process of market discipline of banks proposed by the 
frameworks of either Flannery (2001) or Hamalainen et al. (2005). 
The results show that bank stocks experience significant cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) on the days surrounding bank loan announcements. In addition, we find 
that positive CAR reactions have higher magnitudes and are more frequent in countries 
with more private monitoring regulations, while negative CAR reactions have lower 
magnitudes and are less frequent in countries with high private monitoring. A regression 
analysis including loan specific, as well as firm and country level controls for lender 
and borrower characteristics, provides evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship 
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between the private monitoring measure and the cumulative abnormal returns. The 
evidence suggests that markets, on average, react positively to loan announcements in 
environments where private monitoring is encouraged by the regulator. We interpret this 
as evidence of the disciplining role of market monitoring on banks‘ decisions. 
Moreover, the evidence of decreasing CAR at very high levels of private monitoring 
highlights the difficulties of reaching the Basel Committee‘s recommendation of an 
appropriate balance between the level of bank transparency and meaningful disclosure 
capable to foster effective market discipline, and the level of protection of bank 
proprietary information that guarantees the provision of added-value services by banks. 
Additionally, we find evidence suggesting that private monitoring is more important as 
a mechanism of rewarding sound bank risk-taking practices through positive cumulative 
abnormal returns reactions in countries with less developed stock markets and legal 
systems. Finally, we find the same relationship between private monitoring and 
cumulative abnormal returns in countries with higher official supervisory power, 
suggesting these regulatory mechanisms are complements when influencing bank stock 
market reactions. 
The remainder of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 makes a review of both 
theoretical and empirical related literature. Section 4.3 details the dataset used in the 
analysis. The methodology and results are described in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 
contains the conclusions of this study. 
 
4.2  Related Literature 
 
This section provides a literature review on the role of market discipline on 
banks‘ behaviour. The risk of systemic banking crises or financial instability resulting 
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from bank failures, and the inability of depositors to monitor banks often justify the 
regulation of banks (Santos, 2001). Although the introduction of a lender of last resort 
and deposit insurance schemes minimizes the costs of bank failures, it creates a moral 
hazard problem on the part of banks. To overcome such problem, bank capital 
regulations are introduced, in order to influence bank risk-taking. On top of that, the 
official supervision of banks is adopted to complement capital regulations in shaping 
bank risk-taking behaviour. However, this arrangement is argued to have generated 
substantial social costs (Flannery, 2001). For example, Dermiguç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2000) blame, to a large extent, the inadequate government supervision for the financial 
crises suffered by 40 out of 61 studied countries between 1980 and 1997.  
 
4.2.1 Motivations for the market discipline of banks 
The inherent difficulties experienced by governments to implement efficient 
supervisory systems, worsened by the increasing complexity of banking organizations, 
motivate the reliance of governments on market discipline as a complementary 
supervisory mechanism. This reliance is supported by evidence that investors have the 
ability to assess banks‘ conditions very well13. Indeed, proposals from the United States 
and European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees, as well as the adoption of 
market discipline as one of the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Adequacy 
Framework, or simply Basel II (Basel Committee, 2004) favour the implementation of 
incentive-compatible regulatory design, by acknowledging the importance of market 
discipline.  
Nevertheless, there is not a consensus on the appropriate degree of reliance that 
should be placed on market discipline as a bank supervisory mechanism. In fact, 
                                                          
13
 See Gilbert (1990), Berger (1991) and Flannery (1998). 
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Flannery (2001) remarks that the available empirical work is inconclusive on whether 
the market does a better or a worse job than the regulator in assessing bank quality
14
. 
Basically, opinions regarding the role of market discipline differ across the two different 
approaches to bank regulation thinking, namely, the public interest and the private 
interest views
15
. Barth et al. (2006) notice that, according to the private interest view, 
greater reliance on market discipline is important to deter the pressure that banks put on 
politicians, and the influence of these politicians on supervisors and regulators. Also, 
supervisors may experience mixed incentives to enforce and monitor banks, as a result 
of not being well compensated or not having their own wealth invested in banks. Taking 
the private interest perspective, Herring (2004) argues in favour of market discipline, 
describing it as forward-looking, inherently flexible and adaptive, continuous, 
impersonal and non-bureaucratic, whereas official supervision usually is rule-based, 
episodic, bureaucratic, and slow to change. This author advocates that ‗one of the 
principal merits of market discipline is that banks directors and managers are faced with 
the burden of proving to the market that the bank is not taking excessive risks rather 
than subjecting officials to the burden of proving, in a review process, that the bank is 
taking excessive risks.‘  
                                                          
14
 Berger and Davies (1998), Berger et al. (2000) and Hall et al. (2000) 
15
The public interest approach to bank regulation thinking considers that regulation serves to the public 
interest of improving social welfare, by boosting economic development, preventing systemic crises and 
protecting depositors. This approach assumes the existence of market failures and that governments have 
the incentives and capabilities to overcome those failures. By contrast, the private interest approach 
considers regulation as a product, subject to supply and demand forces. In this view, the private interests 
of the regulator and bankers prevail over the public interest, when determining bank regulations. It is the 
case for political and/or regulatory capture, which can lead to venal and systematic corruption. In 
practice, it is reasonable to view regulations to experience a dynamic process of responding to different 
incentives along the time, fluctuating between the extreme approaches (Kane, 1997). See Barth et al. 
(2006, chapter 2) for a review on public and private interest approaches to regulation. 
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The public interest view questions these arguments, expressing concern about 
placing excessive trust in market monitoring, especially in countries with poorly 
developed capital markets, accounting standards, and legal systems. It is argued that 
those countries are better off delegating to official regulators the control of banks‘ 
behaviour as greater reliance on private-sector monitoring may lead to exploitation of 
small savers, resulting in poor bank development. However, Caprio and Honohan 
(2004) present reasons why low-income countries may be in a better position to exert 
market discipline. First, in general these countries do not have deposit insurance and, 
even if they do, fiscal difficulties make it less credible, resulting in incentives to market 
participants to exercise monitoring on banks. Second, these countries have more foreign 
banks, which are more transparent and easier to be monitored by the market. Third, 
banks are less complex in low-income countries, which facilitates monitoring. Fourth, 
the small size of business and banks also facilitates monitoring. Additionally, those 
supporting the private interest view argue that it is precisely in countries with weak 
institutional development where supervisors are more likely to be captured. Barth et al. 
(2006) believe that ‗only empirical testing can resolve the debate over which approach 
to bank regulation better characterizes the regulatory policies countries make‘. In this 
chapter we contribute to this discussion by investigating whether and how different 
markets react to bank loan announcements, through a cross-country analysis that allows 
us to control and examine how different institutional settings affect this relationship.  
 
4.2.2 Market discipline framework 
It is important to understand the mechanism through which the market can 
discipline banks. According to Lane (1993), the concept of market discipline refers to 
‗[f]inancial markets providing signals that lead borrowers to behave in a manner 
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consistent with their solvency‘. These signals typically assume the form of cutbacks in 
sources of funds used to finance a firm‘s assets. Therefore, applying the concept of 
market discipline to banking means that suppliers of bank‘s funds, namely, depositors, 
debt holders and equity owners, may provide reactions to bank behaviour that induce 
bank managers to undertake actions that promote solvency. 
For the sake of clarity and contextualization of this study in the literature on the 
market discipline of banks, we rely on Flannery (2001) and Hamalainen et al. (2005) to 
make the distinction between the concepts of ―market monitoring‖ and ―market 
discipline‖, in the context of banking. According to those authors, market discipline 
includes two distinct components, or, similarly, consists of a two-stage process. The 
first component or stage is the ―market monitoring‖ or the ―recognition phase‖. It refers 
to the situation where ‗investors accurately evaluate changes in a firm‘s condition and 
incorporate those assessments promptly into security prices‘ (Flannery, 2001, p. 110). 
The second component or stage is referred as ―market influence‖ or the ―control phase‖, 
and consists of ‗the process by which outside claimants influence a firm‘s actions‘ 
(Flannery, 2001, p. 110). In Hamalainen et al. (2005)‘s words, ‗true risk control 
depends on whether the borrowers, i.e., banks, react to these signals and behave in a 
manner consistent with their solvency‘. We adhere to this two-stage process of market 
discipline and seek to make a contribution to the literature by analyzing our results in 
the light of this framework.  
 
4.2.3 Conditions for effective market discipline 
The literature has identified four necessary conditions for market discipline to 
occur, according to Hamalainen et al. (2005). Three conditions are associated to the 
recognition phase (or market monitoring stage), while the remaining one refers to the 
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control phase (or market influence stage). Concerning the recognition phase, the first 
condition is the existence of unrestricted and efficient capital markets, ‗so that the 
market can discriminate between prudent and imprudent credit institutions and, 
therefore, provide appropriate market signals‘ (Hamalainen et al., 2005, p. 189).  
Second condition to effective market monitoring refers to the public disclosure 
of bank capital structure and risk exposures. It means that ‗investors must be able to 
obtain relevant information about a borrower‘s outstanding debts‘ (Hamalainen et al., 
2005, p. 189). It is precisely at this point that bank regulations implemented by 
regulatory and supervisory agencies to favour the private-sector monitoring of banks 
may play a role in promoting the market discipline of banks as a complementary 
mechanism of bank regulation. In this regard, the Basel Committee (1998) argues that 
the accurate assessment of a bank‘s financial condition by investors requires sufficient 
public disclosure of bank information. As argued by Hamalainen et al. (2005, p. 190), 
the benefits of enhanced information transparency are that ‗it should allow market 
discipline to work earlier and more efficiently, thereby strengthening the incentives for 
banks to behave in a prudent and efficient manner‘, as well as to work as a signalling 
mechanism for the sound and well-managed bank to discriminate from bad banks. 
However, as argued by Bruni and Paterno (1995), a certain amount of informational 
opaqueness is required for banks to be able to provide added-value services. The Basel 
Committee (1998) attempts to conciliate these arguments by stating the importance of 
reaching an appropriate balance between the need for meaningful disclosure that allows 
effective market discipline, and the protection of bank proprietary information. Inspired 
by Berger (1991), Hamalainen et al. (2005) summarize the second condition to the 
effective market monitoring as the need of a regime that promotes the disclosure of the 
right information at the right time. The right information condition implies the 
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relevance, sufficiency, comparability, reliability and quality of information, whereas 
disclosing it at the right time is important to avoid moral hazard problems that may arise 
if no external check on the ex ante risk-taking behaviour of banks is performed. Our 
study is closely related to the second condition to effective market monitoring of banks, 
as we seek to estimate the relationship between market signals and an index measuring 
bank regulations that promote the private monitoring of banks. 
The third condition to effective market monitoring states that market participants 
must not believe that the borrower would be bailed out in the case of an actual or 
impending default (Hamalainen et al., 2005). Here the argument is that market prices 
and quantities do not react to changes in bank risk if market participants, including 
banks, investors and depositors, believe that they are protected, explicitly or implicitly, 
in the event of a bank default. Such belief generates moral hazard on the part of both 
borrower and lender, undermining market discipline. Being explicitly or implicitly 
protected is related to the credibility that regulatory authorities enjoy in achieving a ‗no 
bailout policy‘ (Lane, 1993). In other words, in addition to promising not to bail out, 
regulatory authorities should create incentives that signal to market participants that the 
promise is credible. The main forms of bailout are the ‗too-big-too-fail‘ policy and the 
deposit insurance schemes. Where these mechanisms are present, bank and depositors 
moral hazard behaviour harms the efficient assessment and pricing of bank condition by 
investors. However, as argued by Lane (1993), these difficulties can be tackled if the 
safety net is set at the right level, which means to discriminate the market between the 
individuals whose protection is socially, politically or ethically desirable, and those 
individuals who can be in a better position to suffer losses and, given the right 
incentives, perform a valuable monitoring function. The first group of individuals might 
include the depositors, while the second group includes the investors, represented by 
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both debt and equity holders. It is also important to notice that the characteristics of the 
financial instruments providing signals of bank condition will influence the 
effectiveness of market discipline. Hamalainen et al. (2005) incorporate these issues in 
their framework by restating the third condition to the effective recognition phase of 
market discipline as simply the right participants condition, making clear it reflects 
considerations regarding the bailout mechanisms, the ‗no bailout policy‘, the investors‘ 
characteristics and incentives to monitor, and the characteristics of the financial 
instruments. 
The condition to effective market discipline associated to the control phase is 
simply that borrowers (i.e., banks) must respond to market signals produced in the 
recognition phase. To induce appropriate responses of banks, Hamalainen et al. (2005) 
advocate for the creation of suitable incentive structures, including a strong corporate 
governance environment, ‗that ensure that responsibility for the prudent management of 
banks lies firmly with bank management‘. 
 
4.2.4 Equity prices as signals for market discipline 
Regarding the right participants condition, recent proposals of implementation 
of market discipline have focused on the creation of mandatory subordinated debt-
holders
16
. However, given that we conduct an empirical study that looks at stock prices 
reactions, we concentrate on the issues related to other alternative for market 
participants, namely the shareholders. In principle, shareholders are eligible candidates 
for inducing market discipline. According to Saunders (2001), under the assumptions of 
Merton (1974) model on the corporate value of debt, there is no difference between 
                                                          
16
 Hamalainen et al. (2005) apply the mandatory subordinated debt-holders solution to their framework, 
providing a description and justifying the advantages of this kind of proposals. 
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using bond prices or equity prices in providing information for market discipline 
purposes. Nevertheless, it is controversial whether shareholders qualify as ―right 
participants‖ to induce market discipline. The problem lies in that shareholders and 
regulators experience different incentives to monitor and deter bank risk-taking. On the 
one hand, as equity typically loses value in the event of bank failure, shareholders are 
sensitive to bank risk, and consequently may function as reliable monitors of bank 
condition. On the other hand, Evanoff (1993) argues that equity does not work as a 
market discipline instrument, as shareholders have an incentive to invest in high risk-
taking banks, given the moral hazard associated to their skewed risk-return profile. 
Moreover, according to Horvitz (1983), it is uncertain whether enhanced bank 
transparency can mitigate the high risk-taking incentives of shareholders. In conclusion, 
the arguments favour the reliance on equity holders as right participants to induce 
market discipline if bank probability of default is low, while high-risk taking incentives 
at high bank default probabilities may invalidate this reliance. Saunders (2001) 
discusses the pros and cons of both debt and equity as instruments for the market 
discipline of banks. The first pro of equity is that its market is much more liquid than 
the secondary bond market. Second, there are models that successfully predicted 
corporate and bank failures based on equity prices. Third, there are more bank stocks 
traded than bonds. And fourth, as banks‘ managers have increasingly equity linked 
compensation contracts, it is equity rather than bond prices that drive managerial 
decisions. Among the cons, the author mentions firstly the incorporation on equity 
prices of the ―too-big-to-fail subsidy‖, and secondly, the occurrence of overreactions of 
prices to news. Finally, Saunders (2001) recommends the ‗use of equity and equity 
prices and drop the subordinated debt proposal until the corporate bond market becomes 
liquid and bond prices are more transparent‘. Sundaresan (2001) argues that the higher 
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quality of stock prices with respect to bond prices may more than compensate the 
complexity in interpreting stock prices. Flannery (2001) concludes that the value of 
stock vs. bond prices as information sources undoubtedly warrants further research. 
Therefore, the suitability of equity as a market discipline instrument is justified, 
despite the mentioned flaws. In addition, we claim that using equity as instrument is 
more appropriate to our analysis, when compared to subordinated debt. This is because 
the banks in our sample are located in a heterogeneous set of countries, including 
developing ones, where debt markets are inexistent or poorly developed. As argued by 
Karacadag (2001), extending market discipline based on traded debt to emerging 
countries could be disastrous, even if debt discipline might work well in developed 
financial markets. 
 
4.2.5 Our scope and contributions 
We acknowledge and adhere to the merits of the two-stage framework proposed 
by either Flannery (2001) or Hamalainen et al. (2005). Accordingly, we seek to 
contextualize our study in that framework, by clarifying that it encompasses both the 
recognition and the control phases of market discipline. First, our measure of market 
price reactions to loan announcements represents investors‘ reactions to a perceived 
change in bank risk taking that work as a signal to bank managers, which characterizes 
the recognition phase. Second, we claim that the observed market reactions incorporate 
the control phase, in the sense that they reflect an equilibrium situation where banks‘ 
behaviour depends on bank managers‘ beliefs about the market reaction to a particular 
action, in the presence of bank regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks, 
as well as of the necessary conditions for the effective implementation of market 
discipline. In this sense, although our setting does not allow us to observe bank 
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managers‘ actions taken to directly influence banks‘ behaviour, we argue that, as 
conditions for the effective recognition phase of market discipline (efficient capital 
markets, right information at the right time, and right participants) become more 
developed, the observed market signals more likely reflect bank managers‘ actions. The 
rationale behind this mechanism is that the pressure that bank managers experience to 
behave properly increases with the efficiency of capital markets and the quality of 
monitoring exerted by the market on banks. 
Turning to the research on market reactions to bank loan announcements, we 
observe that it has been restricted to the measurement of borrower stock abnormal 
returns (e.g. James, 1987). There is no study focusing on the abnormal returns 
experienced by the lender‘s stock, as a reaction to the announcement of a loan to a 
borrowing firm. There are, however, studies with related purposes, such as those 
measuring bank stock reactions to events related to bank risk-taking behaviour. In this 
context, there are some studies in the early 1980s, including Pettway and Sinkey (1980), 
who showed that abnormal returns on bank stocks can predict bank failure. More 
recently, Bliss and Flannery (2001) report bank holding companies‘ equity and bond 
values variations with respect to changes in bank‘s asset value. O‘Hara and Shaw 
(1990) measure the private value of a ‗too-big-to-fail policy‘ as an average 1.3 percent 
abnormal return to the common equity of banks identified as ‗too-big-to-fail‘. The 
scarce evidence of bank stock reactions to events related to bank risk-taking attitudes is 
somewhat surprising, given the existing literature on the potential role of equity prices 
as a source of signals to effective market discipline of banks. This empirical study 
intends to make a contribution in filling this research gap, besides investigating the 
relationship between regulations promoting market monitoring and bank stock price 
reactions. 
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4.3  Data description 
 
We constructed a sample of loans made by large banks to large firms located in 
different countries, in the period from 1998 to 2006. The source of information on 
individual loans is the LPC Reuters DealScan database, which provides detailed data on 
loan contracts signed all over the world between banks and mainly large firms. 
Information include lender and borrower identities, dates of origination, purpose of 
loan, deal amounts, number of lenders, lender deal share, spreads, loan maturity, 
covenants, and borrower sector and ratings. The focus of our study is to analyze how 
different country level regulations of external private monitoring on banks are related to 
bank loan announcements. Therefore, the sample includes loans made in a set of 
different countries, to ensure heterogeneity of the private monitoring measure across 
observations. Whenever possible, we collected information on loans made by the 15 
largest commercial banks or banking holding companies, in terms of total assets, of the 
49 countries considered in the study of La Porta et al. (1998), for the period from 1998 
to 2006. The selection of such period was motivated by the availability of the bank 
regulations data, which consist of surveys made by the World Bank in the years 2000, 
2003 and 2007 (Barth et al., 2001, 2006, 2008). We assume that country bank 
regulations reported by those surveys are in place for the following 3-year periods: 1998 
to 2000, 2001 to 2003 and 2004 to 2006. Hence, yearly bank regulations variables 
representing each country‘s level of private monitoring, capital requirements stringency 
and official supervisory power are added to the database.  
With regard to the variable measuring the degree of private monitoring of banks, 
which is the focus of this study, it is an index proposed by Barth et al. (2006), basically 
given by the sum of affirmative answers that a country‘s bank regulatory and 
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supervisory authority provides to questions proposed in the surveys conducted by the 
World Bank concerning the existence of the following mechanisms affecting banks
17,18
: 
external auditing, credit rating by external agencies, (absence of) deposit insurance, 
accounting recognition of loans accrued unpaid interest/principal, consolidation of 
accounting, legal liability of directors in case of erroneous or misleading information 
disclosure, use of subordinated debt as regulatory capital, disclosure of risk 
management procedures and off-balance sheet items, publicity of formal enforcement 
actions.  
Other country-level variables are included, namely, the borrower country‘s 
sovereign debt rating, the level of legal protection of creditors in borrower country, and 
lender country-level variables such as concentration in the bank industry, number of 
commercial banks in the country, and proxies for financial development, stock market 
development, economic development, economy size, and business cycle. Finally, bank-
                                                          
17
 Precisely, the questions considered in Barth et al. (2006)‘s index of private monitoring are: (1) Is an 
external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? (2) Are auditors licensed or certified? (3) How many of 
the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by international credit rating agencies (e.g., 
Moody's, Standard and Poor)? (4) How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are 
rated by domestic credit rating agencies? (5) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? (6) 
If answer to previous question is ‗yes‘, were insured depositors wholly compensated (to the extent of 
legal protection) the last time a bank failed? (7) Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the 
income statement while the loan is still non-performing? (8) Are financial institutions required to produce 
consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries (including affiliates of 
common holding companies)? (9) Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous 
or misleading? (10) Is subordinated debt allowable as part of regulatory capital? (11) Is subordinated debt 
required as part of regulatory capital? (12) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public? (13) Must 
banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public? (14) Are bank regulators/supervisors 
required to make public formal enforcement actions, which include cease and desist orders and written 
agreements between a bank regulatory/supervisory body and a banking organization?  
18
 Each ‗yes‘ answer to questions (1), (2), (7), (8), (9), (12), (13) and (14) above adds one point to the 
index. Each‗10‘ answer to questions (3) and (4) adds one point to the index. If answers to questions (5) 
and (6) are both ‗no‘, one point is added to the index. If answer to questions (10) or (11) is ‗yes‘, one 
point is added to the index.  
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level characteristics are collected from the Bankscope database, and hand-matched with 
the previous loan deal level information. 
The variable we use to measure the reactions of bank stock prices to loan 
announcements is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), calculated in different 
event windows of days surrounding the announcement. To compute the CAR, we first 
gathered information on both bank stock prices and country stock market indices for a 
pre-estimation period, for each event of a loan announcement. This procedure 
eliminates from the original sample the loans of banks which stocks are not publicly 
traded. The source of data on stock prices and market indices is the Bloomberg 
database. Then we computed returns on bank stocks and market indices, which are 
necessary to estimate the market model of returns on bank stocks. Returns considered as 
outliers are excluded from the respective time series of bank stock returns. Following 
standard recommendations of event-study techniques (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997), we tackled the problem of confounding events in two ways: first, the returns 
computed are net of the impact of events of dividend payments; second, we excluded 
from our sample all loan announcements made by the same bank in a time interval 
shorter than 10 days from the previous or the next loan announcement. This procedure 
eliminates a very large number of loans, and in some cases, all the loans extended by a 
very large bank, because some of these banks extend a huge number of loans in almost a 
daily basis. CAR is simply the returns in excess of the ones predicted by the market 
model, accumulated on the days included in the event window surrounding the loan 
announcement. The CAR computed for different event windows are then added to the 
database of loans, to be used as dependent variables in the estimation of models that 
explain the influence of bank regulations and other country, lender, borrower and loan 
specific characteristics on bank stock price reactions to loan announcements.  
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Most loan deals are syndicated loans, which are loans of large amounts extended 
by a group of banks. A syndicated loan is leaded by one or few arranger banks and 
includes some participant banks. The arranger bank is the lender that effectively 
interacts with the borrower, and its reputation and/or lending relationship with the 
borrower is relevant to determine loan contract characteristics. The role of participant 
banks in a syndicated loan is limited to simply compose the loan amount. Therefore, we 
believe that reactions of investors to a syndicated loan announcement are likely to affect 
mainly arranger banks‘ stocks.  
After dropping the events of loan announcements for which there are not enough 
observations to estimate the market model of returns and, in the case of syndicated 
loans, keeping only the loans in which the underlying bank is an arranger
19
 of the loan, 
we ended up with a sample composed of 1,354 events of loan announcements arranged 
by 119 different banks located in 35 countries. 
We grouped the explanatory variables included in the regression models of CAR 
in five different sets: lender country specific, borrower country specific, lender specific, 
borrower specific and loan specific. A detailed description of each variable is provided 
in Appendix C. Additionally, we included indicator variables for each year in the 
models. 
Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics of the variables described in Appendix 
C. We notice the high variances of the dependent variables (CAR in three different 
event windows). Regarding lender and borrower country specific variables, none of 
them seem to have a problem of low heterogeneity, which results from the fact that the 
                                                          
19
 We follow S&P (2006) and consider a lender as an arranger if the lender role informed by DealScan is 
one of the following: Arranger, Administrative Agent, Lead Manager, Agent, Lead Arranger, Bookrunner 
and Lead Bank. We also included the following lender roles as arranger: Co-arranger, Co-lead Arranger, 
Coordinating Arranger, Joint Arranger, Mandated Arranger, Senior Arranger and Senior Co-arranger. 
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35 countries in the sample is a subset of the heterogeneous set of La Porta et. al (1998). 
Table 4.2 presents the mean of some lender country specific variables across countries 
and confirms the heterogeneity of these variables. Concerning lender specific variables, 
we notice from Table 4.1 that bank leverage is very high (mean of 0.94), and has low 
heterogeneity (standard deviation of 0.03), which is typical in banking industry. Turning 
to borrower specific variables, we observe that the borrower has not Debt_Rating in 
90% of the events, which may represent a problem of low heterogeneity. Borrower and 
lender arranger are in the same country in 61% of loan announcements. Finally, with the 
exception of the Spread variable, which is missing in 34% of the observations, loan 
specific variables do not pose any problem to the analysis. We conclude that the 
heterogeneity of the variables in the sample is enough to allow the conduction of an 
econometric analysis. 
  
Chapter Four: Bank Loan Announcements and Market Discipline 
 
119 
 
Table 4.1 – Descriptive Statistics  
(sample of loan announcements made by arranger banks, from 1998 to 2006) 
  
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables:       
CARi[-5,+5] days (bp) 1,354 -1.45 2.36 519.59 -3,244 4,592 
CARi[-3,+3] days (bp) 1,354 -12.57 -8.58 437.92 -3,067 3,190 
CARi[-2,+2] days (bp) 1,354 2.50 -2.72 404.90 -2,784 3,141 
Lender country specific:       
Private Monitoring 1,314 8.25 8.00 1.27 5 11 
Capital Stringency 1,314 5.86 6.00 1.94 2 10 
Official Supervision 1,350 9.94 10.50 2.37 4 15.5 
Financial Development 
a 
1,354 0.94 0.94 0.39 0 2.01 
Stock Mkt Capitalization 1,354 1.07 0.81 0.87 0.09 4.22 
Rule of Law 1,354 1.23 1.42 0.65 -1.65 2.04 
Bank Concentration 1,346 0.63 0.62 0.21 0.21 1.00 
Log (Number of Banks) 1,354 4.60 4.25 1.35 2.56 9.26 
Log (GDP) 1,354 6.03 5.90 1.09 4.07 9.43 
Log (GDP per capita) 1,354 9.73 10.11 1.11 6.06 11.20 
GDP Growth 1,354 3.60 3.32 2.75 -13.13 21.18 
Borrower country specific:       
Sovereign Credit Risk 1,302 4.52 3 3.94 1 18 
Creditor Rights 
a 
1,354 2.13 2 1.33 0 4 
Creditor Rights Missing 1,354 0.07 0 0.26 0 1 
Lender specific:       
Log (Assets) 1,354 18.29 18.43 1.31 14.17 20.82 
Leverage 1,354 0.94 0.94 0.03 0.82 1.25 
Loan Loss Res./Gross Loans 1,231 3.11 1.82 3.72 0 40.74 
Borrower specific:       
Debt Rating 
a 
1,354 0.44 0 1.39 0 6 
Same country as lender 1,354 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 
Loan specific:       
Log (Loan Amount) 1,353 18.56 18.55 1.34 13.21 23.12 
Log (Lender Amount/ Total Assets) 1,353 -5.35 -4.91 3.03 -14.16 2.16 
Spread (bp) 891 166.70 120.00 155.65 -10.50 1,050 
Log of Maturity (months) 1,233 3.83 4.09 0.80 0 5.99 
Secured 
a 
1,354 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 
a Zero if originally missing. 
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Table 4.2 – Lender Country Descriptive Statistics  
(Mean of country-specific variables for the 1998-2006 period) 
  Country 
Private 
Monit. 
 
Fin. 
Devel. 
Stock 
Mkt 
Cap 
Bank 
Conc. 
Numb 
of 
banks 
GDP 
(bn 
USD) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
 
GDP 
growth 
1 Argentina 8.3 0.17 0.49 0.39 88 212 5,685 2.21 
2 Australia 9.7 0.90 1.06 0.76 52 509 25,657 3.51 
3 Austria 6.0 1.03 0.22 0.68 921 245 30,154 2.31 
4 Belgium 7.0 0.75 0.72 0.83 112 297 28,563 2.21 
5 Brazil 8.7 0.29 0.38 0.43 181 701 3,960 2.48 
6 Canada 8.3 1.04 1.04 0.54 63 859 27,261 3.37 
7 Chile 7.3 0.61 0.91 0.51 28 89 5,652 3.63 
8 Denmark 8.3 1.19 0.59 0.78 181 204 37,987 2.05 
9 France 6.3 0.86 0.81 0.55 366 1,703 28,375 2.32 
10 Germany 7.7 1.14 0.50 0.67 1,999 2,341 28,418 1.41 
11 Greece 7.3 0.54 0.60 0.86 27 180 16,297 4.14 
12 Hong Kong 8.5 1.52 3.36 0.61 164 169 25,067 3.60 
13 India 7.0 0.25 0.24 0.55 96 576 550 6.73 
14 Indonesia 8.5 0.30 0.40 0.34 148 214 1,000 2.46 
15 Ireland 8.7 1.12 0.63 0.57 53 141 35,513 6.77 
16 Israel 9.7 0.80 0.62 0.74 22 120 18,286 3.66 
17 Italy 7.3 0.76 0.48 0.51 845 1,416 24,620 1.46 
18 Japan 9.0 0.72 1.14 0.87 248 4,303 33,817 1.07 
19 Korea (South) 10.0 0.81 0.54 0.44 20 589 12,377 4.34 
20 Malaysia 9.0 1.22 1.40 0.43 29 108 4,369 4.10 
21 Nigeria 7.0 0.12 0.12 0.40 77 70 540 7.82 
22 Norway 7.5 0.71 0.44 0.92 15 219 47,957 2.40 
23 Pakistan 8.5 0.24 0.18 0.54 38 87 603 4.72 
24 Philippines 8.3 0.34 0.44 0.71 45 83 1,037 4.07 
25 Portugal 7.0 1.27 0.43 0.79 59 146 14,054 2.04 
26 Singapore 9.0 1.03 1.84 0.91 125 99 23,870 5.07 
27 South Africa 9.0 0.65 1.73 0.87 51 168 3,672 3.53 
28 Spain 8.3 1.06 0.76 0.74 286 822 19,594 3.83 
29 Sweden 6.7 0.77 1.13 0.95 25 296 32,974 3.30 
30 Switzerland 7.7 1.58 2.50 0.86 370 308 42,682 1.90 
31 Taiwan 8.3 - 1.13 0.27 40 316 14,059 4.14 
32 Thailand 8.0 1.10 0.48 0.48 26 143 2,244 3.25 
33 Turkey 7.0 0.15 0.25 0.67 55 323 4,974 4.10 
34 United Kingdom 9.7 1.33 1.49 0.56 394 1,782 29,939 2.82 
35 USA 9.3 0.52 1.40 0.25 8,697 10,745 37,232 2.97 
 Mean 8.11 0.79 0.87 0.63 456 874 19,115 3.42 
 Std Deviation 1.02 0.40 0.69 0.20 1,482 1,914 14,112  1.51 
 
Table 4.3 shows the correlations between the main variables used in the analysis. 
Regarding the correlation between the dependent variables and bank regulations, the 
only significant correlation found is a low and positive correlation of 7% between 
Private_Monitoring and the CAR of the [-5;+5] event window. CARi[-5;+5] is also 
positively and low correlated with Financial_Development, Log(Number_of_Banks), 
Log(GDP) and Log(GDP_per_capita). CAR in the three event windows are negatively 
and low correlated with the GDP_Growth variable. As GDP_Growth is higher in less 
developed countries, i.e., where Log(GDP_per_capita) is lower, it suggests that in these 
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countries stock market reacts negatively to a loan announcement. The correlations 
between CAR and the remaining of variables are not significant. As expected, the 
correlations between the different bank regulations are positive and significant. In 
particular, the correlation between Private_Monitoring and Official_Supervision is 
44%. Table 4.3 also shows many high correlations, especially between country and 
lender specific variables. Regarding lender country variables, Financial_Development 
has correlations with Stock_Market_Capitalization, Rule_of_Law and Log(GDP per 
capita) above 35%. We expect a high correlation between a country‘s levels of 
economic and legal development. In fact, the correlation between Rule_of_Law and 
Log(GDP per capita) is 83%. Concerning lender specific variables, we observe that the 
size of banks, measured by Log(Total Assets), has correlations above 50% with some 
lender country specific variables, namely, Rule_of_Law, Log(GDP) and Log(GDP per 
capita). 
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Table 4.3 – Correlation Matrix (Sample of 1,354 loan announcements made by 119 banks located in 35 countries during the period 1998-2006) 
 CAR 
-5,+5 
CAR 
-3,+3 
CAR 
-2,+2 
Priv. 
Mon. 
Cap. 
Str. 
Off. 
Sup. 
Fin. 
Dev. 
Stock 
Cap. 
Rule 
Law 
Bank 
Conc 
Num. 
Bank 
Log 
GDP 
GDP 
cap 
GDP 
Grow 
Sov. 
CR 
Cred. 
Right 
Log 
Asset 
Lev LLR/ 
Loan 
Debt 
Rat 
Log 
Am/As 
CARi[-5,+5]  
1                     
CARi[-3,+3]  
0.79* 1                    
CARi[-2,+2]  
0.70* 0.86* 1                   
Private 
Monitoring 0.07* 0.03 0.04 1                  
Capital 
Stringency 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.14* 1                 
Official 
Supervision 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.44* 0.28* 1                
Financial 
Development
 
0.07* -0.01 0.01 0.10* -0.14* -0.03 1               
Stock Mkt 
Capitaliz. 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.16* -0.01 0.17* 0.41* 1              
Rule of Law 
0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.13* -0.19* 0.35* 0.20* 1             
Bank 
Concentration -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13* 0.12* -0.16* 0.18* 0.11* 0.45* 1            
Log (Number 
of Banks) 0.06* 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.30* 0.08* 0.07* 0.13* 0.13* -0.25* 1           
Log (GDP) 
0.07* 0.04 0.01 0.12* 0.05 -0.08* -0.09* -0.22* 0.19* -0.41* 0.60* 1          
Log (GDP per 
capita) 0.08* 0.05 0.05 0.11* -0.14* -0.12* 0.36* 0.25* 0.83* 0.36* 0.26* 0.28* 1         
GDP Growth 
-0.09* -0.09* -0.08* 0.04 0.06* 0.05 -0.18* 0.23* -0.14* -0.02 -0.18* -0.23* -0.22* 1        
Sovereign 
Credit Risk -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14* 0.09* 0.19* -0.26* -0.14* -0.66* -0.23* -0.14* -0.25* -0.66* 0.11* 1       
Creditor 
Rights
 
-0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10* 0.17* 0.33* -0.20* -0.06* -0.09* -0.30* -0.20* 0.19* 0.10* 1      
Log (Assets) 
0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.23* 0.03 -0.33* 0.50* 0.11* 0.35* 0.58* 0.51* -0.19* -0.39* -0.30* 1     
Leverage 
-0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.24* -0.2* -0.24* -0.09* -0.41* 0.20* 0.02 -0.09* 0.19* 0.08* -0.24* -0.14* -0.20* 0.42* 1    
Loan Loss 
Res./Loans -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.14* 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.19* -0.59* -0.20* -0.10* -0.29* -0.65* 0.01 0.46* 0.22* -0.35* -0.03 1   
Borrower 
Debt Rating -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.06* -0.13* -0.05 -0.07* 0.10* -0.04* 0.06 0.15* 0.07* -0.04 -0.04 -0.20* 0.14* 0.08* 
-
0.06* 1  
Log(Lend. 
Am. / Assets) -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.11* -0.00 0.05 0.04 0.25* -0.15* -0.00 -0.23* -0.28* -0.19* 0.09* 0.06* 0.26* -0.49* -0.21* 0.06* -0.06* 1 
Log(Maturity) 
-0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11* 0.06* -0.05 -0.03 -0.09* -0.03 0.10* -0.12* -0.10* -0.01* 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08* 0.01 -0.10* -0.01 
* Significant (at the 5% level). 
Chapter Four: Bank Loan Announcements and Market Discipline 
 
123 
 
4.4  Methodology and Results 
 
Our analysis is developed through the use of two methodological approaches. 
First, we rely on standard event-study technique following Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) to determine the existence and significance of banks‘ stock returns reactions to 
loan announcements. Second, we seek to explain the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) found in the first approach by performing OLS regressions on a selected set of 
explanatory variables. 
 We estimate the following market model using the previously described sample 
of banks‘ stock returns: 
 ,    (1) 
 
where  is the rate of return on the share price of bank i on day t,  is the intercept 
term for bank i,  is a measure of the systematic risk sensitivity of the stock of bank i, 
 is the return of the country‘s market index, and  is the error term. 
We use the loan deal activation date minus five days as the date of the loan 
announcement, i.e., the event date
20
. The estimation window is from 180 days prior to 
the event date to 10 days after it. After estimating the alphas and betas in equation (1) 
for each event, we compute the abnormal returns considering different event windows.  
According to the scope of this study, we want to show that market discipline of 
banks takes place in our setting, by providing evidence of the occurrence of both 
                                                          
20
 We follow Ongena et al. (2007), who also use a sample of loans from DealScan database to conduct an 
event study. They investigate a representative matched sample of press releases from Lexis/Nexis and 
find that announcements were made on average 5 to 7 days prior to the loan facility activation date. 
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recognition and control phases of market discipline. Therefore, the empirical analysis 
that follows is divided in separate assessments of the occurrence of these phases. 
 
The recognition phase 
We start by examining specifically if the recognition phase of market discipline 
is effective, i.e., whether investors react to loan announcements irrespective of the sign 
of the reaction. First, we assess the significance of the CAR for each event in the 
sample. Table 4.4 shows high proportions of events that have significant CAR, which 
represent preliminary evidence that markets react to bank loan announcements. 
 
Table 4.4 – Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
Proportion of events (loan announcements) that present significant Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR), for different event windows. Sample is composed of 1,354 loan announcements 
made by 119 banks in 35 countries during the period from 1998 to 2006. 
Event window  
(days) 
% of events with 
significant CAR 
(-5, +5) 60% 
(-3, +3) 73% 
(-2, +2) 79% 
 
 
We proceed computing absolute values of CAR and calculating the significance 
of the absolute cumulative average abnormal returns (ACAAR) for all events treated as 
a group. Table 4.5 shows the ACAAR and their significance across event windows and 
different samples. We notice that the ACAAR are significant when considering the 
whole sample of 1,354 events. We next split the sample in two sub-samples according 
to the Private_Monitoring variable. First sub-sample includes events that occurred in 
countries with Private_Monitoring lower than the median of 8, whereas second sub-
sample includes events that occurred in countries with Private_Monitoring greater than 
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or equal to 8. Results in Table 4.5 show that the magnitudes of ACAAR are greater in 
the low Private_Monitoring sub-sample. In principle, the evidence tells that reactions to 
loan announcements are greater in countries with less regulations promoting the private 
monitoring of banks. A breakdown in sub-samples of negative and positive reactions 
within the sub-samples of low and high Private_Monitoring reveals that negative 
reactions are greater in countries with low Private_Monitoring, while positive reactions 
are greater in countries with high Private_Monitoring. Together with the evidence of 
Table 4.4, we conclude that markets do react to bank loan announcements. Moreover, 
the recognition phase of market discipline takes place in the form of bank stock holders‘ 
reactions to bank risk-taking decisions related to lending activity. 
 
Table 4.5 – Market Reactions to Loan Announcements Measured by the Absolute 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (ACAAR) 
Absolute Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (ACAAR) in basis points, across samples and 
different event windows. The sample is composed of 1,354 loan announcements made by 119 
arranger banks in 35 countries during the period from 1998 to 2006. Sub-samples include loans 
made by arranger banks in countries with private monitoring respectively lower than 8, and 
greater than or equal to 8. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
+
. 
 
Event 
 
Whole 
Low  
Private  
High 
Private  
Low Private  
Monitoring 
High Private  
Monitoring 
Window Sample Monitoring Monitoring Negative Positive Negative Positive 
(-5,+5) 364.4 *** 387.3 *** 355.2 *** 417.8 *** 353.0 *** 346.1 *** 363.8 *** 
 (10.1) (19.5) (11.7) (30.9) (22.3) (15.9) (17.1) 
         
(-3, +3) 301.3 *** 321.6 *** 293.1 *** 364.5 *** 279.8 *** 285.0 *** 301.8 *** 
 (8.6) (16.7) (10.1) (27.76) (18.6) (13.2) (15.3) 
         
(-2, +2) 264.1 *** 271.6 *** 261.1 *** 284.3 *** 258.2 *** 249.5 *** 272.7 *** 
 (8.3) (15.6) (9.9) (23.1) (20.7) (12.2) (15.6) 
           
Obs 1,354 389 965 206 (53%) 183 (47%) 467 (48%) 498 (52%) 
    + Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
 
 
The evidence in Table 4.5 suggests a role for the degree of regulations 
promoting the private monitoring of banks in explaining the reactions of arranger 
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lenders‘ stocks following the announcements of loans. We investigate deeply the issue 
by offering an analysis aimed to explain the abnormal returns we have found. 
Accordingly, we estimate the following model, which regress the CAR on a 
comprehensive set of explanatory variables: 
 
 
 
  (2) 
 
In equation (2), Private_Monitoringi is the lender country index of private 
monitoring on banks, the focus of this study. A quadratic term of this variable is 
included to allow for a nonlinear relationship between private monitoring and CAR. 
Capitali and Officiali account for lender country bank regulations measuring 
respectively the stringency of capital requirements and the power of official supervision. 
LenderCountryi , BorrowerCountryi , Lenderi , Borroweri and Loani are vectors of, 
respectively, lender country, borrower country, lender, borrower and loan specific 
variables. The variables included in each set are described in Appendix C. The index i 
stands for an event, i.e., a loan announcement. The events in the sample do not occur at 
the same point in time, as they are distributed along the 1998-2006 period. We pooled 
all the events to perform a single OLS regression, by simply shifting the date of all 
events to a single new time origin. Year dummies are included as explanatory variables 
in the vector YearDummiesi to take into account the economy cycle associated to the 
time dimension. As most banks contribute to the sample with more than one event, we 
cluster the error terms  by bank, to take into account that the events produced by the 
same bank may be not independent. We restricted our sample in two ways: first, to only 
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those loan announcements where the underlying bank is an arranger of the loan 
syndicate, and, second, to the events for which the CAR is significant. 
Given the focus of this subsection on the recognition phase of market discipline, 
the model described by equation (2) includes variables that take into account the three 
conditions for the effectiveness of this phase. Concerning the first condition, the 
variable Stock_Market_Development included in LenderCountryi vector of explanatory 
variables is assumed to be a measure of the existence of an efficient capital market. 
Compliance with second condition, namely, the public disclosure of bank capital 
structure and risk exposures, is measured by the Private_Monitoring variable. With 
respect to third condition, which refers to the ‗no bailout policy‘, we concentrate on the 
potential moral hazard behaviour on the part of banks in the presence of a ‗too-big-to-
fail‘ policy. Also, we rely on equity holders as the market participants with incentives to 
perform a monitoring function. We believe that the Bank_Concentration variable 
conveys a measure of a ‗too-big-to-fail‘ policy regarding the bailout of banks that 
influences bank equity holders‘ incentives to monitoring. 
Table 4.6 presents regression results for the [-2,+2] days event window and 
different sets of explanatory variables. Specifications R1, R2, R4 and R5 include a 
reduced set of variables and report R-squared around 3% whereas specifications R3 and 
R6, which include the full set of variables, report R-squared around 5%. First three 
regressions show a significant and positive linear effect of the level of 
Private_Monitoring on CAR. Last three regressions, which include the squared value of 
Private_Monitoring, point to a quadratic, inverse U-shaped relationship between 
 and CAR. The estimated coefficients for these regressions indicate 
that the maximum CAR with respect to  occurs at an index of private 
monitoring around 9. Considering the range of this variable from 5 to 11 and its median 
Chapter Four: Bank Loan Announcements and Market Discipline 
 
128 
 
of 8, we conclude that CAR is mainly increasing with respect to private monitoring. 
Moreover, despite the decreasing effect of high levels of private monitoring (indices of 
10 or 11) on CAR, it is the case that the net positive effect is still greater than the one 
for indices of private monitoring lower than 8. An explanation for the decreasing effect 
of very high Private_Monitoring indices on CAR may be that stock investors interpret 
that too much transparency in the bank industry makes relationship banking less 
attractive, resulting in reduced opportunities of banks to profit from lending. 
Alternatively, excess of transparency may harm banks‘ reliance on a certain amount of 
‗information opaqueness‘ to provide added-value services (Bruni and Paterno, 1995). 
The evidence also highlights the difficulties of reaching the Basel Committee‘s 
recommendation of an appropriate balance between the need for meaningful disclosure 
to allow for effective market discipline and the protection of bank proprietary 
information. The magnitude of the positive relationship is important, as the net marginal 
effect of  on CAR (i.e., considering linear and quadratic coefficients) 
is between 300 and 350 basis points, according to regressions R4 to R6.  
Table 4.7 shows similar regressions for the [-5,+5] and [-3,+3] days event 
windows. Evidence on the linear effect of Private_Monitoring on CAR appears only on 
first regression of [-3,+3] days event window, whereas the inverse U-shaped 
relationship is robust to all specifications. 
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Table 4.6 – Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in (-2, +2) window 
Dependent variable: CAR (in basis points). Event window of (-2,+2) days. OLS regressions of 
CAR on country, lender, borrower and loan specific variables. Only arranger banks and 
significant CAR are included. Robust standard errors clustered by banks are in parenthesis
+
. 
Explanat. Variables R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
 Lender Country Specific     
1 Private monitoring  34.4 ** 
(14.7) 
39.3 ** 
(15.4) 
31.0 * 
(17.3) 
378.8 *** 
(131.7) 
328.0 ** 
(153.7) 
398.8 ** 
(172.3) 
2 Private monitoring^2 
   
-20.4 ** 
(7.8) 
-17.1 * 
(9.2) 
-21.9 ** 
(10.5) 
3 Capital Stringency 6.2  
(9.4) 
-1.0  
(9.3) 
-1.0  
(11.4) 
-0.3  
(9.2) 
-6.2  
(9.3) 
-8.3  
(11.7) 
4 Official Supervision  -4.9  
(7.2) 
-6.7  
(8.2) 
-4.9  
(9.3) 
-3.3  
(7.2) 
-5.9  
(8.2) 
-3.6  
(9.2) 
5 Financial 
Development 
46.4  
(51.2) 
10.5  
(55.4) 
-2.1  
(51.3) 
34.5  
(51.6) 
5.4  
(56.4) 
-6.8  
(50.6) 
6 Stock Market 
Development 
21.1  
(19.9) 
12.2  
(25.8) 
10.3  
(32.1) 
13.7  
(21.1) 
2.3  
(27.6) 
-3.2  
(34.7) 
7 Rule of Law -114.9 ** 
(50.8) 
-118.8  
(71.8) 
-138.2 * 
(75.7) 
-98.9 ** 
(49.2) 
-106.8  
(70.4) 
-124.1 * 
(73.3) 
8 Bank Concentration 6.0  
(94.9) 
33.6  
(100.9) 
31.7  
(108.2) 
39.4  
(97.6) 
56.7  
(103.8) 
50.6  
(108.1) 
9 Log (Number of 
Banks) 
9.8  
(16.3) 
16.7  
(19.9) 
13.3  
(22.8) 
11.1  
(16.9) 
17.0  
(20.2) 
13.7  
(23.0) 
10 Log (GDP) 11.2  
(22.7) 
-0.6  
(30.9) 
-2.2  
(35.7) 
16.5  
(22.9) 
6.2  
(31.8) 
7.0  
(36.8) 
11 Log (GDP per capita) 67.6 ** 
(29.8) 
41.3  
(48.2) 
57.8  
(52.2) 
57.5 * 
(29.7) 
38.0  
(48.1) 
54.5  
(51.9) 
12 GDP growth -12.8  
(11.5) 
-16.9  
(15.2) 
-15.8  
(16.7) 
-13.8  
(11.4) 
-17.6  
(15.2) 
-17.1  
(16.5) 
 Borrower Country Specific     
13 Sovereign Credit Risk 
 
-6.4  
(6.6) 
-8.2  
(8.5)  
-5.7  
(6.4) 
-7.5  
(8.2) 
14 Creditor Rights 
 
-2.1  
(15.4) 
-3.8  
(18.7)  
-0.7  
(15.2) 
-3.1  
(18.5) 
 Lender and Borrower Specific     
15 Log (Assets) 
 
-0.1  
(26.1) 
13.1  
(36.0)  
-4.3  
(26.1) 
10.9  
(35.3) 
16 Leverage 
 
-7.3  
(9.2) 
-9.8  
(10.3)  
-7.0  
(9.1) 
-10.2  
(10.3) 
17 Loan Loss Reserves 
 
-1.1  
(5.6) 
3.4  
(7.0)  
-2.1  
(5.7) 
2.6  
(7.1) 
18 Borrower Rating 
 
7.4  
(12.7) 
14.4  
(12.1)  
5.2  
(12.9) 
12.2  
(12.2) 
19 Borrower in Same 
Country  
-48.4  
(45.2) 
-24.8  
(49.1)  
-44.3  
(44.4) 
-20.3  
(48.7) 
 Loan Specific       
20 Log (Loan Amount) 
  
5.7  
(16.9)   
3.7  
(16.9) 
21 Log (Lender Amount 
/ Total Assets)   
-0.2  
(9.0)   
2.0  
(8.8) 
22 Log (Maturity) 
  
-11.4  
(27.5)   
-11.4  
(27.3) 
23 Secured Loan 
  
-74.8  
(113.6)   
-78.6  
(113.7) 
Other loan specific controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1038 914 832 1038 914 832 
R-squared 0.034 0.0294 0.0541 0.0392 0.033 0.0596 
+ 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
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Table 4.7 – Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR): (-5, +5) and (-3, +3) 
windows 
Dependent variable: CAR (in basis points). Event windows of (-5,+5) and (-3,+3) days. OLS 
regressions of CAR on country, lender, borrower and loan specific variables. Only arranger 
banks and significant CAR are included. Robust standard errors clustered by banks are in 
parenthesis
+
. 
+ 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
  
Explanatory Variables (-5,+5) window (-3,+3) window 
 Lender Country Specific     
1 Private monitoring  33.2  
(20.7) 
30.8  
(24.9) 
413.7 ** 
(169.8) 
490.6 ** 
(204.7) 
33.8 ** 
(16.1) 
28.8  
(19.5) 
465.9 *** 
(133.7) 
532.9 *** 
(175.0) 
2 Private monitoring^2 
  
-22.5 ** 
(10.0) 
-27.3 ** 
(12.4)   
-25.6 *** 
(8.1) 
-30.0 *** 
(10.8) 
3 Capital Stringency 12.5  
(12.6) 
2.3  
(15.6) 
5.1  
(12.7) 
-7.1  
(16.3) 
5.7  
(9.1) 
-0.1  
(10.3) 
-3.4  
(9.4) 
-11.4  
(11.1) 
4 Official Supervision  -4.0  
(9.6) 
-7.8  
(12.4) 
-2.1  
(9.6) 
-5.7  
(12.3) 
-9.9  
(7.5) 
-11.2  
(9.2) 
-7.9  
(7.3) 
-9.7  
(9.1) 
5 Financial 
Development 
71.0  
(84.8) 
48.6  
(74.9) 
63.7  
(85.6) 
46.4  
(74.9) 
66.3  
(57.0) 
-11.0  
(55.2) 
54.3  
(57.2) 
-15.9  
(55.5) 
6 Stock Market 
Development 
32.8  
(27.3) 
15.1  
(43.0) 
24.0  
(27.9) 
-3.6  
(45.2) 
21.8  
(20.9) 
3.1  
(31.0) 
12.1  
(20.8) 
-17.3  
(33.3) 
7 Rule of Law -137.1 ** 
(68.3) 
-179.3 * 
(97.9) 
-121.4 * 
(66.9) 
-160.9 * 
(94.6) 
-99.8 * 
(55.6) 
-135.8 * 
(78.1) 
-81.9  
(53.3) 
-122.8  
(74.8) 
8 Bank Concentration 13.7  
(146.7) 
-9.6  
(146.0) 
53.2  
(149.2) 
22.5  
(143.4) 
15.1  
(107.0) 
59.8  
(117.1) 
59.8  
(105.6) 
92.7  
(113.0) 
9 Log (Number of 
Banks) 
5.4  
(21.2) 
13.3  
(28.8) 
7.3  
(21.7) 
14.6  
(29.0) 
9.9  
(16.0) 
24.2  
(21.6) 
13.6  
(15.7) 
27.6  
(21.8) 
10 Log (GDP) 33.5  
(35.3) 
0.3  
(43.5) 
39.0  
(35.1) 
12.6  
(45.0) 
15.8  
(24.9) 
4.6  
(36.0) 
21.0  
(23.0) 
13.6  
(36.0) 
11 Log (GDP per 
capita) 
81.0 ** 
(39.6) 
46.0  
(70.2) 
68.8 * 
(40.1) 
43.0  
(69.5) 
39.6  
(33.7) 
12.5  
(52.4) 
24.9  
(33.9) 
9.0  
(52.3) 
12 GDP growth -19.9  
(17.0) 
-23.0  
(22.1) 
-21.3  
(16.9) 
-24.4  
(21.8) 
-14.4  
(12.2) 
-10.7  
(16.7) 
-15.8  
(12.0) 
-12.1  
(16.4) 
 Borrower Country Specific     
13 Sovereign Credit 
Risk  
-10.2  
(13.0)  
-9.9  
(12.8)  
-12.9  
(10.0)  
-12.6  
(9.7) 
14 Creditor Rights 
 
-15.1  
(25.7)  
-12.3  
(25.8)  
-2.3  
(20.1)  
0.6  
(20.1) 
 Lender and Borrower Specific    
15 Log (Assets) 
 
24.7  
(41.5)  
19.4  
(40.2)  
7.4  
(32.5)  
4.8  
(31.3) 
16 Leverage 
 
-13.5  
(14.9)  
-14.1  
(14.8)  
-4.1  
(10.4)  
-4.9  
(10.3) 
17 Loan Loss Reserves 
 
-0.7  
(11.9)  
-1.0  
(11.9)  
2.4  
(8.0)  
1.2  
(8.1) 
18 Borrower Rating 
 
20.5  
(16.7)  
18.8  
(16.5)  
9.1  
(13.8)  
6.7  
(13.8) 
19 Borrower in Same 
Country  
-47.4  
(64.4)  
-43.3  
(65.0)  
-40.7  
(58.2)  
-31.6  
(58.6) 
 Loan Specific         
20 Log (Loan Amount) 
 
-2.1  
(22.3)  
-5.3  
(22.2)  
6.9  
(18.3)  
3.8  
(18.6) 
21 Log (Lender Amount 
/ Total Assets)  
0.6  
(12.5)  
2.6  
(12.3)  
0.4  
(10.6)  
3.0  
(10.4) 
22 Log (Maturity) 
 
-20.1 
(44.0)  
-19.2 
(43.6)  
-34.3 
(31.0)  
-36.0  
(30.8) 
23 Secured Loan 
 
-42.9 
(141.5)  
-43.4 
(142.0)  
-66.4 
(122.6)  
-76.9 
(123.2) 
Other loan specific contr. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 787 636 787 636 953 753 953 753 
R-squared 0.044 0.0718 0.0482 0.0776 0.0309 0.0572 0.0378 0.0659 
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Apart from regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks, we want to 
assess the importance of the other two necessary conditions for the effectiveness of the 
recognition phase of market discipline. The first piece of evidence coming from Tables 
4.6 and 4.7 does not support a significant influence on CAR of neither the level of the 
stock market development nor the adherence to a ‗no bailout policy‘, assumed to be 
inversely related to Bank_Concentration. In order to investigate the issue in depth, we 
performed regressions on sub-samples of low and high values of 
Stock_Market_Development and Bank_Concentration, according to their medians
21
. 
Results in Table 4.8 show that the private monitoring of banks does not matter for CAR 
reactions in countries with more developed stock markets. It might be that high 
competition for investors in these markets induces sound bank behaviour, reducing the 
importance of bank regulations favouring the private monitoring of banks. Conversely, 
the quadratic relationship between Private_Monitoring and CAR is present in countries 
with low stock market development. The evidence suggests that 
Stock_Market_Development works as a substitute mechanism to Private_Monitoring, 
which implies that these two conditions to the recognition phase of market disciple may 
not simultaneously hold. Regarding the third condition to the recognition phase, Table 
4.8 shows evidence that private monitoring matters for CAR when the bank industry is 
low concentrated. Recalling that Bank_Concentration proxies for the existence of ‗too-
big-to-fail‘ institutions, such result may be capturing the situation where low 
concentrated bank industries enable a role for private monitoring, as we expect these 
industries comply with the condition of ‗no bailout policy‘ of too-big-to-fail institutions.  
  
                                                          
21
 For the sake of concision, we report only the results for the [-5,+5] days event window, even though the 
results hold for the [-3,+3] and [-2,+2] windows as well. 
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Table 4.8 – Determinants of CAR: Sub-samples  
Dependent variable: CAR (in basis points). Event window of (-5,+5) days. OLS regressions of 
CAR on country, lender, borrower and loan specific variables. Only arranger banks and 
significant CAR are included. Robust standard errors clustered by banks are in parenthesis
+
. 
+ 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
 Stock Mkt Develop. Bank Concentration Rule of Law Official Supervision 
Explanatory Variables Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 Lender Country Specific        
1 Private monitoring  802.9 *** 
(300.0) 
-89.6  
(452.8) 
467.4 ** 
(256.4) 
269.4  
(316.4) 
1,046 *** 
(377.4) 
192.2  
(320.6) 
731.9  
(477.1) 
760.6 ** 
(336.9) 
2 Private 
monitoring^2 
-46.2 ** 
(19.2) 
1.4  
(24.5) 
-28.4 ** 
(15.6) 
-14.6  
(19.2) 
-63.2 *** 
(21.8) 
-6.9  
(19.5) 
-42.1  
(30.8) 
-44.8 ** 
(19.2) 
3 Capital Stringency -1.6  
(29.1) 
34.8  
(30.8) 
-22.6  
(48.9) 
-7.3  
(22.2) 
-31.8  
(38.0) 
19.7  
(25.9) 
6.1  
(26.1) 
1.4  
(21.8) 
4 Official 
Supervision  
25.2  
(29.4) 
9.2  
(19.4) 
17.7  
(23.4) 
-15.1  
(13.5) 
-5.1  
(31.1) 
-24.7  
(17.2) 
59.9  
(45.0) 
-9.8  
(36.4) 
5 Financial 
Development 
-446.1 ** 
(206.8) 
218.3 * 
(109.9) 
128.7  
(195.1) 
90.1  
(137.6) 
99.2  
(157.8) 
-134.7  
(155.7) 
-186.0  
(195.6) 
236.5 ** 
(116.3) 
6 Stock Market 
Development 
217.6  
(409.4) 
46.4  
(101.8) 
-3.3  
(109.0) 
-12.6  
(55.3) 
3.2  
(134.9) 
44.6  
(58.3) 
609.3 * 
(324.1) 
-89.7  
(59.1) 
7 Rule of Law -5.9  
(165.4) 
90.7  
(170.4) 
-220.2  
(170.6) 
-171.5  
(149.3) 
-248.2  
(203.9) 
159.0  
(334.1) 
-254.4  
(213.3) 
-120.6  
(162.4) 
8 Bank 
Concentration 
-568.2 * 
(334.6) 
168.3  
(344.1) 
107.1  
(620.2) 
-269.8  
(331.1) 
106.6  
(405.7) 
-61.6  
(275.1) 
48.9  
(479.4) 
-246.8  
(213.5) 
9 Log (Number of 
Banks) 
-29.6  
(56.0) 
-35.7  
(69.4) 
16.5  
(67.0) 
-14.6  
(64.3) 
-18.7  
(111.1) 
65.9  
(49.4) 
43.3  
(51.3) 
21.1  
(47.6) 
10 Log (GDP) -36.9  
(104.5) 
215.6 * 
(121.6) 
18.6  
(77.7) 
27.6  
(55.2) 
105.3  
(133.2) 
-106.8 * 
(63.4) 
-30.8  
(99.2) 
76.9  
(73.1) 
11 Log (GDP per 
capita) 
10.9  
(129.0) 
-265.9  
(192.8) 
9.7  
(103.8) 
74.8  
(158.1) 
62.8  
(128.5) 
-184.6  
(222.1) 
142.9  
(134.5) 
16.4  
(134.7) 
12 GDP growth -70.0 * 
(35.5) 
5.1  
(30.7) 
-13.0  
(33.2) 
-28.8  
(26.4) 
-20.8  
(34.2) 
-28.3 * 
(14.6) 
-69.7 * 
(40.7) 
30.9  
(31.8) 
 Borrower Country Specific      
13 Sovereign Credit 
Risk 
-27.0  
(24.4) 
-2.9  
(18.5) 
-3.9  
(29.8) 
-31.2 ** 
(14.8) 
-12.5  
(28.6) 
-5.2  
(18.2) 
2.4  
(17.4) 
-15.4  
(18.0) 
14 Creditor Rights -47.3  
(50.5) 
20.9  
(37.3) 
-78.8  
(54.1) 
7.4  
(32.4) 
-17.2  
(55.7) 
-45.6  
(34.6) 
26.2  
(38.7) 
-14.8  
(41.3) 
 Lender and Borrower Specific      
15 Log (Assets) 42.5  
(86.8) 
-27.5  
(39.9) 
90.5  
(74.8) 
-15.4  
(43.6) 
43.9  
(62.1) 
45.2  
(51.9) 
-75.9  
(116.6) 
3.5  
(45.6) 
16 Leverage -16.8  
(28.9) 
-20.7  
(20.3) 
-35.8  
(28.2) 
-34.5  
(22.4) 
-38.3  
(30.8) 
12.7  
(20.5) 
26.5  
(31.4) 
-13.7  
(23.7) 
17 Loan Loss 
Reserves 
-2.5  
(21.4) 
18.4  
(31.4) 
-10.2  
(21.6) 
-13.9  
(28.1) 
-8.1  
(19.2) 
-2.4  
(24.5) 
15.1  
(23.0) 
2.1  
(29.6) 
18 Borrower Rating -19.7  
(83.7) 
38.8  
(80.1) 
55.1  
(105.6) 
-42.6  
(78.0) 
-74.9  
(110.3) 
16.6  
(88.6) 
-49.3  
(73.6) 
114.3  
(111.5) 
19 Borrower in Same 
Country 
-121.2  
(162.3) 
-32.2  
(72.1) 
23.4  
(110.9) 
-177.2 * 
(93.0) 
-169.6  
(150.4) 
12.9  
(66.0) 
-43.3  
(101.8) 
-96.2  
(103.6) 
 Loan Specific         
20 Log (Loan 
Amount) 
19.0  
(43.0) 
6.6  
(30.7) 
-6.1  
(35.6) 
26.4  
(30.0) 
-30.7  
(48.5) 
-11.3  
(30.3) 
8.5  
(38.8) 
-28.6  
(27.3) 
21 Log (Lend Amount 
/ Total Assets) 
3.5  
(22.3) 
0.2  
(15.4) 
-5.0  
(20.7) 
0.6  
(18.5) 
26.3  
(19.5) 
-12.2  
(13.6) 
-1.5  
(19.2) 
12.9  
(18.5) 
22 Log (Maturity) 4.2  
(109.1) 
-28.1  
(47.0) 
-16.5  
(79.3) 
-69.9  
(47.3) 
-9.0  
(113.9) 
8.4  
(40.0) 
36.7  
(87.8) 
-5.2  
(50.1) 
23 Secured Loan -150.1  
(265.8) 
8.7  
(131.1) 
-295.0  
(332.1) 
113.3  
(124.0) 
-305.5  
(237.2) 
153.9  
(131.4) 
-86.0  
(168.3) 
18.5  
(203.4) 
Other loan spec. controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 294 342 315 321 315 321 287 349 
R-squared 0.183 0.128 0.156 0.191 0.136 0.160 0.195 0.152 
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The control phase 
Next, we argue that the signals provided by the market through price reactions of 
equity holders to bank loan announcements also convey evidence of the control phase of 
market discipline, in the sense that banks managers‘ behaviour is influenced by and 
reflected on these market signals. We believe that markets influence banks managers‘ 
beliefs and provide incentives for them to take better lending decisions when they are 
exposed to the monitoring of the market. Table 4.5 provides pieces of evidence 
supporting that in countries where regulations promoting the private monitoring of 
banks are more intense, market reactions to loan announcements tend to have a better 
quality in terms of increasing banks‘ market value. First, positive reactions have higher 
magnitudes and are more frequent in countries with more private monitoring 
regulations, when compared to positive reactions in countries with less regulations of 
this kind. Second, negative reactions have lower magnitudes and are less frequent in 
countries with high private monitoring, with respect to countries with low private 
monitoring. These results corroborate the positive correlation between cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) and Private_Monitoring in Table 4.3. Results of the regression 
analysis of Tables 4.6 and 4.7 confirm that CAR increase with the level of private 
monitoring of banks. In this sense, banks that are more exposed to external monitoring 
through mechanisms such as information and accounting disclosure, external auditing 
and subordinated debt, experience higher positive reactions in their equity value in 
response to a loan announcement. We interpret it as a beneficial role of market 
monitoring to banks as it contributes in assuring a business environment where 
asymmetric information is reduced and market prices reflect sound management 
practices.  
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To get a clearer picture of which factors influence different types of bank stock 
price reactions to loan announcements, we next perform regressions of sub-samples of 
positive and negative CAR on the full set of explanatory variables, in the [-3,+3] and [-
2,+2] days event windows. In addition, we run regressions of the absolute value of CAR 
on the same variables, with the purpose to help explaining stock price reactions 
irrespective of their signs. From results in Table 4.9, which show regressions on 
positive and negative CAR with R-squared above 30%, we notice that the previous 
inverse U-shaped relationship between Private_Monitoring and CAR holds for positive 
and absolute CAR, but not for negative CAR
22
. These findings suggest that, with 
respect to bank loan announcements, the private monitoring of banks is important as a 
market mechanism of validating sound bank risk-taking practices. Moreover, although 
not significant in explaining negative CAR, higher levels of private monitoring seem to 
inhibit poor lending practices, as we observe from Table 4.5 that negative CAR are less 
frequent when private monitoring is high. We claim that, in this context, banks 
managers‘ effort to pursue sound risk management in lending increases with the 
effectiveness of the market monitoring. It means that the effectiveness of the control 
phase of market discipline depends, to a great degree, on the effectiveness of the 
recognition phase. In other words, the higher the effectiveness of market monitoring, the 
more likely banks managers‘ respond and behave in the direction of improving bank 
solvency. We believe that our results provide support to this contention.  
 
                                                          
22
 We checked that the conditional distributions of the Private_Monitoring variable given that CAR is 
either positive or negative do not differ from its distribution when the whole sample of CAR is 
considered, i.e., positive and negative CAR sub-samples have no selection bias. 
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Table 4.9 – Determinants of Positive, Negative and Absolute CAR 
Dependent variable: CAR (in basis points). Event windows of (-3,+3) and (-2,+2) days. OLS 
regressions of CAR on country, lender, borrower and loan specific variables. Only arranger 
banks and significant CAR are included. Robust standard errors clustered by banks are in 
parenthesis
+
. 
+ 
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
 Positive CAR Negative CAR Absolute CAR 
Explanatory Variables (-3;+3) (-2;+2) (-3;+3) (-2;+2) (-3;+3) (-2;+2) 
 Lender Country Specific     
1 Private monitoring  463.58 *** 
(167.10) 
417.99 ** 
(166.36) 
-38.53  
(128.19) 
-83.56  
(91.59) 
218.10 * 
(116.93) 
258.80 ** 
(103.32) 
2 Private monitoring^2 -27.04 *** 
(9.67) 
-23.86 ** 
(9.55) 
3.83  
(7.75) 
5.32  
(5.55) 
-13.66 ** 
(6.85) 
-15.13 ** 
(6.06) 
3 Capital Stringency -13.55  
(10.24) 
-12.56  
(8.25) 
6.55  
(8.79) 
10.98  
(6.65) 
-10.53  
(7.22) 
-13.97 ** 
(5.34) 
4 Official Supervision  7.28  
(7.02) 
-2.12  
(6.76) 
-17.78 *** 
(6.34) 
-7.60  
(6.63) 
9.96 ** 
(4.64) 
2.04  
(4.38) 
5 Financial 
Development 
8.63  
(37.47) 
-67.67  
(42.78) 
-48.32  
(48.79) 
-17.91  
(39.96) 
38.52  
(31.46) 
-18.78  
(27.87) 
6 Stock Market 
Development 
-57.30 ** 
(24.91) 
-52.52  
(33.23) 
11.86  
(26.63) 
3.92  
(20.56) 
-44.04 ** 
(18.51) 
-29.60 * 
(17.51) 
7 Rule of Law -140.06 ** 
(66.82) 
-17.36  
(70.46) 
18.05  
(53.35) 
-1.95  
(39.19) 
-63.17 * 
(37.50) 
-6.94  
(36.70) 
8 Bank Concentration 216.76 ** 
(96.41) 
173.57  
(108.46) 
136.02  
(95.97) 
25.39  
(84.53) 
-32.14  
(78.60) 
28.52  
(73.08) 
9 Log (Number of 
Banks) 
-9.55  
(22.20) 
2.07  
(27.04) 
7.83  
(16.79) 
-1.47  
(12.83) 
-6.81  
(15.92) 
0.06  
(15.57) 
10 Log (GDP) 113.18 *** 
(41.81) 
86.34 ** 
(42.95) 
5.70  
(23.20) 
4.07  
(21.23) 
37.08  
(23.43) 
32.94  
(20.30) 
11 Log (GDP per capita) 41.29  
(46.05) 
-20.47  
(54.71) 
8.99  
(56.85) 
67.08 * 
(39.48) 
26.91  
(31.92) 
-26.15  
(31.32) 
12 GDP growth 3.64  
(7.34) 
-11.85  
(7.38) 
9.79  
(16.36) 
10.11  
(9.84) 
-3.13  
(6.66) 
-11.07 ** 
(5.55) 
 Borrower Country Specific     
13 Sovereign Credit Risk -6.81  
(6.19) 
-1.31  
(7.77) 
-0.62  
(7.39) 
0.21  
(4.53) 
-2.33  
(4.31) 
1.91  
(3.35) 
14 Creditor Rights 39.49 ** 
(18.39) 
39.37 ** 
(18.54) 
-28.33  
(18.28) 
-29.98 ** 
(13.20) 
26.92 ** 
(12.64) 
30.30 *** 
(10.65) 
 Lender and Borrower Specific     
15 Log (Assets) -92.77 *** 
(25.90) 
-79.96 *** 
(29.30) 
16.39  
(28.82) 
-3.06  
(22.88) 
-53.84 *** 
(17.56) 
-34.21 ** 
(15.49) 
16 Leverage 17.89 ** 
(7.31) 
22.57 *** 
(8.22) 
-24.86 ** 
(11.79) 
-18.23 *** 
(6.42) 
17.41 *** 
(5.97) 
16.83 *** 
(4.62) 
17 Loan Loss Reserves 4.20  
(5.50) 
12.68  
(8.25) 
-4.92  
(13.48) 
1.69  
(6.18) 
5.95  
(5.54) 
7.56 * 
(4.38) 
18 Borrower Rating -57.28  
(44.77) 
-31.34  
(56.79) 
40.89  
(26.41) 
2.02  
(22.70) 
-47.74  
(28.96) 
-20.30  
(32.50) 
19 Borrower in Same 
Country 
-55.75  
(47.06) 
-65.22  
(52.92) 
-33.40  
(32.50) 
-30.31  
(29.13) 
-11.50  
(25.64) 
-11.68  
(23.76) 
 Loan Specific       
20 Log (Loan Amount) 1.62  
(15.93) 
-6.54  
(14.35) 
1.48  
(12.61) 
-2.66  
(8.43) 
-1.40  
(10.14) 
-4.59  
(8.62) 
21 Log (Lender Amount 
/ Total Assets) 
-5.30  
(7.48) 
0.68  
(6.65) 
-11.09 * 
(5.69) 
-10.47 * 
(5.65) 
3.11  
(3.65) 
5.11  
(3.26) 
22 Log (Maturity) -31.45  
(24.07) 
-14.52  
(32.82) 
46.10  
(34.74) 
7.46  
(22.22) 
-35.97  
(22.10) 
-7.24  
(19.83) 
23 Secured Loan -87.57  
(135.31) 
-73.78  
(129.21) 
-24.46  
(74.64) 
-30.10  
(44.81) 
-29.30  
(71.46) 
-33.41  
(65.03) 
Other loan specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 377 427 376 405 753 832 
R-squared 0.3661 0.3280 0.3190 0.3204 0.2740 0.2631 
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Influence of other country-level factors 
Thanks to our cross-country analysis that allows us to control and examine how 
different institutional settings affect markets‘ reactions to bank loan announcements, we 
believe that our study contributes to the evaluation of the relative importance of bank 
regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks in the broad context of regulatory 
policies. Accordingly, we proceed by providing evidence on the influence of 
institutional characteristics at the country level on market reactions to loan 
announcements. 
Regarding the other bank regulations variables, there is not evidence of the 
influence of capital regulations stringency or official supervisory power on CAR in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Also, (unreported) regressions including interaction terms between 
the three bank regulations variables show no significant results. Nevertheless, Table 4.8 
provides evidence that private monitoring affect CAR only in countries with high 
official supervisory power, which suggests that these regulatory mechanisms 
complement each other. Regarding negative CAR reactions reported in Table 4.9, there 
is evidence that more powerful official supervision decreases CAR, in response to loan 
announcements. In an unreported regression, we interacted Official_Supervision with 
the level of the enforcement of laws, represented by the Rule_of_Law variable, and 
found a significant and negative coefficient for the interactive term, and a significant 
and positive coefficient for Rule_of_Law. Together, the evidence indicates that the 
combination of high official supervision and high rule of law boosts a negative CAR 
reaction, which means that these mechanisms favour the disciplining role of a negative 
market price reaction in response to poor bank lending practices.  
We found evidence that Rule_of_Law decreases CAR, according to most 
regressions in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. It means that CAR are lower in countries with more 
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developed legal systems. Given that the distributions of CAR in countries with Rule of 
Law above the median is symmetric, such result might suggest that stock market 
reactions in these countries are less important. Additional evidence on Rule_of_Law 
coming from Table 4.8 shows that Private_Monitoring matters when the level of rule of 
law is low. Such finding corroborates that more important market reactions are 
associated to low levels of Rule_of_Law. While private monitoring is important in 
countries where the rule of law is weak, it seems that markets believe that banks behave 
appropriately in countries with strong rule of law, precluding a role for the private 
monitoring of banks. In this sense, Rule_of_Law works as a substitute mechanism to 
Private_Monitoring. 
Still on lender country-level variables, results in Table 4.9 show that improving 
stock market development and the rule of law reduces the bank stock positive reactions 
to loan announcements, whereas countries with higher concentrated bank industries and 
higher GDP experience higher CAR. Except from the GDP‘s coefficients, this piece of 
evidence seems to favour the private interest view of regulation, as it suggests that 
private monitoring is more important as a mechanism of rewarding sound bank risk-
taking practices, through positive CAR reactions, in countries with less developed stock 
markets and legal systems, as well as with more concentrated bank industries. 
Regarding borrower country-level variables, Creditor_Rights cause opposite effects on 
CAR depending on the sign of the reaction, according to Table 4.9. In other words, a 
positive market reaction to good news in terms of bank lending is stronger when 
borrower country legal protection of lenders is more developed, while a negative market 
reaction to a bad bank lending decision is even worse if lenders are more legally 
protected. We observed in unreported regressions that this effect of Creditor_Rights on 
CAR matters only if lender and borrower are in the same country. We conclude that 
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legal protection of lenders boosts either positive or negative CAR reactions and is 
enforceable only if lender and borrower are located in the same country.  
 
Influence of bank and loan level factors  
The influence of bank size and leverage on CAR is also remarkable, according 
to Table 4.9. Increasing bank size - measured by total assets - reduces a positive CAR, 
but has no influence on a negative CAR reaction. It seems that market reactions to 
sound bank lending decisions are less important for larger banks. On the other hand, 
bank leverage affects CAR differently, according to the sign of the reaction. The higher 
the leverage, the higher is a positive CAR reaction to a loan announcement. By contrast, 
a negative CAR reaction decreases with bank leverage. Therefore, leverage boosts 
either good or bad market reactions to loan announcements. This evidence might 
support the reliance on equity holders as right participants to induce market discipline 
even if bank probability of default is high. However, unreported tests do not show 
similar evidence across different levels of capital ratios.  
Interesting evidence is also given by the Log(Lender_Amount / Total_Assets) 
variable, in Table 4.9. In the case of negative CAR reactions, the higher the amount lent 
by the bank (relative to its size), the stronger the negative market reaction. Additional 
results show that the coefficient for the dummy indicating Working Capital loan 
purpose (unreported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7) is positive and very significant in all 
regressions that include this dummy. No other coefficient for loan purpose dummy is 
significant. It tells that financing short term cash flow needs of firms is interpreted as 
good news by bank stock investors, probably because it is considered a less risky 
investment decision. Alternatively, it suggests that the reactions may be related to the 
short maturity of this kind of loans. Indeed, loans with working capital purposes have an 
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average maturity of 51 months, shorter than the 55, 57, 71 and 129 months on average 
of loans made with respectively corporate, debt repayment, LBO/MBO and project 
finance purposes. The exceptions are loans for acquisition line and takeover purposes, 
which have an average maturity of respectively 51 and 49 months. However, despite the 
short maturity of these latter kinds of loans, given their peculiarities and the mixed 
evidence regarding the effect of mergers and acquisitions on acquiring firms‘ stocks 
prices (e.g., Bhagat et al., 2005), a positive impact on banks‘ stock prices due to the 
short maturity feature of acquisition line and takeover purposes loans is not certain. 
 
4.5  Conclusions 
 
This paper provides evidence of stock market reactions to bank loan 
announcements, focused on bank stock price variations. In addition, it contributes to the 
empirical literature on market discipline of banks by providing evidence of market 
monitoring of banks through equity markets‘ price reactions to loan announcements, as 
well as evidence of banks‘ responses to these market reactions in the direction of 
pursuing sound risk-taking practices. In this sense, we offer evidence of the 
effectiveness of both recognition and control phases of market discipline, as proposed 
by the framework of Hamalainen et al. (2005).  
By applying event-study techniques in a cross-country sample of loan 
announcements, we first find that stock market reactions - measured by bank stock 
cumulative abnormal returns - to loan announcements are significant. Second, a 
regression analysis shows that the higher the level of private monitoring of banks, the 
higher the positive market reactions to loan announcements, in the form of higher 
positive cumulative abnormal returns of bank stocks.  
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Our findings suggest that bank regulations that promote the external private 
monitoring of banks – e.g., regulatory requirements of information and accounting 
disclosure, external auditing, depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and 
discipline – play a role in influencing bank stock market reactions to banks‘ risk taking 
decisions. Particularly, stock markets reward, through increasing bank equity value, 
good news in terms of sound bank lending, with intensity proportional to the level of 
private monitoring. We also observe that positive reactions are greater and more 
frequent in countries with high private monitoring, while negative reactions are lower 
and more frequent when the private monitoring is low. Our evidence supports the idea 
that more regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks induce, through 
enhanced market reactions, the pursuing of sound lending practices on the part of banks‘ 
managers.  
We also find a decreasing effect of very high levels of private monitoring in 
positive CAR, which supports the view that the excess of transparency may harm 
banks‘ reliance on a certain amount of information opaqueness to provide added-value 
services. The evidence also highlights the difficulties of reaching the Basel Committee‘s 
recommendation of an appropriate balance between the need for meaningful disclosure 
to allow for effective market discipline and the protection of bank proprietary 
information. 
Furthermore, we find that the private monitoring of banks is especially important 
in countries where either the legal system or the stock market is poorly developed, the 
bank industry is low concentrated, or the official bank supervision is strong. The piece 
of evidence highlighting a role for private monitoring in countries with poor 
enforcement of law or poorly developed stock markets favours a private interest view of 
bank regulation, which means that it is precisely in countries with weak institutional 
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development where supervisors are more likely to be captured, and market discipline 
emerge as a beneficial mechanism to attain bank performance and stability. These 
findings also indicate that private monitoring behaves as a substitute to stock market 
development or the rule of law. The evidence that the private monitoring of banks is 
important in countries with low concentrated bank industries suggests that ‗too-big-to-
fail‘ incentives in these countries are probably less present, which guarantees a role for 
the private monitoring in reducing bank risk-taking. Finally, the evidence that private 
monitoring works especially in countries with more powerful official supervision 
supports the view that these two mechanisms are complementary in achieving bank 
soundness.  
To conclude, we believe that our study contributes to the debate over the 
appropriateness of incorporating bank regulations that promote the private monitoring 
of banks in country-level regulatory policies, by investigating whether and how 
different markets react to bank loan announcements, through a cross-country analysis 
that allows us to control and examine how different institutional settings affect this 
mechanism. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
General Conclusions, Contributions and Lines for Further 
Research 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to achieve a better understanding of 
the functioning of banks, by providing empirical evidence of how specific dimensions 
of bank activity are affected by internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
Three empirical essays were conducted in order to help explaining some banks‘ 
outcomes. In the first essay (Chapter 2), we investigated the relationship between bank 
ownership concentration and both risk and performance, in the presence of broad bank 
regulations and other country-level conditions that shape the banking industry. In the 
second essay (Chapter 3), we assessed the relative roles of three broad categories of 
bank regulations, namely, capital requirements, official supervision and external private 
monitoring, on the determination of spread and maturity of loan contracts. In the third 
essay (Chapter 4), we provided evidence indicating that capital markets are important in 
monitoring banks. In particular we analysed equity markets‘ price reactions to loan 
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announcements, and found evidence indicating that banks respond to the markets‘ 
scrutiny, pursuing sound risk taking practices. 
In Chapter 2 we make use of the so-called Generalized Method of Moments 
panel data estimation techniques (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998), and apply them to an original and comprehensive cross-
country sample of bank accounting and ownership information that also incorporates 
data on bank regulations and other country-level factors. This allows us to contribute to 
the existing literature by providing evidence that: (1) banks‘ ownership concentration 
and performance have a cubic relationship, supporting the theoretical hypotheses of 
effective monitoring at low levels of ownership concentration (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976); expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Faccio and Stolin, 2006), or loss of 
managerial discretion (Burkart et al.,1997) at moderate ownership concentration; and 
high costs of expropriation at high levels of ownership concentration (Burkart et al., 
1998); (2) the initial positive effect of ownership concentration on performance is 
stronger  when legal protection of shareholders is low; (3) the stringency of capital 
regulations  interacts positively with ownership concentration to increase the 
performance of banks for low levels of ownership concentration; (4) banks‘ ownership 
concentration and risk have an U-shape relationship, supporting that shareholders‘ 
incentives to take risk prevail when their equity stake is above a threshold; (5) the 
stringency of capital regulations is effective in simultaneously reducing risk and 
improving performance of banks. 
In Chapter 3, we perform standard OLS regressions on a large sample of loans 
extended by banks located in 39 countries to examine how bank regulations regarding 
capital requirements, official supervision and private monitoring, influence the risk 
characteristics of loan contracts. We used broad indices proposed by those Barth et al., 
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(2006) to measure the extension of adoption of these regulations by countries. Given the 
comprehensiveness of our dataset, we were also able to extend our analysis by 
examining complementarities and interactions between bank regulatory mechanisms 
themselves and between these and country factors such as the level of bank competition, 
financial development and legal enforcement. Contributions of Chapter 3 to the 
literature are summarized by the following findings: (1) the stringency of capital 
regulations and loan contracts‘ risk characteristics (spread and maturity) have an inverse 
U-shaped relationship; (2) more powerful official supervision is associated with riskier 
loan contracts; (3) both official supervisory power and private monitoring work as 
substitutes for capital regulation, helping to reduce the risk measures of loan contracts 
when capital stringency is low; (4) for high levels of capital stringency, official 
supervision and private monitoring complement capital regulation in reducing loan 
contracts‘ risk measures; (5) for a given country, the degrees of both legal enforcement 
and competition in the banking industry complement capital and private monitoring 
regulations and improve the risk characteristics of loan contracts. 
Chapter 4 focused on the issue of reliance on market discipline as a bank 
supervisory mechanism. In the first part it employs event-study techniques to assess 
market reactions to bank loan announcements in the form of abnormal returns on stocks 
of a large and diverse cross-country set of banks. Then, OLS regression analysis is used 
in order to explain how reactions are associated to a country‘s degree of adoption of 
regulations that promote the external private monitoring of banks. The variable 
measuring external private monitoring is an index proposed by Barth et al. (2006) that 
assesses the existence of regulatory requirements of information and accounting 
disclosure, external auditing, depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and 
discipline. Through this setting, which also incorporates other country, bank and loan 
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level variables, Chapter 4 was able to offer empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
the two stages that drive the process of market discipline of banks, namely the 
recognition and the control phases, according to the framework of Hamalainen et al. 
(2005). The contribution of Chapter 4 is twofold. First, it helps to fill a gap in the 
literature by providing evidence of market price reactions to loan announcements. 
Second, it contributes to the debate over the appropriateness of incorporating bank 
regulations that promote the private monitoring of banks in country-level regulatory 
policies, by investigating whether and how different markets react to bank loan 
announcements. The main findings of Chapter 4 are that: (1) abnormal bank stock 
returns are significant on the days surrounding a bank loan announcement; (2) positive 
abnormal returns are higher and more frequent in countries with high private 
monitoring, while negative abnormal returns are lower and more frequent when the 
private monitoring is low, supporting the idea that more regulations promoting the 
private monitoring of banks improve the quality of market signals, and induce the 
pursuing of sound lending practices on the part of banks‘ managers; (3) private 
monitoring plays a more important role in countries with low enforced legal systems, 
poorly developed stock markets, low concentrated banking industry, and strong official 
bank supervision. 
All of these results from the different chapters can be summarized in four 
important conclusions about the functioning of the banking industry as follows: 
- Banks behave in a similar way as non-financial firms in general: they face 
similar agency problems and use similar corporate governance mechanisms to solve 
them. 
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- Capital regulations play an important role in attaining bank efficiency, both 
from the perspective of regulators, who seek to attain financial stability, and from the 
perspective of shareholders, who want to improve performance. 
- The different regulations imposed by the supervisors on the banking industry 
interact among them in complex ways, and this in turn affects their influence on the risk 
taking behaviour of banks. The assumption that the three types of regulations play 
complementary roles, as advocated by proponents of reinforcing pillars of Basel II, is 
incorrect. 
- Regulations that promote the external private monitoring of banks increase the 
sensitivity of market reactions to banks‘ risk taking decisions associated to loan 
announcements. Thus, stock markets reward, through positive price reactions, the 
implementation of sound bank lending policies, and induce, through market reactions, 
the pursuing of sound lending practices on the part of banks‘ managers. 
- Regulations that promote the external private monitoring of banks increase the 
sensitivity of bank stock prices to announcements of loan decisions. Thus, stock 
markets reward, through positive price reactions, the implementation of sound bank 
lending policies, and induce, through market reactions, the pursuing of sound lending 
practices on the part of banks‘ managers. 
We believe these are interesting contributions to the growing, but still small, 
literature that studies the governance of banks. Moreover, several lines for further 
research naturally emerge on subjects related to the ones covered in this thesis. 
Related to whether corporate governance issues in banking are similar to those 
in non-financial firms, which is the subject of Chapter 2 of this thesis, the incorporation 
to our setting of more detailed data on bank-specific corporate governance, such as 
board composition, insider ownership and executive compensation schemes, would 
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allow a deeper investigation of the influence of banks‘ internal corporate governance 
choices on their risk and performance. Moreover, this setting could enrich the analyses 
that assess the agency costs related to poor risk management practices and expropriation 
of banks‘ resources by managers or controlling shareholders. For instance, the different 
degree of earnings management/income smoothing practices among banks and non-
banks, observed but not explained by Shen and Chih (2005), could be examined in such 
a richer setting. This would contribute to the limited literature that looks at the impact of 
corporate governance on earnings management at banks, as identified by Cornett, 
McNutt and Tehranian (2006). 
The focus of Chapter 3 is on the influence of bank regulations on banks‘ credit 
policies in a setting where the corporate governance mechanisms analyzed are only 
external and at the country level. Our proposal is to incorporate in our setting variables 
of bank-specific corporate governance traits, in order to investigate whether these 
characteristics have any influence on the credit policies of lenders. In particular, 
whether banks lend in better conditions to firms with sound governance practices, 
whether borrowers‘ corporate governance factors can help explaining banks‘ 
performance, or whether banks specialize across borrowers‘ corporate governance 
characteristics.  
Furthermore, as more data on bank regulations become available through new 
surveys of the World Bank, a natural extension of Chapter 3 is to improve the 
methodology used, by adopting more sophisticated estimation techniques, such as panel 
data analysis, so as to explain loan contracts‘ terms and other relationships between 
lending and bank regulations. For instance, such a setting would allow for a longitudinal 
analysis of how variations in regulatory measures produce changes in the credit policy 
of each individual bank. This would help tackling endogeneity issues, when the changes 
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in regulation may be triggered by certain condition in the credit market, as well as 
issues related to cost adjustments. Finally, issues of simultaneous versus sequential 
implementation of both capital requirements and supervision regulations would be 
properly addressed in a longitudinal study. 
Among other findings, Chapter 4 provided empirical evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of the control phase, or market influence component of market discipline 
of banks, as proposed by the frameworks of Flannery (2001) and Hamalainen et al. 
(2005). Such interpretation of the results relies on the assumption that we observe an 
equilibrium situation where banks‘ managers have incentives to pursue sound risk 
taking practices, given that markets reward good news in terms of bank lending. In this 
context, a valuable extension to Chapter 4 would be to develop a theoretical model that 
predicts such equilibrium as the outcome of a game where banks‘ behaviour depends on 
the beliefs of banks‘ managers about markets‘ reactions to a particular risk taking 
policy. In this case, conclusions derived from the empirical evidence of Chapter 4 
would be appropriately grounded on theoretical predictions. 
As a final comment, we highlight the enormous economic and social relevance 
of properly understanding all dimensions related to the functioning of banks, 
remarkably after the seriousness of both the economic downturn and the distress in 
financial stability experienced worldwide during the time this thesis was written. Thus, 
we are confident that the issues treated in this thesis will be the subject of intensive 
research in the near future. Hopefully, the academic community will persevere with 
continuously rethinking bank regulation ―till angels govern‖, as conjectured by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2006). 
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Appendix A: Description of Explanatory Variables (Chapter 2) 
 
Variable Description Source 
Bank specific   
Ownership 
Concentration 
The equity percentage participation of the largest shareholder of the bank. More specifically, it is 
the total participation of the largest shareholder taken from the Bankscope database, i.e., the sum of 
direct and indirect fractions of the bank‘s voting rights held by the largest shareholder, whenever 
this information is available. Often, only the direct participation is available, and this value is used 
instead. Quadratic and cubic variables for ownership concentration are also generated for the 
examination of a cubic relationship between performance and ownership.  
 
Bankscope. 
Revenue Growth The bank‘s average growth in total revenues respect to the previous year.  
 
Calculations on data 
from Bankscope. 
Size Natural logarithm of bank‘s annual total assets in thousands of US dollars.  
 
Bankscope. 
Leverage The bank‘s ratio of total debt to total assets.  
 
Bankscope. 
State Owned A dummy indicating if the largest shareholder of the bank is the government of a country or State. It 
is included to control for government ownership, which is argued to affect principal-agent 
relationships (Levine, 2003), and to be associated with poorly developed banks (Barth et al., 1999). 
 
Bankscope. 
Bank regulations   
Capital Stringency It is the Capital Requirements Stringency Index of Barth et al. (2006). It measures the level of 
stringency of capital restrictions imposed to banks, such as eligible funds for entering in the banking 
industry, and the use of risk based approaches by central banks when defining capital ratio 
requirements. Constructed for three periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using data 
from the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, it 
ranges from 2 to its maximum possible value of 10, with higher values representing stricter capital 
regulations.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 
2008). 
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Variable Description Source 
Official 
Supervisory Power 
It is the Official Supervisory Power Index of Barth et al. (2006). It represents the degree of the 
power that the supervisor authority has to oversee and intervene in banks functioning. Also 
constructed for three periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using data from the surveys 
on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, the index ranges 
from 4 to 14.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 
2008). 
Private Monitoring It is the Private Monitoring Index of Barth et al. (2006). It gives a measure of the degree to which 
banks are exposed to external monitoring, apart from official regulatory and supervisory oversight. 
It comprises regulatory requirements of information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, 
depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and discipline. The index was constructed for three 
periods (1997-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007), using data from the surveys on bank regulation 
and supervision conducted by the World Bank. Higher values of the index represent more 
regulations promoting the private monitoring of banks. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 
2008).  
Other country specific  
Shareholders 
Rights 
It is the measure of a country‘s degree of legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders, represented by the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. 
(2008). These authors argue that such index is better than their previous La Porta et al. (1998)‘s 
anti-director rights index to explain a variety of stock market outcomes. It is assumed constant all 
over the period from 1997 to 2007. 
 
Djankov et al. (2008). 
Financial 
Development 
A proxy of a country‘s financial development, constructed by Beck et al. (2000), using raw data 
from the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics, October 2008. This variable is given by the total 
credit to the private sector by deposit money banks, as a share of GDP. It is available for each year 
of the period. Higher values of this variable should correspond to more developed financial systems. 
If it is originally missing, zero is assigned to this variable, and a separate indicator for missing value 
is included. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
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Variable Description Source 
Rule of Law It is a country governance indicator constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) measuring perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The authors rely on multiple sources to construct a weighted 
aggregate indicator. 
 
Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Bank 
Concentration 
Total assets of country‘s three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks, 
constructed by Beck et al. (2000) using data from the Fitch’s Bankscope database. It reflects the 
level of concentration in the banking industry. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
Log (Number of 
Banks) 
It is the logarithm of the number of commercial banks in the country, made available by Barth et al. 
(2001, 2006, 2008), based on the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the 
World Bank. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 
2008). 
Log (GDP) The logarithm of the annual country‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), where GDP is given in 
billions of US Dollars. This variable is supposed to measure the size of a country‘s economy. 
 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
The logarithm of the annual country‘s GDP per capita. This variable is relied as a measure of a 
country‘s economic development. 
 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
GDP growth The percent growth in a country‘s GDP from the previous year to the current year. This variable 
reflects a country‘s business cycle. 
 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
Country-Average 
ROA 
Annual return on assets averaged across all banks in the country. Calculations on data 
from Bankscope. 
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Appendix B: Description of Explanatory Variables (Chapter 3) 
Variable Description Source 
Lender country specific   
Capital Stringency It is the Capital Requirements Stringency Index of Barth et al. (2006). It measures the level of 
stringency of capital restrictions imposed to banks, such as eligible funds for entering in the banking 
industry, and the use of risk based approaches by central banks when defining capital ratio 
requirements. Constructed for three periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from 
the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, it ranges 
from 2 to its maximum possible value of 10, with higher values representing stricter capital 
regulations.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Official Supervisory Power It is the Official Supervisory Power Index of Barth et al. (2006). It represents the degree of the power 
that the supervisor authority has to oversee and intervene in banks functioning. Also constructed for 
three periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on bank regulation 
and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, the index ranges from 4 to 15.5.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Private Monitoring It is the Private Monitoring Index of Barth et al. (2006). It gives a measure of the degree to which 
banks are exposed to external monitoring, apart from official regulatory and supervisory oversight. It 
comprises regulatory requirements of information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, 
depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and discipline. The index was constructed for three 
periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on bank regulation and 
supervision conducted by the World Bank. Higher values of the index represent more regulations 
promoting the private monitoring of banks. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008).  
Financial Development A proxy of a lender‘s country financial development, constructed by Beck et al. (2000), using raw data 
from the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics, October 2008. This variable is given by the total 
credit to the private sector by deposit money banks, as a share of GDP. It is available for each year of 
the period. Higher values of this variable should correspond to more developed financial systems. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
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Variable Description Source 
Log (Number of Banks) It is the natural logarithm of the number of commercial banks in the country, made available by Barth 
et al. (2001, 2006, 2008), based on the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the 
World Bank. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Rule of Law It is a country governance indicator constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) measuring perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. The authors rely on multiple sources to construct a weighted aggregate indicator. 
 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008). 
Borrower country specific   
Creditor Rights It is the index of La Porta et al. (1998), which measures a country‘s level of legal protection of lenders, 
against expropriation by borrowers. It is assumed constant along the period from 1997 to 2006. If it is 
not available for a country, zero is assigned to this variable, and a separate indicator for creditor rights 
index missing is included. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Log (GDP) The natural logarithm of the annual country‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), where GDP is given in 
billions of US Dollars. This variable is supposed to measure the size of a country‘s economy. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
Log (GDP per capita) The natural logarithm of the annual country‘s GDP per capita. This variable is relied as a measure of a 
country‘s economic development. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
GDP growth The percent growth in a country‘s GDP from the previous year to the current year. This variable 
reflects a country‘s business cycle. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
Sovereign Credit Risk It is an index ranging from 1 to 24, representing the borrower‘s country Fitch Sovereign Rating on 
foreign currency, long term debt. Higher values of the index represent higher risk. It is available for 
each year. 
 
 
 
 
Fitch Ratings. 
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Variable Description Source 
Lender specific   
Log (Assets) The natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank. It is a measure of the size of the bank. Available 
for each year. 
 
Bankscope. 
Leverage It is the ratio of total book value of liabilities to total book value of assets. It is available for each year. 
 
Bankscope. 
Borrower specific   
Debt Rating This variable consists of an index ranging from 1 to 6, representing the Moody‘s senior debt rating at 
the close of the loan. When Moody‘s ratings are missing, S&P ratings are used. The index equal to 1 
represents a rating of ―Aaa‖, 2 indicates ―Aa‖, and 6 indicates ―B‖ or worse. If there is no rating 
information for the borrower, zero is assigned to this variable. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Same country A dummy variable that indicates if the loan was made to a borrower in the same country as the lender. 
 
LPC DealScan 
Industry sector Ten indicators, corresponding to the first digit of the SIC code that describes the broad sector of 
activity of the borrower.  
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan specific   
Log (Loan Amount) It is the natural logarithm of the loan deal amount, expressed in US Dollars. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan Purpose dummies These are 7 indicators of the most common specific purposes of the loan, which accounts for 82% of 
the loans in the sample. These purposes are: Acquisition line, CP backup, Corporate Purposes, Debt 
Repayment, LBO/MBO, Takeover, and Working Capital. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan Type dummies Five variables, accounting for 77% of the loans in the sample, indicating the most common types of 
deals: 364-day facility, Term Loan, and Revolver line >= 1 year. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
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Appendix C: Description of Explanatory Variables (Chapter 4) 
Variable Description Source 
Lender country specific   
Private Monitoring It is the Private Monitoring Index of Barth et al. (2006). It gives a measure of the degree to which 
banks are exposed to external monitoring, apart from official regulatory and supervisory oversight. It 
comprises regulatory requirements of information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, 
depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and discipline. The index was constructed for three 
periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on bank regulation and 
supervision conducted by the World Bank. Higher values of the index represent more regulations 
promoting the private monitoring of banks. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008).  
Capital Stringency It is the Capital Requirements Stringency Index of Barth et al. (2006). It measures the level of stringency of 
capital restrictions imposed to banks, such as eligible funds for entering in the banking industry, and the use of 
risk based approaches by central banks when defining capital ratio requirements. Constructed for three periods 
(1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on bank regulation and 
supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, it ranges from 2 to its maximum possible value of 10, 
with higher values representing stricter capital regulations.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Official Supervisory Power It is the Official Supervisory Power Index of Barth et al. (2006). It represents the degree of the power that the 
supervisor authority has to oversee and intervene in banks functioning. Also constructed for three periods 
(1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on bank regulation and 
supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, the index ranges from 4 to 15.5.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Financial Development A proxy of a lender‘s country financial development, constructed by Beck et al. (2000), using raw data 
from the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics, October 2008. This variable is given by the total 
credit to the private sector by deposit money banks, as a share of GDP. It is available for each year of 
the period. Higher values of this variable should correspond to more developed financial systems. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
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Variable Description Source 
Stock Market Development A variable reflecting the stock market capitalization of the country, given by the value of listed shares 
to GDP. It was constructed by Beck et al. (2000), using data from the Standard and Poor’s Emerging 
Market Database (and Emerging Stock Markets Factbook), World Development Indicators, and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, October 2008. Higher values of this variable represent larger 
stock markets. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
Rule of Law It is a country governance indicator constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) measuring perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. The authors rely on multiple sources to construct a weighted aggregate indicator. 
 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008). 
Bank Concentration Total assets of country‘s three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks, constructed 
by Beck et al. (2000) using data from the Fitch’s Bankscope database. It reflects the level of 
concentration in the banking industry. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
Log (Number of Banks) It is the logarithm of the number of commercial banks in the country, made available by Barth et al. 
(2001, 2006, 2008), based on the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World 
Bank. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Log (GDP) The logarithm of the annual country‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), where GDP is given in billions 
of US Dollars. This variable is supposed to measure the size of a country‘s economy. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
Log (GDP per capita) The logarithm of the annual country‘s GDP per capita. This variable is relied as a measure of a 
country‘s economic development. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
GDP growth The percent growth in a country‘s GDP from the previous year to the current year. This variable 
reflects a country‘s business cycle. 
 
 
 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
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Variable Description Source 
Borrower country specific   
Sovereign Credit Risk It is an index ranging from 1 to 24, representing the borrower‘s country Fitch Sovereign Rating on 
foreign currency, long term debt. Higher values of the index represent higher risk. It is available for 
each year. 
 
Fitch Ratings. 
Creditor Rights It is the index of La Porta et al. (1998), which measures a country‘s level of legal protection of lenders, 
against expropriation by borrowers. It is assumed constant along the period from 1997 to 2006. If it is 
not available for a country, zero is assigned to this variable, and a separate indicator for creditor rights 
index missing is included. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Lender specific   
Log (Assets) The logarithm of the total assets of the bank. It is a measure of the size of the bank. Available for each 
year. 
 
Bankscope. 
Leverage It is the ratio of total book value of liabilities to total book value of assets. It is available for each year. 
 
Bankscope. 
Loan Loss Reserves / Gross 
Loans 
It is the average annual ratio of a bank‘s loan loss reserves to gross loans.  Bankscope. 
Borrower specific   
Debt Rating This variable consists of an index ranging from 1 to 6, representing the Moody‘s senior debt rating at 
the close of the loan. When Moody‘s ratings are missing, S&P ratings are used. The index equal to 1 
represents a rating of ―Aaa‖, 2 indicates ―Aa‖, and 6 indicates ―B‖ or worse. If there is no rating 
information for the borrower, zero is assigned to this variable. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Same country A dummy variable that indicates if the loan was made to a borrower in the same country as the lender. 
 
LPC DealScan 
Industry sector Ten indicators, corresponding to the first digit of the SIC code that describes the broad sector of 
activity of the borrower.  
 
 
 
LPC DealScan. 
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Variable Description Source 
Loan specific   
Log (Loan Amount) It is the logarithm of the loan deal amount, expressed in US Dollars. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Log (Lender Amount /  
Total Assets) 
It is the logarithm of the ratio between the share amount of the underlying arranger lender and its total 
assets. The numerator was computed by multiplying the loan deal amount by the percentage loan share 
of the lender, whenever this information is available in the DealScan database. Otherwise, it was 
computed as the average loan amount per lender, i.e., the loan deal amount divided by the number of 
lenders that participate in the loan. 
 
LPC DealScan and 
Bankscope. 
Spread This variable corresponds to the ―All-in Spread Drawn‖ information available for each deal in the 
DealScan database. It corresponds to the base points in excess of the interbank market rate that is 
asked by lenders to borrowers in a deal. It also incorporates any charged fees associated to the loan. 
  
LPC DealScan. 
Log (Maturity) It is the logarithm of the maturity, expressed in number of months, of a loan.  
 
LPC DealScan. 
Secured A dummy for whether the loan has a collateral. If it is originally missing, zero is assigned to this 
variable. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan Purpose dummies These are 7 indicators of the most common specific purposes of the loan, which accounts for 82% of 
the loans in the sample. These purposes are: Acquisition line, Corporate Purposes, Debt Repayment, 
LBO/MBO, Project Finance, Takeover, and Working Capital. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan Type dummies Five variables, accounting for 77% of the loans in the sample, indicating the most common types of 
deals: 364-day facility, Fixed-Rate, Term Loan, Revolver line >= 1 year, and Other Loan. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
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